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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a model of institutional values transmission through cross-case analysis 
of values education undertaken in three UK secondary schools. Since the early 1980s a 
significant amount of research has been carried out on cultural transmission and the 
transmission of values, though it has focused on intergenerational transmission within 
families and the interaction between the school and the family in terms of converging and 
diverging values and worldviews. Very little work has been done on the process of 
transmission of values in schools or other organisations that is evidence-based. An increasing 
number of governments and organisations, as well as schools, are beginning to invest 
seriously in values education programmes, but whether the idea of values education is 
theoretically coherent is still disputed. 
Through an evaluation of the philosophical, psychological and sociological literature on 
values and employing phenomenological and semiotic analyses, a theory of values as 
transmissible entities is developed, which is then extended to a general concept of values 
transmission using the twin terms invocation and evocation, to denote modes of bringing 
value concepts to the awareness of an audience and of generating group cohesion through a 
shared experience linked to particular values, respectively, these terms themselves emerging 
from the theory of values. Through data collection, analysis and modelling of values 
education in three schools – a state comprehensive, a faith school and an independent – a 
plausible mechanism for institutional values transmission is developed. This mechanism 
integrates two partial models: a permeation-authority inculcation model of transmission flow 
with a resistance-transformation model of moral autonomy. At its heart it envisages a 
systemically robust cycle of institutional values discourse, institutional cultural expectations 
and the generation of a sense of community shored up by individual commitment. 
A two tier qualitative approach is used in this research, having both an inductive, theory 
generating phase of field research, data capture and analysis, and a deductive, hypothesis-led 
confirmatory phase. The inductive phase uses a case study format and cross-case analysis, 
providing data for analysis and for testing a set of hypotheses in the deductive phase. The 
development of a mechanism for institutional values transmission is carried out using an 
institutional model of the schools as a data collection and analytical instrument, based on 
three structural aspects: an authority hierarchy; an interiority/exteriority duality in the 
ix 
 
institutional lived-experience; and a system hierarchy. Multiple data collection and analytic 
methods are employed in each case study, in order to build up a ‘three-dimensional’ picture 
of the transmission of values in each school. Both comparative and iterative cross-case 
analyses are carried out. 
The findings emerging from the case studies suggest the following tentative conclusions: 
schools have varying degrees of awareness of the values that they impart, although all 
consider values education to be an important part of what they do and to impact on student 
performance and behaviour; while there is some explicit values-oriented pedagogy, most 
teaching of values is implicit;  schools with greater ethnic diversity have more challenges to 
build a cohesive community, as this is at odds with the ‘spontaneous sociality’ of the pupils; 
there is a broad convergence on the same values found most widely distributed throughout 
schools across the widest range possible with respect to forms of governance, educational 
philosophy and demography. 
The findings carry a number of pedagogical implications: general support is found for 
explicit values education programmes and the linking between behavioural standards and 
academic achievement; the importance of the development of a ‘moral community’ around 
the ethos of the school and the creation of opportunities for multiple belonging is highlighted; 
and resistance to institutional authority structures is explored for its significant potential for 
transformation to an acceptance of institutional values. 
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
  
 
1.1   Research Context 
Values – both allegiance to values and disagreement about values – have been and continue 
to be fundamental to society, culture and thought (Moor, 2004; Andrew, 1995; Werkmeister, 
1970) yet, paradoxically, remain largely submerged in our individual and collective 
unconscious. It can, however, be reasonably asserted that conscious interest has quickened in 
recent years in response to a perceived ‘crisis of values’ within developed economies and 
modern cultures (Bindé, 2004). This quickening is felt most keenly in the political and 
educational establishments, where responsibility – both for the problem and the solution – is 
considered to lie most heavily (Giroux, 2011). A crisis in values is, in fact, not a peculiarity 
of our age; one only has to read almost any of the writings of antiquity to understand that 
laments about the waywardness of youth and the moral decline of social institutions are as 
old as recorded history. What is perhaps unique is the extent to which we have come to 
believe that schools are the key to arresting this downward spiral. For MacIntyre (1987, 
p.16), ‘Teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity’, suggesting both 
that they are the repository of a type of faith and that this faith is probably misplaced.  
In the UK the current wave of interest in values and in values education can almost be 
pinpointed to a specific moment in time, and began, as these things often do, with a dramatic 
and tragic incident, in this case the murder of a head teacher outside the gates of his school 
(Davis, 2005; Taylor, 2000). Of course, there were antecedent incidents and there have been 
subsequent, regrettably frequent, incidents at schools that have all but erased the memory of 
this earlier outrage. A few years prior to this there had been an upheaval in education, with 
the passing of the Education Reform Act (UK, 1988), itself a reaction to perceived 
weaknesses in the quality of schooling. But this was perhaps the moment when vague 
feelings of disquiet about the state of the nation’s youth and of the inadequacy of our social 
institutions to deal with these problems spilled over into a determination to do something, 
which boosted the profile of the nascent values education movement and that led to calls for 
moral or values education in schools and a flurry of activity on the policy front (SCAA, 
1996). These early government-led initiatives were never systematically implemented or 
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given statutory force (Hawkes, 2010), but stimulated the present oversight of spiritual and 
moral education provision in UK schools in Ofsted inspections (ibid), and resulted in some 
localised and networked  approaches to teaching values (VbE, 2014; Lepkowska, 
2012/08/06). 
Against this contextual background I wish to make two points of a theoretical nature. The 
first is that, for all the positive resonance of the term ‘values’, the nature of values is 
contentious, both as to whether such things actually exist and, if they do, what form they take. 
The second flows from this; it is that values education, in the absence of an understanding of 
the nature of that which is supposedly being transmitted, must lack an adequate theoretical 
foundation. Like ‘education’ itself, the transmission of values is highly contextual and 
sensitive to the nature of the package; it is far more than mere logistics. To illustrate this 
point, a common definition of values that is used within the values education establishment is 
that of Halstead (1996, p.5): 
[Values are] principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards or life stances which act as 
general guides to behaviour or as reference points in decision making or the evaluation of beliefs 
or actions. 
 
 This, or something like this, may, indeed, be what most people would have in mind if they 
were called on to give a definition of values. But from a theoretical point of view its very 
inclusiveness is a weakness, as it offers no cohesive view of values that could be used in 
understanding the process that takes place when a value is acquired within an educational 
setting. This much is clear when looking at various definitions of values education. This is 
Taylor’s (1998, p.1) view: 
[Values Education] is a relatively new umbrella term for a range of common curriculum 
experiences: spiritual, moral, social and cultural education; personal and social education; 
religious education; multicultural/antiracist education; cross-curricular themes, especially 
citizenship; environment and health; pastoral care; school ethos; extra-curricular activities; wider 
community links; collective worship/assembly; the life of the school as a learning community. 
 
A definition of values education comprised entirely of exemplification helps in understanding 
the context within schools where it is taking place, but is also not of much help in 
understanding what takes place when values are acquired or what ought to take place in order 
that this activity can be deemed successful. Hawkes (2010, pp.233-234), in a similar 
descriptive vein, but adding a more practical edge, defines values education as: 
a convenient term for a wide range of implicit and explicit activities devised to develop a values-
base to the life...which are principles that guide behaviour. It explicitly develops an ethical 
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vocabulary based on value words... It encourages reflective learning through silent reflection...It 
looks for ways that values can be expressed through positive behaviour in the school and 
community. 
 
Hawkes attempts through this definition to build a more cohesive sense of what values 
education is beyond the activities which make it up. It moves beyond being merely a 
collective noun for thematically related activities to something with a distinctive and positive 
praxis. Even here, though, it is unclear whether there is a coherent theoretical idea 
underpinning the project. 
1.2   Aims, Objectives and Approaches 
Though there has been considerable work on the philosophical aspect of values and of 
education, most of the literature on ‘values education’ deals with the practical pedagogy of 
teaching values (Lovat, 2010; Taylor, 1998; Selmes and Robb, 1993; Tomlinson and 
Quinton, 1986) and of the administrative resources required to bring it into the curriculum 
(Cooper et al., 2005; Pring, 1984). There has been far less research specifically focused on its 
theoretical coherence, although Merry (2005), Mclaughlin (1994) and Carr (2000) concern 
themselves with closely-related issues, and while metaethics deals with values-related matters 
at a philosophical level, it skirts around the actual issues here. Theorists have considered the 
broader social implication of education, such as ‘socialisation’ (Parsons, 1961), 
‘reproduction’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) and ‘resistance’ 
(Apple, 1982); but a common thread running through these perspectives – the tension 
between the inculcation of values and the acquisition of values within schooling, and the 
question of whether they can be accommodated within a single educational model, rather than 
separately championed – is one that has not been systematically explored or adequately 
addressed at the theoretical level, although Kirschenbaum (1992), for example, advocates an 
approach to values education that combines aspects of values clarification with moral 
guidance. 
This research has set out to address this issue. It does so by investigating, as the title makes 
clear, the nature of institutional values transmission, as that occurs in formal education in 
schools. To open up that idea a little, the diagram on page 4 sets out the conceptual 
relationship between the principal terms in the title in order to reveal the logic of this 
proposition: in order to understand what is happening in values education (d), it is necessary 
to explore the transmission of values (a), the modes of transmission within institutions (b) 
and the structures of formal (institutional) education (c). After defining the terms in the 
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diagram, a brief consideration of the three aspects, (a)-(c), will be given, with more in-depth 
treatment in chapter 2. These three areas, plus an exploration of the nature of values, outline 
broadly the principal areas of concern in researching and modelling institutional values 
transmission. They also roughly delineate the scope of the literature review. 
Values 
I will start with the definition given by Rokeach (1973, p.4): ‘A value is an enduring belief 
that a specific mode of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse 
mode of conduct or end state of existence’, because it has a simple elegance, although I will 
have cause to arrive at a fundamentally different concept in chapter 2, after some 
consideration is given to problematic areas within value theory. 
 
 
Fig 01 Conceptual relationship between principal terms 
Transmission 
‘Transmission’ is a term derived from information theory. I will argue that, from one 
perspective, values can be seen as just another form of information. As such, transmission is a 
more inclusive term than either ‘inculcation’, which emphasises the transmitter, or 
‘acquisition’, which emphasises the recipient, and embraces both. 
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Institutions 
According to Hodgson (2006, p.18), ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded 
social rules that structure social interactions’. This embeddedness means they are not 
autonomous, but are activated and maintained through human participation, so exist at the 
boundary between the objectively real and the subjectively imagined (ibid). Schools belong 
to a class of institutions called organisations, which are characterised by boundaries 
controlling membership, governance and a hierarchy of responsibilities (ibid). 
Education 
Since the focus is on schools and on the education of values, I will take the definition 
enshrined in the 1988 Education Reform Act, which requires schools to:  
[promote] the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils…and [prepare 
them] for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life. 
 
The first of these requirements lies at the root of most of the activism of the various 
movements for values education, is central to the underlying philosophy of the National 
Curriculum, is written into important policy documents in all schools, and forms part of the 
inspection regime of schools. 
(a) The transmission of values 
Since the 1980s considerable work has been carried out on the intergenerational transmission 
of values (Barni et al., 2011; Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988; Schönpflug, 2001a), particularly of 
cultural values within marginalised, ethnic and displaced groups, much of it based on the 
work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) on the evolutionary basis of cultural 
transmission. This has helped to improve understanding of the parameters of transmission 
within families, but has limited applicability to social institutions, although there are studies 
on the interaction – convergence or divergence – of school and family values for migrant 
groups (Hashimzade and Della Giusta, 2011). 
(b) Modes of institutional transmission 
Within the social sciences there are a number of different theories of relevance to 
transmission in social institutions. Parsons’ (1961) model of ‘socialisation’ is a view of the 
role of parents and the school in inculcating values, in which the needs of society are 
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considered paramount. Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1977) theory of ‘reproduction’ considers 
the way in which class and privilege are maintained through the school system. Bernstein 
(1975) sets out a theory of ‘educational transmission’ based on the linguistic ‘codes’ of social 
classes and control over curriculum, syllabus and assessment. These theories, among others, 
contribute to an understanding of the social context of the transmission of values and of the 
part that power and control play in the process. 
(c) Structures of formal education 
Understanding the formal structures of education such as curriculum, syllabus, assessment, 
teacher training, practice and pedagogy, administration and management, are important to 
understanding the transmission of values, particularly the areas of curriculum and pedagogy 
on which most work relevant to values has been done (Haydon, 2010; Lovat, 2010; Aspin 
and Chapman, 2000; Bigger and Brown, 1999; Tomlinson and Quinton, 1986; Pring, 1984, 
1986). This area gives insight into the actual constraints within which the communication of 
values takes place. 
The approach taken in this research is to begin with a review of some of the problematic 
areas in values theory and to propose a concept of values in which transmissibility is inherent. 
Then working with data from three schools on the everyday contexts in which values are 
communicated, attempt to arrive at a theoretical model of value transmission within formal 
education that might have wider applicability. 
In this research phenomenological and semiotic approaches will be employed, both at the 
level of theoretical development and in the analysis of data. My reading of these approaches 
leads me to believe they are not only highly complementary, but they have structural 
similarities at the deepest level. The difference, I would argue, is one of perspective: 
phenomenology looks from the perspective of the interiority of cognition and semiotics from 
the exteriority of cognition, a distinction that will be vital in the analysis of the meaning of 
values. The compatibility of these approaches has been noted, and the term 
‘phenomenological semiotics’ utilised amongst others, by Kozin (2008), Hansen (2007) and 
Lanigan (1982). This idea is explored in more detail in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.6. 
1.3   Research Questions 
The research process is focused on answering the research question:  
How are values transmitted in an institutional setting? 
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To which there are four subsidiary questions: 
1) What is the nature of values? 
 
2) What might the implications be of a theory of values for understanding issues 
around the acquisition and inculcation of values? 
 
3) How do schools approach values education? 
 
4) What could constitute the theoretical basis of values education in formal 
education, taking into account the broader context of the social and political 
demands on schools? 
The principal question could be interpreted as asking rather mundanely what it is that schools 
do to instil their values into the young. The subsidiary questions, though, should make it clear 
that what is being set out is a strategy for a much more forensic examination of what takes 
place in schools, with a view to grasping the fundamental mechanism of this phenomenon. 
Subsidiary question 3, for example, embeds three further questions: what do they think of 
values education (as a strand of education); what do they think about values within the 
educational context; and how do they undertake it? These were included in questionnaires 
used in interviews. These subsidiary questions are tackled roughly in the order in which they 
are given over the course of the research. A brief overview of each chapter follows. 
1.4   Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2, Theoretical Perspectives, undertakes an overview of the relevant literature of the 
field while developing the philosophical basis of the research. The chapter considers 
problematic areas in the philosophy of values and the rationale for a new approach to values 
as transmissible entities. It then looks at research in intergenerational transmission, various 
modes and aspects of transmission and evaluates three models of institutional transmission, 
that of Parsons, Bourdieu and Bernstein. The final part engages with the various debates over 
values education that have ranged over different aspects of schooling, such as the curriculum 
and student wellbeing, and concludes by looking at three perennial issues within values 
education: its implementation, its purpose and the divergent understandings of its nature. 
Chapter 3, Methodology, considers first the basic challenges of designing research around the 
research question. After discussing issues related to the view of social reality a justification 
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for qualitative research is set out, involving a case study approach and mixed methods. I also 
argue for a hypothesis-led confirmatory approach within this research paradigm.  
Chapter 4, Cross-Case Analysis, compares data from across three cases following the topical 
headings ‘Character and Ethos of the School’, ‘Institutional Values’ and ‘Values Education’. 
Each section concludes with a consideration of ‘institutional ontology’ in which common 
themes from the analysis are defined that furnish concepts for modelling values transmission.  
Chapter 5 is the Presentation of Findings, in which a model of institutional values 
transmission that has been developed during the course of the research is examined and its 
constituent categories and concepts defined and audited in relation to samples of the raw data 
they were drawn from. The chapter concludes with two examples of conceptual clustering, 
using the concepts of the model in an analysis and interpretation of a text, demonstrating 
clustering around values. 
Chapter 6 is the Discussion of Findings. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the 
first several partial models, developed from the concepts emerging through the cross-case 
analysis are considered and compared with various theories of transmission covered in the 
literature. Then the model presented in chapter 5 is discussed in detail, analysing the 
dynamics and interrelationship of the parts, again in relation to the relevant literature. 
Chapter 7, Evaluation and Conclusion, does two things. In the first part there is an evaluation 
of the research as a whole, including a brief summary of issues relating to validity and 
reliability in the core research methodology and a lengthier review of several theoretically 
derived hypotheses in light of data from the field. It concludes with a reflection upon some 
broad themes arising out of its findings, locating the research within the academic tradition, 
considering the broader application of the findings and their original contribution to 
knowledge, and any implications or recommendations that arise as a result of these findings. 
It also considers the limitations of the research and suggests avenues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2   THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
2.1   The Scope of this Chapter 
This chapter will lay out the basic theoretical framework for this research: the justification for 
its research question and approach to research, the underlying philosophical presuppositions 
and view of value, and the implications for the course of research to be carried out, and will 
review the literature of the field. The strategic aim in this chapter is to undertake a re-
examination of the foundations of value as a precursor to the development of a theory of 
transmission. This research is carried out broadly within the philosophy and sociology of 
education, but the very specific focus of the research question – the institutional transmission 
of values – and the lack of a specific body of literature in regard to that topic, has meant that 
it has been necessary to range over the literature of a number of fields in order to assemble a 
corpus that covers this subject from all the possible perspectives outlined in the introduction. 
It has meant looking at some of the debates around various aspects of values education that 
have been pursued through the relevant journals, but it has also meant looking at fields as 
diverse as evolutionary psychology, social theory, economics, philosophy of value and moral 
philosophy, linguistics and anthropology; not extensively or deeply enough to do them real 
justice, but focusing on where they touched on issues of values or issues relevant to value 
transmission. So vast is the potential field and so rare are the truly illuminating texts that it is 
difficult to say that everything of importance has been noted, but I believe that a good deal of 
the important ground has been covered. There are literatures that it has not been possible 
within the scope of this research to explore beyond a rudimentary acknowledgement of their 
existence and their contribution to aspects of institutional value transmission, such as those 
concerning criminal justice, health administration, organisational theory, international 
relations and diplomacy and corporate business strategy. 
This chapter has been divided into three parts. The first deals with various perspectives on 
values: philosophical, psychological, sociological, phenomenological and semiotic. The 
second looks at the interpersonal transmission of values and the broader aspects of social 
transmission theories. The third reviews some of the debates within the academic literature on 
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values education covering the structures of formal education. Finally, it considers briefly the 
implications of the issues raised in the literature for the research. 
2.2   Perspectives on the Nature of Values 
As I stated in the introduction, values cannot be considered a simple commodity for which 
the problem of transmission is simply one of logistics. For Schoenpflug (2001b, p.132) the 
nature of that which is transmitted culturally is particularly sensitive to the channel of 
transmission, which suggests that questions of ‘how?’ and ‘by whom?’ are going to feature. 
This in turn entails that the transmissibility of values is something that needs to be better 
understood. For Severn (2003) the transmission of values within a particular context requires 
a coherent ‘framework’, which includes aspects of ‘language, tradition and community’ (ibid, 
p.4), a position I agree with, but the relationship between values and these features of the 
educational context needs to be more fully explored. Fundamentally, the transmission of 
values cannot be adequately understood without inquiring into the nature of values 
themselves. 
Values have been important conceptually within the social sciences, psychology and 
philosophy, although different disciplines tend to favour definitions according to their central 
interest. For example, while philosophy attempts to grasp the essential nature of values 
beyond the multiplicity of forms, sociology focuses on their function in human society and 
human interaction, and psychology their utility in integrating the personality and guiding 
meaningful and purposive action for the individual. What these disciplines all share in 
common, though, is a sense of the transcendental unity of the phenomenon of value beyond 
the particularity and multiplicity of its forms. In philosophy issues around values have been 
associated with the interpretation of human nature, in particular what was understood as the 
inner life, whether from a sacred or secular viewpoint. The reason for this is not difficult to 
grasp: values do not exist in the state of nature as physical phenomena, but are connected 
with the intricate nature of human interiority, intellectual reflectivity, and emotional 
immanence. At the same time values have a clear functionality at every level of human 
interaction, from the individual to all human groupings and institutions.  
In the first part of this chapter (sections 2.3 and 2.4) the intention is to explore the nature of 
values, through looking at some of the problematic areas within the theory of value and 
suggesting a view of values that might address some of those issues, working towards a 
definition of values in which the transmissibility of values is integral.  
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2.3   Problematic areas within the philosophy of value 
These can be reduced to a core of six, closely interlinked antinomies: existence/non-
existence; subjectivity/objectivity; singularity/plurality; absoluteness/relativity; 
interiority/exteriority; and values/disvalues. Though they will be dealt with under different 
sections, there is a significant degree of overlap. 
2.3.1   Existence/non-existence 
The most fundamental problem in approaching the issue of the institutional transmission of 
values is the nature of values themselves, not only what they are, but whether, in fact, they 
have any meaningful existence. For empiricist scientists (whether hard, social or behavioural) 
and philosophers some major hurdles to their acceptance are their imperceptibility, their 
resistance to meaningful measurement, and the inability to predict behaviour from them 
(Hechter, 1993). While few, if any, state outright that there are no such things as values, they 
are ontologically downgraded by being cast as secondary, derivative phenomena, often not 
worthy of the attention of serious minds or serious research. Karl Popper (2005, pp.225-6) for 
example states: 
[F]ew scientists, and few philosophers with scientific training, care to write about values. The 
reason is simply that so much of the talk about values is just hot air. So many of us fear that we 
too would only produce hot air or, if not that, something not easily distinguished from it.... I shall 
therefore say nothing more than that values emerge together with problems; that values could not 
exist without problems; and that neither values nor problems can be derived or otherwise obtained 
from facts, though they often pertain to facts or are connected with facts.  
 
Popper repeats the dictum, common since first asserted by Hume, that values cannot be 
derived from facts (usually stated in the form ‘an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’’). 
This is an idea that has been challenged by, for example Rand (1964), MacIntyre (1981) and 
Searle (1995), though their reformulations of the problem have been shown to miss the point; 
they (mis)understood Hume to have declared that facts and values have nothing to do with 
each other. Popper, after Hume, is thinking of strict logical entailment, but he does state that 
values ‘often pertain to facts or are connected with facts’; in real life factual and value 
judgements are indiscriminately mixed.  
For philosophers of a metaphysical bent, the issue of imperceptibility has been less 
problematic. Taking their cue from the Platonic tradition of positing a transcendent world of 
forms, philosophers such as Munsterberg (1909) and the Baden school of neo-Kantians, that 
included Rickert (1921), Windelband (1901) and Troeltsch (1931), were able to argue for the 
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existence of a realm of absolute values. For example, Rickert addressed the problematic 
dichotomy of subject and object, bequeathed by Cartesian dualism, by placing them both in 
the category of the ‘the real’ and then positing the category of ‘the non-real’ which ‘when 
interpreted positively’ was understood to include value, meaning and significance (Rickert, 
1921, pp.102-3). Value is immanent in every cognition, but is ultimately as independent of 
mental processes as it is of the objects of cognition. Values cannot even be said to exist; 
instead, they have validity (Rickert, 1928, p.195), which is the only and absolute measure of 
all values. 
I consider both the positivist and metaphysical views to be flawed. From a phenomenological 
perspective anything which consciousness intends, that is, anything of which we are aware, 
such as beliefs and values, has a mode of existence, to the extent that it can have a profound 
effect on an individual’s life. That does not, of course, address the positivist/empiricist point 
Hechter (1993) makes concerning the intangibility of values, a point that I take seriously and 
will answer as this argument develops. Rickert, though, seems to be sidestepping the 
problematic issue of existence by making the same case for values that is frequently made for 
mathematics by mathematicians with platonic tendencies. However, in asserting that values 
do not exist but ‘have’ validity is surely a categorical mistake, as for anything to possess a 
quality in any meaningful sense it must be thought to be real. Moreover, it ignores the issue 
of transmissibility: just as mathematics, whatever its ontological status, is communicated 
through a semiotics, values are likewise communicated in daily life and the classroom though 
a range of actions, images and words. 
2.3.2   Subjectivity/objectivity 
Since Descartes re-oriented philosophy away from ontological to epistemological concerns, 
there has been, according to Kolakowski (1988), a dilemma at the heart of western thought: 
the incommensurability of subjectivity with objectivity. Though there have been attempts 
within philosophy to bridge that divide, schools of thought have tended to gravitate to one 
side or the other. That is no less true in the philosophy of value, where thinkers have tended 
to emphasise either the subjective or objective aspect. 
As a field in its own right, the focus on issues of value, separate from ethics, aesthetics, 
theology, economy and sociology, only appeared towards the end of the nineteenth century in 
Germany, in the writings of Lotze, von Ehrenfels, Meinong and Brentano. These thinkers 
gave birth to the ‘Psychological School’ of value theory, so-called due to their attribution of 
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aspects of subjectivity to be the foundation of the experience of value: ‘right-loving’ and 
‘right-hating’ in the case of Lotze; ‘right-desiring’ for von Ehrenfels and ‘right-feeling’ 
according to Meinong (Werkmeister, 1970). By the early part of the twentieth century 
different schools of value theory were emerging.  Urban (1917) in the United States, and 
Scheler (1973) and Hartmann (1932) in Germany were developing theories that followed the 
platonic concept of values as objective features of a non-temporal realm. The neo-Kantian 
school, including Munsterberg, believed values to be objective universally valid judgements.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, in an attempt to introduce some order into the profusion of 
approaches, and in the belief that a ‘scientific’ basis for value theory could be found, two 
American philosophers – Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey – attempted to develop a 
General Theory of Value. Perry, in particular, sought to correlate the subjective aspects of 
human psychology with objective reality with his notion of ‘interest’:  
It is characteristic of living mind to be for some things and against others….It is to this 
all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state, act, attitude or 
disposition of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name of ‘interest’….That 
which is an object of interest is eo ipse invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, 
acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it. (Perry, 1926, pp.115-116) 
 
For Perry the key concept was ‘value’, a property inhering in things themselves (sometimes 
referred to as a tertiary property), rather than ‘values’, which many philosophers and 
scientists of a positivistic bent continue to doubt really exist. This was a view shared by 
Dewey, whom Perry cites in support: ‘[T]he relation of judgement or reflection to things 
having value is as direct and integral as that of liking’ (Dewey, 1923, pp.617-8, cited in 
Perry, p.123). However Dewey’s basic category was ‘valuation’ rather than value as such. 
Rand (1967), in a similar vein, put forward a theory known as value objectivism, which stated 
that values arise from the interaction between our subjective desires and objective conditions; 
values are objective in the sense that they are rooted in the properties of the object valued, to 
be discovered and appreciated by the individual, and not in any belief held about the object. 
Rand’s view is more oriented to an economic view of value, though it is rooted in 
philosophical arguments. Perry, Dewey and Rand have developed theories in which a 
psychological response or relationship to an object allows an objective quality of ‘value’ to 
be discovered or created. Though this relates a universal experience of the valuable, whether 
economic or personal, such an experience is not something transmissible, and corresponds 
only to what I have termed the appreciative aspect of value (see 2.4.3). 
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There are, however, interpretations of the objectivity of value that go further than positing a 
quality that is uncovered in relation to consciousness. The notion of intrinsic value is shared 
among several ideological stances, notably those with Catholic leanings (derived from 
Thomistic theology) and the more radical environmentalists who advocate a pristine nature 
purged of human despoliation. Some philosophers, though not necessarily sharing the above-
mentioned convictions, have argued for value as a tertiary property of objects not requiring 
the presence of consciousness. Rescher (2005, p.25), for example asks: 
Does value demand an actual valuer? Does having value require being valued? By no 
means! Value requires an actual valuer no more than length requires an actual measurer... 
[Something] has value not because it is valued, but because it deserves to be valued – 
because rational beings who contemplate it...do so with appropriation and prioritive 
response. Such appreciators do not create that value but rather appreciate it. Subjectivity 
does not come into it. 
 
I would point out the implicit contradiction in the concept of intrinsic value: in positing that 
the value of human being or the natural environment is objectively and indisputably inhering 
in the object, a value judgement has already been posited. There is no evidence that such a 
tertiary property of things exists. Belief in the existence of intrinsic value is just that, a belief; 
moreover, it is a belief that can under some circumstances justify intolerance, even the 
seemingly benign belief in the intrinsic value of human beings. I prefer a subjectivist account 
of values, as I largely share the view of the psychological school that values are characterised 
by their interiority; I differ, though, on the nature of that interiority and also would argue that 
values that are constituted solely by their interiority are incapable of transmission. 
2.3.3   Singularity/plurality 
One of the greatest sources of confusion in value theory has been the actual object of 
investigation, whether it is the singularity ‘value’ or the plurality ‘values’. This has far-
reaching consequences, for as discussed above it entails whether the phenomenon of 
value/valuing is one that inheres in the properties of objects or in the properties of minds. The 
reason for this confusion lies ultimately in the fact that there are two sources for value theory, 
economics and ethics. A theory of economic value is found in Aristotle’s Politics which 
influenced the views of Aquinas’ just price (Zuniga, 1997) and Marx’s labour theory of value 
(Johnson, 1939). On the other hand, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics laid out the idea of the 
virtues, which also influenced and combined with ideas of Christian piety in Aquinas. While 
the genealogy of these influences is not entirely clear on the subsequent development of value 
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theory, its pioneers in the nineteenth century sought an underlying unity to the phenomenon 
of valuation which, until then, only economic theory had attained to any significant degree. 
Brentano, for example, first proposed the idea of the intentionality of consciousness, that 
consciousness is always a consciousness of something, whether that be the perception of a 
physical object or of a mental image. He argued that just as awareness of the act of perception 
is itself part of the experience of perception, so an awareness of one’s emotional response to 
something was also part of the emotional experience. Like Hume, whom he had read 
extensively (Werkmeister, 1970), Brentano believed the basis of valuation was the emotional 
responses of approval and disapproval. However, he went further than Hume in asserting that 
there was a correlate of this act of appreciation, which was whether the approval or 
disapproval was justified. He spoke of ‘right loving’ and ‘right hating’ as the basis of value. 
Ultimately, this rested on a view of humans as having a rational and spiritual nature and an 
animal nature, and of the desires emanating from those natures. Following Brentano, 
Meinong also took a psychological stance on the question of value. However, he diverged 
from Brentano in believing that all valuation is based on feeling, without regard to 
justification. Forestalling the obvious objection that such a ‘value-feeling’ would be entirely 
solipsistic, Meinong anchors this feeling in the experience of others’ pleasures and pains and 
in reflection upon that experience. For both Brentano and Meinong desire was recognised as 
a factor in valuation but its significance was played down (Werkmeister, 1970). For von 
Ehrenfels, however, desire became foundational; the ascription of ‘value (or disvalue) to a 
real or to a merely imagined object’ is made ‘insofar as the appropriate concrete and vivid 
presentation of its realization causes an enhancement (or diminution) of happiness as 
compared with the presentation of its non-realization’ (von Ehrenfels, 1893, p.116), in which 
desire is equated with a form of ‘presentation’ in which relative degrees of happiness are 
experienced (Werkmeister, 1970, pp.87-88). Brentano, Meinong and von Ehrenfels all in 
their own way recognised the inherent danger of a concept of value based entirely upon an 
individual’s experience of value, and attempted to introduce a more objective correlate to this 
experience. This is an important insight which has guided the development of a transmissible 
concept of value in this research. 
Heyde made a fundamental distinction in value theory between ‘value’ as a property 
universal to all experiences of valuation and ‘values’ as a term for all those things that are 
valued. He referred to these as value1 and value2 respectively, and asserted that the former is 
foundational. Heyde did not claim that value in this sense is a property of things, but a 
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property of a relationship, that between things and consciousness (Werkmeister, 1970, p.140). 
However, he rejects the views of the psychological school that mental acts are the foundation 
of value and that we merely ‘ascribe’ value to objects; to value something, to have a value-
feeling in connection with a particular object is to discover the value that it already has. 
Valuation, then, is a form of knowledge which rightfully forms part of epistemology, not 
psychology (ibid, pp.145-146). 
I have carried out an extended analysis of the semantic and syntactic distinctions within the 
language of value, i.e. those words that constitute a ‘family’ around the base term ‘value’, 
which begins with and expands upon the distinction made by Heyde, which I summarise here. 
I would argue that there are four basic categories rather than two: two nouns forms, ‘value’ 
(uncountable) and ‘value’ (countable); and two verbal forms, ‘value’ (appreciate) and ‘value’ 
(evaluate) and their various syntactic variations. These form two subjective-objective 
pairings, which I term the appreciative system and the evaluative system. The appreciative 
system is similar to the perspective offered by forms of value objectivism in that we value 
what is valuable. By contrast, with the evaluative system we evaluate based on given values. 
Beyond this reductio, the argument can only proceed by exploring whether the two systems 
are capable of being harmonised within a single concept of value, which I maintain is 
possible and results in a concept of value that can be the basis for a theory of value 
transmission. 
2.3.4   Absoluteness/relativity 
In value theory theories of absolute values are attributed to Munsterberg and Rickert. 
Rickert’s views have already been considered above. Munsterberg (1909) proceeded to 
absolute values through a three stage process. To begin with, he affirmed that the values that 
philosophy is concerned with are absolute values and not values based on desires, which are 
relative values. This even extends to values grounded in the common good, for they are part 
of the hierarchy of relative values and not transcendent of desires. Next, Munsterberg 
asserted that in contemplating the sense of  ‘obligation’  in every sphere of life, absolute 
values appropriate to that form of life, such as truth, beauty and goodness, are encountered 
(1909, p.39). Finally, he declared, in order to bring coherence to the multiplicity of such 
values, there is one act that must be undertaken, which is ‘the self-assertion of the world’ 
(ibid, p.87). It is easy to denigrate this type of thinking as purely metaphysical, having no 
relationship to the real world. It is less easy to dismiss, however, the human hankering for 
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certainty which underlies the idea of absolute values. There is an unceasing tension between 
the knowledge of the contingency of our ideas and beliefs and the conviction with which we 
hold them that conspires to drive forward human social evolution while being, at the same 
time, elusive to satisfactory explanation. 
By something of a paradox, then, Rickert’s view of values as non-real absolutes found their 
way into the social sciences through the writings of one of the founders of sociology, Max 
Weber. Paradoxical, that is, because the social sciences are characterised by value objectivity 
or value neutrality, which is interpreted as meaning that they advocate value relativism. As 
values are considered as structural or functional aspects of the social system, there is a 
tendency to view values as interchangeable. Weber was particularly influenced by the neo-
Kantian element of Rickert’s theories that advocated ‘value-freedom’ (Brun, 2007, p.8), 
which was utilised as a basis for his methodological commitment to objectivity in the social 
sciences (Brun, 2007), in an attempt to bolster the prestige of the social sciences to a level 
comparable to that of the physical sciences. Weber, though, was probably not a relativist, 
ontologically speaking, as maintained by Strauss (1953, cited in Brun, 2007, p.18) and 
MacIntyre (1981); the commitment to scientific objectivity methodologically is compatible 
with a personal commitment to absolute values as ‘goals’ within Weber’s view of sociology 
as the study of ‘social action’ (Brun, 2007, p.15).  
Ciaffa (1998, pp.13-14) argues that the dispute over value-freedom is actually two logically 
distinct arguments: a ‘methodological’ argument that the social sciences should be 
objectively scientific and free of normative concerns, and a ‘practical’ argument that the 
social sciences not be used to bolster particular political or moral claims. Critical social 
theorists such as Habermas (1973) take issue with the concept of a value-free social science; 
they contend that social realities are essentially interpreted and value-laden unlike physical 
realities and that Weber is imposing a technical framework on society under the influence of 
a positivist ideology. This is slightly disingenuous; it does not follow, after all, from the 
observation that institutions are value-laden that, therefore, social theory must be. 
The fact that there is a multiplicity of values would indicate that, at a methodological level at 
least, some form of relativism is reasonable. I advocate the position that for human existential 
values, with which the social sciences are concerned, there can be no a priori ranking or 
hierarchy, by which I mean that the essential nature and transmissibility of all values is 
identical. That is not the same as saying that all values are equally valid in a particular 
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professional context or for moral and social codes, which I do not believe; but these are, by 
contrast, a posteriori considerations. Despite their philosophical pedigree and exalted 
rhetoric, there is something curiously empty about absolute values. If absoluteness is to be 
sought, I will argue, it is in the interiority of values, in the immanence of the value 
experience. 
2.3.5   Interiority/exteriority 
The antinomy of interiority and exteriority is related to those of subjectivity/objectivity and 
absoluteness/relativity but is not the same. As far as I am aware, it is not even an issue within 
philosophy, but arises out of the problematic relationship of the social sciences with values, 
in which values have been fundamental but not easily understood (Hechter, 1993), and are 
treated as a theoretical black box: something which works well in an equation, a description 
of social structure or process, but whose properties are not well understood or even 
particularly important. In an early work, Parsons (1991), for example, for whom values are 
fundamental to the process of socialisation, links them explicitly with the unknowable, non-
empirical elements of reality, and in one of his major works, The Social System, offers the 
following definition: ‘An element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or 
standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a 
situation can be considered a value’ (Parsons, 1951, p.12). This is what I refer to as the 
exteriority of values: values as ‘an element of a…system’.  
Even psychological approaches to values frequently see them as performing a function. 
Mandler (1993), for example, proposes that values shape the emotions cognitively. However, 
this does not address the interior nature of values as such. Kluckhohn (1951, p.399) even 
links the psychological and the social: values are concepts, he argues, that achieve the 
regulation of: 
impulse satisfaction in accord with the whole array of hierarchical, enduring goals of the 
personality, the requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the 
need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living.  
However, this hardly begins to address the issue of what values look like from the inside. It is 
only in phenomenological approaches that what I refer to as the interiority of values begins to 
be addressed. Marx’s (1992, p.37) conception of the basis of a phenomenological ethics is of 
particular interest, when he states that it is ‘concerned with the possibility of a transformation 
of ethical comportment on the basis of an experience that arises out of an emotion and thus 
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plays a role in the formation of virtues, without, however, excluding reason in doing so’. The 
conceptualisation of experience in which the emotions are central will be fundamental to an 
understanding of what values are and how they are transmitted. Eliade (1957) in his 
phenomenological anthropology transcends even the psychological in locating the root of 
value in the experience of the numinous, the sacred. He maintains that even in the modern 
secular society we witness the retention of the sacred as a range of values in the sphere of 
private experience, the ‘holy places’ of a ‘private universe’ (ibid, p.24): ‘Even the most 
desacralized existence still preserves traces of a religious valorization of the world’ (ibid, 
p.23). For Eliade, this most atavistic of human experiences, for which he coins the term 
hierophany (the revelation of the sacred) is a universal phenomenon which underlies not only 
the foundation of all religions but the ontology of social living within an otherwise 
meaningless universe:  
When the sacred manifests itself...there is not only a break in the homogeneity of space; 
there is also revelation of an absolute reality, opposed to the non-reality of the vast 
surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the world. In 
the homogeneous and infinite expanse, in which no point of reference is possible and 
hence no orientation can be established, the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a 
center...The discovery or projection of a fixed point – the center – is equivalent to the 
creation of the world (ibid, p.21). 
 
I believe that while the language of values is the language of a secular frame of reference, and 
many values, particularly those in the technical sphere, are unremittingly desacralized, as 
Eliade has argued, when the interiority of values is interrogated there is an element of the 
sacred in the way they command our emotional as well as rational commitment and orient our 
lives in particular directions, leading us to accept particular worldviews and reject others. 
2.3.6   Values/disvalues 
One problem in dealing with values is what I term ‘the surfeit of positive connotations’. By 
this I mean that it is near impossible to engage in a meta-discourse on values which is not 
itself value-laden. Rokeach (1973, p.3) specifically addresses this issue when he states that a 
‘fruitful’ concept of values must be distinct from similar concepts, avoid circularity (self-
definition), and take a value-free approach. I am uncertain whether Rokeach breaches his 
own criteria when he includes among the parameters of his definition, ‘something that is 
personally or socially preferable’ (ibid, p.5). The problem within the social sciences, related 
to that of relativity, discussed previously, is that values represent an assumed, unmediated 
and unmitigated good: good by definition. This causes some disquiet among moral 
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philosophers. MacIntyre (1981, p.26) claims ‘on values reason is silent; conflict between 
values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose’. I agree that if ‘rationally 
settled’ means that one value is proven and one disproven then conflict between values 
cannot be rationally settled; but it is quite incorrect that one must ‘just choose’. Both 
individually and as societies we accommodate and mitigate the outcome of conflicting values 
within an individual or social narrative. This is a practical application of reason. The 
psychological school, Lotze, von Ehrenfels and Meinong all posited a symmetry between 
values and disvalues, between ‘right loving’ and ‘right hating’ in the case of Lotze, applying 
a rational justification to the emotive response. I do not think that values and disvalues are 
exactly equivalent; values are more fundamental in terms of social organisation, but disvalues 
have a role in provoking a value response so can act as a reinforcement.  
2.3.7   Provisional Conclusions  
In the desire to establish a concept of value that can underlie a process of transmission, the 
inherently communicative nature of values is a fundamental premise. This rules out the 
concept of absolute values as given in the theories of Rickert and Munsterberg; their theories 
rely on the existence of a transcendental ego and a supreme willing of a lived-world. Their 
values may be absolute, but they are curiously empty. That is not to deny that there is 
something absolute about values, but their absoluteness lies in a particular quality of their 
‘givenness’ in experience, not in their existence in an eternal world of forms. The concept of 
transmission entails communicative activity and the plurality of values, and therefore 
precludes the idea of intrinsic value; yet the relationship of values to the quality of 'value' 
needs to be explored. As several philosophers and psychologists have noted, values are 
profoundly connected to our feelings. Therefore, the concept of values is likely to be largely 
independent of, or at least supervenient on, the material world. Furthermore, a psychological 
trait as general and colourless as Perry’s ‘interest’ is unlikely to have much relevance. As 
Meinong asserted, though, this value feeling should be rooted in empathy for other’s feelings 
in social solidarity. If values are real, however, then the positivists charge must be addressed: 
values must leave some trace of their being. 
2.4   A Phenomenological-Semiotic Theory of Values 
2.4.1   The Phenomenology of Values  
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Phenomenology, as mentioned above, has its roots in the psychologist Brentano’s concept of 
the intentionality of consciousness, the idea that consciousness must be a consciousness of 
something, rather than an empty abstraction. The main development of phenomenology, 
however, came through the work of Edmund Husserl. From the perspective of an 
understanding of values, the importance of phenomenology is in radicalising the notion of the 
object of consciousness. According to Husserl (1990, p.43 [italics original]), the phenomenon 
of cognition ‘is not merely concerned with the genuinely immanent, but also with what is 
immanent in the intentional sense’. By this Husserl indicates that valid perception is not only 
the perception of physical objects, but of anything that we are conscious of. ‘Cognitive 
mental processes (and this belongs to their essence) have an intentio, they refer to something, 
they are related in this or that way to an object. This activity of relating to an object belongs 
to them even if the object itself does not’ (ibid). For Husserl, then, the nature of intentional 
consciousness is to encounter objectivity in perception even if there is no literal object there. 
This point is emphasised thus: ‘What is objective can appear, can have a certain kind of 
givenness in appearance, even though it is at the same time neither genuinely within the 
cognitive phenomenon, nor does it exist in any other way as a cogitatio’ (ibid). Values are 
clearly not objects in a physical sense, yet they are considered meaningful within several 
disciplines, previously referred to. Phenomenology, and particularly the idea of the 
intentionality of consciousness, provides a language and a conceptual framework within 
which their reality can be asserted and they can be meaningfully discussed. 
Husserl’s view of values, although he developed no systematic axiology, has certainly 
influenced the conception of values that I will propose, to a degree, particularly the idea of 
double intentionality. He considered the term ‘values’ to be equivalent to ‘valued thing’, the 
valuing of which implied ‘an intentional object in a double sense’ (Husserl, 1976, p.122 
[italics original]), of both the object and the appreciation of it: ‘not merely the representing of 
the matter in question, but also the appreciating which includes this representing, has the 
modus of actuality’ (ibid). In the previous section (2.3) the relationship between values, in the 
sense they are understood within the social sciences, and valued objects was discussed at 
some length. The idea of double intentionality, though, will be referred to later in discussions 
of signs and symbols. It is clear that Husserl considered valuing a primary aspect of 
cognition, along with facticity, practicality and usefulness (ibid). It is from those who were 
influenced by the phenomenological approach, however, that a more concrete conception of 
values emerges. Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, took phenomenology in a radically 
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different direction, giving it both an ontological interpretation and, through an investigation 
of the ontology of human being (Dasein), an existentialist turn. So for Heidegger (1962, 
p.339), ‘the theory of value...has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a ‘metaphysic 
of morals’ – that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence’. Interpreting Heidegger, I would 
take this to mean that what we have to say about values is (or should be) rooted in a natural 
morality arising from human nature. That nature, Dasein, is fundamentally social as well as 
individual, so our conception of values arises from this sociality as well as personal 
reflection. 
2.4.2   The Semiotics of Values  
The appearance of a discipline dedicated to the study of signs is frequently attributed to the 
French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, though Charles Sanders Pierce in the US and Victoria 
Welby in the UK made significant contributions in the nineteenth century. However, in this 
research the main source of ideas on semiotics is taken from Charles Morris who attempted to 
consolidate semiotic thinking with a contribution to the International Encyclopaedia of 
Unified Science in 1938 and over the next decades developed semiotics as a theory of man as 
a ‘symbolic animal’ and as a common language for science, aesthetics and spirituality 
(Morris, 1971, pp.7-8). Saussure’s concept of the sign is rather simple and is confined to 
linguistic signification, comprising a binary system of signifier, meaning an utterance or 
written form and the signified, an abstract quality embodying the meaning (Saussure, 1959). 
Morris’ concept of the sign is more complex and consists of:  
three (or four) factors: that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that 
affect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that 
interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the sign 
vehicle, the designatum and the interpretant; the interpreter may be included as a fourth 
factor (Morris, 1971, p.19). 
 
The introduction of the interpretant, which Morris took from Pierce and developed, 
introduces a level of sophistication over that of the simpler binary model of Saussure. Morris 
introduces the element of consciousness into the definition of a sign, which causes a 
reinterpretation of all the elements: only those elements of the sign (as commonly 
understood) which signify are a part of semiosis and the concern of semiotics. For example, 
the shape and colour of a notice are usually of no significance to the message being conveyed 
even though they delimit the extension of the notice as sign in space. In referring to the 
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semiotic function throughout this research, it is Morris’s conception of the semiotic that is 
being referred to. 
Symbols are related to signs (they are considered by most semioticians to be a subset of 
signs) but for Morris there is a crucial difference. He quotes the ethologist Robert Yorkes: 
‘Whereas the sign is an experience-act which implies and requires as its justification in terms 
of utility a succeeding experience-act, the symbol has no such implication and is an 
experience-act which represents or may function instead of whatever is represented’ (cited in 
Morris, 1971, p.99), to which he adds ‘[A] symbol is a sign produced by its interpreter which 
acts as a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous’ (ibid, p.100). For Morris 
then ‘representation’ is a form of substitution in which two sign vehicles have the same 
designatum (or closely linked designata) for the interpreter, a visual – or indeed a verbal – 
metaphor. While, representation is one aspect of symbols as a class, I will refer to another 
aspect, that of ‘emotive evocation’ (Schwaller de Lubicz, 1978, p.45), which seems perhaps 
more important for linguistic symbolism, when discussing the ‘symbolic’ function of values. 
Morris is, in semiotics, concerned in a general way with matters pertaining to values, 
although there is no specific attempt to develop a value theory.  It is clear though that he 
regards semiotics as vital to such a development, ‘since the question as to the similarity and 
difference in the ‘verifiability’ of statements and appraisals demands a sharp formulation of 
[their] nature’, for which a ‘well-developed semiotic’ is vital (Morris, 1971, p,202, [italics 
added]). In his later work Morris developed an interest in axiological topics and the place of 
values in human action. He identified three modalities of human behaviour in a ‘value 
dimension’: detachment, or the maintenance of autonomy and individuality; dominance, that 
is, control over others or situations; and dependence, or the need to be controlled by, guided 
by or protected by others and social systems (Morris, 1964). This seems an apposite 
expression of what could be called the contextual background to the process of values 
transmission, as this is investigated in this research. 
As noted in the introduction, I will use both phenomenological and semiotic approaches in 
the development of a transmissive theory of value. Phenomenological approaches are 
appropriate to explore the interiority of values and semiotics their exteriority. This is not a 
matter of convenience or an arbitrary decision. My analysis of these systems leads me to 
believe they are not only highly complementary, but they have structural similarities at the 
deepest level. The interpretant in Morris’ semiotics has a strong correlation with the 
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cogitatum in Husserlian phenomenology, that is, the object of intentional consciousness; 
moreover, Husserl’s concept of double intentionality involved in evaluation expresses in 
different terminology an idea which is almost identical to the structure of symbolism in 
Morris’ semiotics. The difference, I would argue, is one of perspective: phenomenology 
looks from the perspective of the interiority of cognition and semiotics from the exteriority of 
cognition, a distinction that will be vital in the analysis of the meaning of values. I have 
undertaken phenomenological and semiotic analyses of the appreciative and evaluative 
systems, respectively, (referred to in section 2.3.3) and offer a proposal for a concept of value 
which brings together both perspectives. Here only a summary of each section will be given 
and related to the previous discussion. 
2.4.3   The Appreciative System and the Phenomenology of Value 
This analysis begins by posing the question raised in the consideration of 
subjectivity/objectivity of the source of value. It argues that the value supposedly inhering in 
the object is nothing more than a reification of language, but accepts that the appreciation 
attaching itself to a particular object must have some relationship to that object. By a process 
of elimination I have concluded that what is appreciated/valued is the function of the object 
in evoking a particular experience – generally a positive emotional experience – that is 
unique. In other words, the value of the object bears no intrinsic relation to its qualities or 
dispositions, but only an arbitrary relationship to personal history. It is the quality of 
reflective consciousness to recall the emotive response both in the presence and absence of 
the object that constitutes the continuity of the value experience. This experience of value 
proper is contrasted with utility, where a ‘tool’ is valued less for its private meaning than for 
a publicly acknowledged good based on its particular characteristics or disposition. 
2.4.4   The Evaluative System and the Semiotics of Value 
At this point the analysis faces a dilemma. It is analysing a system based on values as the 
norms of judgement, but there is no more evidence for the existence of ‘values’ than there 
was for the quality of ‘value’ supposedly inhering in valued objects. Instead I propose that the 
sub-class of tools that are referred to as (technical) ‘values’, things like numbers, colours, 
etc., which exactly fits Parsons description as ‘An element of a shared symbolic system’, but 
which are not normally considered to be real values, are instead taken as paradigmatic for all 
values. Each value then can be seen to function as a sign within a system of signs. A semiotic 
analysis of such value systems turns up an interesting question: if the analogy holds, then 
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existential values, like technical values, must have an exteriority, that is, they must have a 
trace in the real world, which is something that has not been considered by either 
philosophers of a positivist or metaphysical inclination. If the exteriority of a sign is the sign 
vehicle, then the exteriority of a value is that which designates it, the word which names it. 
While this may seem a trivial observation, it has important consequences. It means that 
values can be compared directly with things to which they are similar – symbols, signs and 
concepts – and a different and clearer understanding of what values are can begin to emerge. 
The table below summarises the comparisons. 
Fig 02      A comparison of signs, symbols, concepts and values 
 Sign Symbol Concept Value 
Content of 
Consciousness 
Idea or 
information 
Shared 
experience 
Idea or 
information 
Shared 
experience 
 
Physical trace 
Material, 
graphic, verbal 
(conventional) 
Material, 
graphic, verbal 
(represent-  
ational) 
Graphic, 
verbal 
(conventional) 
Graphic, 
verbal 
(conventional) 
 
2.4.5   The Nature of Values: Unification of the Appreciative and Evaluative 
An interrogation of my own values reveals that they are things to which I am personally and 
emotionally attached, and it is fair to assume that this is universally so. This leads back to a 
consideration of the valued object undertaken in the analysis of the appreciative system. The 
conclusion in that analysis was that the relationship between the valued object and the 
valuing subject was purely arbitrary, in terms of the characteristics of the object. In the case 
of values, however, there is no object; instead there is an arbitrary linguistic reference to an 
experience with which the valuing subject can identify. There is a clear inference from this; it 
is that, since the linguistic reference is part of a shared language, that the value experience 
itself is a shared experience. This would seem to be broadly in agreement with Mandler’s and 
Marx’s views of value discussed above. 
There is a further aspect to be considered. The above explanation indicates that valuing is 
essentially a communicative process, but it does not explain the context within which 
linguistic information becomes shared values. Referring to the table above, it can be seen that 
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values are structurally very similar to symbols in that their interiority is shared experience. 
The difference is that symbols can be physical objects and they are representational. Just as 
symbols tend to be localised to close communities, unlike signs which are universal, so also 
some values are privileged in particular social groups and occupations; which suggests that 
language in this case has a more symbolic function, that value terms are being invoked within 
a group and reciprocally are evoking a sense of a community of shared values. 
By positing the linguistic exteriority of values, a model of values as transmissive entities 
begins to emerge. In this model values have a dual nature: as linguistic concepts, values flow 
through open communicative channels; as linguistic symbols, however, values function to 
bind communities of shared experience. Existing at the nexus of these two functions, under 
the conditions of a liberal social environment it is possible to adopt a wide range of values 
and experience multiple overlapping belonging. The diagram below illustrates this model. 
 
Fig 03 The dual nature of values 
2.4.6   The Definition of Values in this Research 
It is now possible to advance a definition of values with inherent transmissibility. In this 
research a value is defined as the conceptualisation of a culturally shared emotional 
experience, although for brevity subsequently in the thesis this may be shortened to ‘shared 
experience’, ‘conceptualised shared experience’ or ‘the conceptualisation of experience’ (the 
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qualifications of the term ‘experience’ need to be borne in mind, however; it is delimited by a 
cultural referent, by being shared and by being of an emotive nature, so it does not include 
shared experiences of natural forces, which are not emotive, and states like sadness, which 
are universal emotional experiences, not culturally specific). In the subsequent paragraphs the 
philosophical basis of this definition and an explanation of the definition will be offered. A 
degree of overlap is inevitable as the phenomenon is approached from a number of 
perspectives and levels of (complexity of) explanation. 
The definition above contains a primary dichotomy, between the terms ‘conceptualisation’ 
and ‘experience’, which are referred to as the exteriority and interiority of a value 
respectively (terms that will be defined below), based upon the semiotic and 
phenomenological perspectives on the mode of existence of values. From the review of the 
antimonies of value, carried out in section 2.3, it could be seen that  a number of polarised 
views of values persist, such as whether the fundamental conception is of ‘values’ as discreet 
entities or ‘value’ as a property inhering in things. Through phenomenological analysis of the 
appreciative system, I have come to the conclusion that the ‘sense of value’ attaching to 
things does so on the basis of personal experience in which the object plays a role in personal 
history, rather than any ‘tertiary property’ (Rescher, 2004, p.16) of the object itself. 
Additionally, through a semiotic analysis of the evaluative system, in which technical values 
were compared with signs, I have concluded that for values to be considered real, including 
existential values, they must leave a ‘trace’ in the world, and that for existential values that 
trace is the value-term itself. The point of overlap and unification of the appreciative and the 
evaluative is at the point where the value-term becomes itself the focus of appreciation and 
the source of the sense of value in a system of values. 
I now wish to place these ideas more firmly within the context of semiotic and 
phenomenological theory. For Morris (1971, p.19) the sign has a basic tripartite structure of 
sign vehicle, designatum (the meaning) and interpretant (the mind for which the sign is 
meaningful). This means that for all entities having a sign-like structure, which on the basis 
of Morris’ own interpretation includes every cultural and social artefact and phenomenon, 
consciousness is an integral aspect of their semiosis, i.e. their signifying. Morris (1971, 
p.202) indicates that semiotics is fundamental to valuing, though he does not himself set out a 
theory of value. Clearly, though, the tripartite structure of the sign lends itself readily to an 
understanding of the structure of values, as value-term, meaning and valuer/valuing mind. 
However, this corresponds only to the evaluative (valuing) aspect and, as argued above, the 
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nature of values must also incorporate the appreciative ‘sense of value’ or experience of 
value, which is particularly amenable to phenomenological analysis. The phenomenological 
notion of the intentionality of consciousness radicalises the object of consciousness, to 
include mental states as well as perceptions of the physical world. All such ‘intentional 
objects’ have a dual structure of cogitans (thinking aspect) and cogitatum (thought aspect). 
For Husserl (1976, p.122) in valuation there is a double intentionality, that of the object’s 
perception and its appreciation in which the perception is included (ibid). In the case of 
values understood as the unification of the evaluative and appreciative I believe there is a 
case for there being a triple intentionality, that of perception of the value-term, its meaning 
and of the experience of value; however, accepting as given the complex reflectivity of 
consciousness, I have sought to simplify this complexity through the concepts of exteriority 
and interiority, where exteriority is the trace in the phenomenal/physical world (equivalent to 
the sign vehicle in semiotics) and interiority is the aspects of consciousness, such as meaning 
(equivalent to the designatum) and experience (equivalent to the intentional object). All 
social and cultural artefacts have interiority and exteriority, though they vary in complexity. 
Values have a simple exteriority (the value-term) and a rather complex interiority. 
All this is to say, at one level, in terms of exteriority, a value is just a word, an abstract noun 
or its lexical variations and, as such, is communicated through the channels of normal human 
discourse, where, if its meaning is pondered, it is considered something akin to a collectively 
determined good. This corresponds closely to Rokeach’s (1973) definition of a value as the 
idea of the preferable. At another level, however, in terms of interiority, the ‘sense of value’ 
inherent in acquiring, professing and  promoting a value is a very personal, intense 
experience of identification with and attachment to the value, which is identical to that 
experienced before a valued object. This experience is, therefore, of an affective nature, even 
if this is linked to perceptual input of natural, social or cultural phenomena. This view is 
supported by recent research in the neurosciences (Zahn et al., 2009). This duality is not 
merely a matter of perspective; it is intrinsic to the nature of values themselves. 
It is the value-term itself which is the bridge between the worlds of discourse and personal 
commitment (see fig 03, p.26), as a conceptual element of discourse and as the object of 
emotional attachment, respectively. The value-term carries a meaning that we have imbibed 
through culture, pointing to a generalised human concern or trait, critical in specific cases and 
situations, but one which we may or may not have a personal concern with. When there is a 
personal concern the value-term directs and makes coherent our emotional response to a 
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given situation, sometimes by cultural connotation, that can be called ‘an experience of the 
sense of value’. Where this personal concern is absent, however, the response may be limited 
to an assent to the culturally accepted meaning of the term. Although this value-term is 
constant, as an element of the language in which it is embedded, a change of context may 
cause it to change function, between the prosaic, descriptive function in which it acts 
conceptually, and something akin to what Austin (1962) referred to as a performative 
function, in which it acts symbolically.  
By ‘performative’ Austin means things like when someone says ‘I promise’ or ‘I pronounce 
you man and wife’ or ‘I hereby declare this meeting open’; these are words that accomplish 
in their very utterance the state of affairs which they describe or, to put it more simply, words 
that describe actions that are achieved as they are said (an illocutionary act). I do not think 
this fully describes the operation of performative language, however. Three conditions need 
to be met. First, there must be a person with authority to perform. Secondly, the language 
must have a ritualistic element that taps into a cultural tradition, not simply a declarative one. 
Thirdly, there must be a receptive audience for whom the performative function is 
meaningful. Austin approaches these conditions in a different manner, though what he says is 
essentially covered by these three.  
These three conditions apply to values in their ‘performative’ mode, but values’ central 
function is different to that of performative language as Austin identified it, as an 
illocutionary act. First, it names an emotional experience people have in response to 
identifiably similar dispositions in their perceived world. Secondly, through this and through 
the medium of a common language and common value-term, it creates the sense of a shared 
experience. Thirdly, it locates this shared experience in a specific cultural entity – Pring 
(1986) uses the term ‘form of life’, which I take to be a similar idea – marked by a boundary 
of inclusion and exclusion (Tajfel, 1974). A value in this mode functions like a cultural 
symbol for a particular cultural grouping, similar to the function of religious symbols for faith 
communities, flags for national identity, or even a pop idol for their fan base. In this mode the 
value-term is more likely to be ‘dis-embedded’ from its linguistic matrix, in order to throw it 
into greater prominence, where it may be displayed on signs or in documents or uttered 
ritualistically in order to reaffirm its importance to the identity of the cultural entity. In this 
research this display or utterance of the dis-embedded value is referred to by the term 
invocation. 
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The symbolism of a value structurally is not, however, identical to the symbolism of a 
symbol. Symbolic structure is generally accepted to involve the idea of representation, which 
means that in its physical form it is something like the meaning it has; in other words, the 
form of the symbol is non-arbitrary or, at least, not totally arbitrary. In this sense values are 
unlike symbols and more like concepts, as the value-term is purely arbitrary. Yet they 
function like symbols in the emotional force they exert, what Schwaller de Lubicz  refers to 
as their ‘emotive evocation’ (1978, p.45) and, particularly in collective settings, through 
referencing something like a mythic history or sacred events (Eliade, 1957). It is this function 
that I have already referred to as a ‘shared experience’ which lies at the heart of the ‘sense of 
value’. Linguistically, then, values are distinct from both concepts and symbols, although 
they share traits of both. In their exteriority they are more like concepts and in their interiority 
they are more like symbols. The unity of values, ontologically, is achieved through the 
meaning of the value-term itself ‘pointing to’ the origins and perpetuation of the value (as a 
‘symbol’) in shared experience. I suggest it is this bedrock of shared experience that underlies 
the consistent positive connotation of value-terms – due to their potential for generating 
social cohesion within cultural entities – even when they function within open discourse as 
abstract concepts. 
Despite the essential unity of these two functions – the conceptual and the symbolic – within 
values, in the social world one or the other is typically dominant. The conditions that 
determine this dominance at any given moment are unclear at present, although it is a 
reasonable assumption that social context is important. In an open social context, in which 
social control is minimised and in which meaning is largely undetermined, the value-term 
will default to a more objective, conceptual mode in which the symbolic function is largely 
suppressed. By contrast, in closed social contexts, where social control is frequently 
heightened (for example, to preserve the rules of inclusion and exclusion) and meaning is 
more likely to be determined, a value-term appropriate to the social context will default to the 
more subjective mode in which it functions to augment the sense of group identity, through 
identification with a shared history and a shared experience. This use of values to invigorate 
the communal imagination is referred to in this research by the term evocation. I should point 
out, though, that in the theory of institutional transmission of values that is proposed and 
developed over the course of this research, both the conceptual and the symbolic functions 
have a role in the transmission of values, in widespread diffusion and individual acquisition, 
respectively. 
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The definition of a value as the conceptualisation of a culturally shared emotional experience 
has a number of corollaries. One is that while there can be individually held values, there are 
no truly private values; or if there are this is intrinsically unknowable, as in the sharing of an 
experience there must be recourse to a shared language and therefore the conceptualisation of 
the experience; alternatively, the creation of a neologistic value-term which must resonate 
with others’ experience if it is to be acknowledged as a value. A further corollary is that, 
while there can be common values within cultures and across cultures, there can be no 
absolute values (unless an absolute value is taken as an empty formalism, as in Rickert and 
Munsterberg), as values bind cultural entities and are delimited by the boundaries of those 
entities; hence, from a perspective of rational universalism, values are always relative to the 
localised context and always valid within that context, though this is not the same as saying 
that all values are equal in terms of social outcomes, nor that we are incapable of making a 
rational choice of which values to prioritise on the basis of perceived outcomes. The 
absoluteness of values, as I have previously stated, is to be sought in the intensity of the value 
experience and also in the communal commitment to their local promotion. Finally, as a 
result of their cultural limitations, values underlie social conflicts as much as they underlie 
social cohesion, i.e. conflicts between different and competing values and value systems. 
Such conflicts are a necessary part of the process of social development, as societies 
determine which values are to be more central to their identity and which more peripheral. 
2.5   The Transmission of Values 
I want to turn now to determine, on the basis of the concept of value argued for here, the 
manner of transmission that is entailed, an argument which I summarise here. Returning to a 
consideration of the comparison between values, concepts, signs and symbols, values like 
symbols evoke a shared experience within a given community, and it is in this property of 
evocation that lies at the root of the power of both entities to bind communities together. 
While values do not generally provoke the same intensity of response as symbols (which can 
provoke the most extreme of human passions), they can act in lieu of symbols in denoting 
that which is ‘sacred’ to a community. They do this, though, not through representation, 
which is the mode by which symbols can be endlessly reproduced and disseminated, but by 
utterance within the bounds of the community, by repeated invocation at the core of the 
community.  
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The transmission of values, according to this argument, takes place through two related steps, 
the invocation of the values that lie at the heart of communal life for a given community, and 
through invocation of the values the evocation of the realm of shared experience encapsulated 
in those values that binds the community together. There is a further implication of this idea: 
it is that for values to be uttered and for the communal imagination to be so bounded, a 
charismatic authority must exist at the heart of the community that can counter the 
differentiating tendencies of the wider society in which the community is embedded. This is 
the role that in all institutional structures is filled by a charismatic figure that (ideally) 
combines characteristics of leadership, concern and wisdom. This figure protects the integrity 
of the community through teaching and exemplification in which the communal values are 
both explicit and implicit, and by the clear demarcation of the boundary between the 
community and the non-community.  
This is only one aspect of transmission. In the previous section I argued that the exteriority of 
values as ordinary language terms means that their function is bifurcated, operating as 
symbols within closed communal structures, but also as ordinary concepts in discourse 
through open communicative channels, as shown in the figure on page 26. The circumstances 
that cause the change of function, beyond the change of context, is something not clear at this 
point, but this flexibility means that values can flow as easily as any other type of 
information. This mitigates the rather austere view of the closed community painted above, 
and suggests that values can be transmitted in open social contexts. However, the underlying 
logic of the view that values are shared experience means that transmission can only occur 
within a closed community. The way out of this impasse is to posit a multiplicity of values 
entailing a plurality of contexts in which belonging is real but only provisional, not absolute 
or exclusive. 
This view of our individual life-worlds as being constituted by overlapping associations and 
our values fairly eclectic and not necessarily resolved to a single coherent worldview seems 
to me to be fundamentally true to the form of liberal information-driven society in which we 
increasingly live today. I am not entirely sure whether the unresolved incompatibility of 
many of our values is a strength or a weakness. What is clear is that within this framework 
there is a freedom to pursue greater participation – and hence commitment – in one or more 
areas according to our desire or circumstances. I imagine society is best served by having 
both individuals who are wedded to certainty and those who have questing, open minds. 
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The notion of transmission in the humanities, itself a loan term from communications theory, 
should strictly speaking be limited to the evaluation of inter-generational cultural continuity, 
where it began as a discussion within evolutionary psychology in the 1980s (Schoenpflug, 
2001b). However, it is a term with potentially important philosophical implications, though 
not to my knowledge one with any current or historical, specifically philosophical denotation. 
In this research therefore its meaning is extended to cover any phenomenon in which 
information is passed from a transmitter to a receiver. Although the focus in this research is 
on institutional transmission, in this section the parameters of transmission in general will be 
considered, that is to say the structural and contextual aspects of transmission.  Included here 
are concepts as they appear in the pertinent literatures, specifically psychology and the social 
sciences, that do not make any reference to the term ‘transmission’, yet which I will argue fall 
under that general description. I have, in addition, chosen to differentiate between theories 
that address an aspect of transmission, dealt with here and in section 2.6, and those that offer 
a more complete model of transmission, which will be dealt with in the section 2.7. In 
sociological terminology derived from Hirsch (2003), this section will deal with the micro 
aspects of transmission, that is, the interpersonal, while the next two sections will focus on 
the macro aspects, the broadly social. Section 2.8 will focus on the meso aspects, the 
institutions of schooling. 
2.5.1   The evolutionary basis of transmission 
Moving from a pure deductive theory to an empirically based theory of institutional value 
transmission requires a number of steps. The first is to look at the literature outside of 
philosophy. Beginning in the 1970s a considerable body of work has amassed on the 
evolutionary basis of cultural transmission. One of the most prominent hypotheses is known 
as the Dual Inheritance Theory, which claims that human nature and behaviour can best be 
understood as an amalgamation of genetic inheritance and cultural transmission (McElreath 
and Henrich, 2007). The main contributors to the field have been Lumsden and Wilson 
(1981), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) who all 
developed mathematical models of how genetic and cultural factors can reinforce each other. 
I will look at the theory of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman in some detail as it has features of 
interest in looking at institutional transmission. Slightly predating these, and far better 
known, Dawkins (1976) theory of memetic evolution (cultural transmission though ‘memes’, 
a cultural analogue of genes) is of less interest. Dawkins’ focus is on the evolutionary logic of 
the meme as universal replicator; there is little in the way of social or cultural context.  
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I have divided this section into two parts, parameters and conditions. Parameters are the basic 
components and structures of transmission; conditions are various other factors associated 
with transmission, particularly the requirements for transmission to take place successfully. 
The parameters were laid down fairly early on by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman and there has 
been little significant development since then. The subsequent research in the field has 
focused strongly on conditions. 
 
 
2.5.2   Parameters of transmission 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) develop the theory of cultural transmission based on an 
epidemiological model of viral diffusion. That model draws on four evolutionary factors 
(ibid, pp. 65-67) as the driving forces of evolutionary change, the two classical Darwinian 
notions of variation and selection and the later neo-Darwinian concepts of drift and 
migration. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman utilise the first two to create a basic typology of 
cultural change through the non-reproducibility of cultural knowledge, akin to genetic 
variation. As in epidemic spread, they identify three transmission routes (ibid, p. 54): vertical, 
from parent to offspring; horizontal, from peer to peer (non-related individuals of the same 
generation); and oblique, between non-related or distantly-related individuals of different 
generations, though Cavalli-Sforza (1993, p.312) later refines this concept of transmission 
routes adding ‘one to many’, typical of institutional structures such as schools, and ‘many to 
one’, referred to as ‘social group pressure’. He also differentiates (ibid) between vertical 
transmission between parent and child and other routes in terms of outcomes.  
Schönpflug (2001b, p.132), clearly indebted to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, but adapting and 
developing the ideas into the social-psychological arena, identifies four significant 
parameters of cultural transmission: the carriers of transmission, or transmitters – the people 
involved in the process of transmission; the contents of transmission, that which is 
transmitted, which are particularly sensitive to the channel; the mechanism of transmission, 
which is thought to include two stages – awareness and acceptance (cf. Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, 1981, p.62); and developmental windows, which can be genetically-based (e.g. 
language acquisition) or socially-based (e.g. compulsory schooling).  
2.5.3   Conditions of transmission 
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Within their model Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (ibid, pp.61-62) reckon there are four 
structural variables, ‘factors in transmission rules’: the relationship of teacher (transmitter) 
and taught (recipient); the age difference between transmitter and recipient (generation gap); 
the numerical relationship (ratio) of teacher to taught; and the degree of complexity of the 
society in which the transmission takes place. Schönpflug (2001a, p.174) considers the 
conditions, which he terms ‘transmission belts’, which favour cultural transmission taking 
place in a particular socio-economic and cultural context. They are primarily the age and 
educational level of the transmitter and receiver (‘personal characteristics’) and the marital 
relationship of the parents and the parenting style of the parents (‘family interaction 
variables’). Altogether ten conditions have been identified: degree of acceptance, quality of 
relationships, developmental windows, personal characteristics, perceptions, biases, common 
values, generation of values, numerical ratio, and social complexity. There is a degree of 
overlap, but they will be dealt with separately. 
Degree of acceptance:  According to Cavalli-Sforza (1993) vertical transmission is more 
likely to result in variation in terms of the intergenerational value systems, whereas other 
routes, particularly the institutional route of ‘one to many’, are more likely to result in 
homogeneity of values. Barni et al. (2011) argue that there is a moderate degree of 
willingness among adolescents to accept their parents’ values. Also, after a period in which 
adolescents’ values diverge from their parents’, as they are asserting their identity, there is a 
tendency for the two generations’ values to become more similar (ibid). 
Quality of relationships: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) state that the relationship of 
teacher (transmitter) and taught (recipient) is a key condition of transmission, while 
Schoenpflug (2001a) specifies the marital relationship of the parents and the parenting style 
of the parents. More effective cultural transmission takes place when there is a harmonious 
and constructive relationship between the parents (ibid), and less effective transmission in a 
dysfunctional relationship. Schönpflug’s research also suggests that empathetic parents are 
the most effective transmitters (ibid). Euler et al. (2001) add that two important related 
aspects of cultural transmission between generations are investment in the younger 
generation and emotional closeness between the generations. Barni et al. (2011) assert that 
acceptance is assisted when the parents themselves share the same values, and that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between closeness and acceptance of parental values; that is, this is not 
a relationship of simple causality, but a bi-directional relationship. 
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Developmental stage: According to Schönpflug (2001a, p.185) acquisition of values is 
differentiated according to age of the receiver/acquirer. Early adolescents are more open to 
collective values, but are less receptive as they reach later adolescence; however, in later 
adolescence they are more open (and more cognitively developed to receive) individualistic 
values, those that contribute to a ‘stimulating life’, a point that Barni et al. (2011) confirm. 
Personal characteristics: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, and Schönpflug both assert the 
importance of personal characteristics; the former emphasise the age difference between 
transmitter and recipient (generation gap) and the latter adds the educational level of the 
transmitter and receiver. 
Perceptions: In general, the values the parents wish to transmit are perceived by the younger 
generation to be more conservative, whereas the young are more open to new ideas (Barni et 
al., 2011). 
Biases: Whitbeck and Gecas (1988) recognise that females have a slightly higher acceptance 
of parents values than males and that the mother-daughter bond in this respect is particularly 
strong, what they refer to as the ‘female lineage’ of value transmission. 
Common values: According to Barni et al. (2011), some values seem to be almost universally 
shared between the generations, such as benevolence and independence of thought and 
action. 
Generation of values: According to Grusec and Goodnow (1994) acquisition of values takes 
place through the assertion of moral autonomy; acceptance comes on the basis of self-
generation. Barni et al. (2011) contest this view; they prefer the notion of self-other 
generation: the values we acquire are the result of our free choice, but this choice is not made 
in a vacuum; we tend to choose the values of those close to us in a familial setting. 
The final two points are of particular relevance outside of the immediate family setting, in the 
broader social and institutional context: 
Numerical ratio: The numerical relationship (ratio) of teacher to taught can also be a factor in 
how effective value transmission can be (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). It is unclear 
here what conclusion they might have reached about this. The assumption is that they 
consider a smaller teacher-pupil ratio to be more effective; however, this might contradict the 
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idea that ‘one to many’ transmission reproduces a more homogeneous set of values, referred 
to above. 
Social complexity: The degree of complexity of the society in which the transmission takes 
place is considered to be a factor in value transmission(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; 
Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988); there is a recognition that multiple factors are at play in value 
socialisation, not only the parents, important as that influence is. Hashimzade and Della 
Giusta (2011) have modelled the relationship between the intergenerational values of 
immigrant families and the values of their schools, in order to determine the optimal 
outcomes. They have concluded that in a society of heterogeneous communities, better social 
outcomes are created when schools focus on inclusivity in order to avoid alienation. Attempts 
by schools to create homogeneity of values increases alienation and worsens social outcomes. 
If there is a gradual convergence of values between the immigrant community and the host 
society, there is a measured improvement in social and economic outcomes, initiated in part 
by higher educational outcomes. 
I would expect that much of what has been studied in terms of intergenerational transmission 
of values would be of relevance to transmission in schools, particularly in terms of the key 
relationship between teacher and pupil, which while not commonly as close as that of parent 
and child, has some of the features of that relationship (Riley, 2010; Pianta, 1994; Bowlby, 
1969). Clearly, though, on the basis of the research, transmission of values within a school is 
going to be dependent upon a number of variables such as age and gender, parental 
relationship and the quality of home life, level of education (both in terms of level achieved 
and receptivity), the ethnic makeup of the school catchment area, and even – apparently – 
which values are being transmitted. It is probably a mistake, though, to consider that these 
conditions are all equally important. There seems to be fairly robust agreement that in 
intergenerational transmission the quality of the relationships within the family are key, and it 
would not be unreasonable to expect that within a school the quality of the relationship 
between the teacher and the pupil in particular, but also that between colleagues and between 
management and staff, which are important in creating morale and a good learning 
environment, are also going to play a significant role.  
There do seem to be two noticeable omissions. Although Schönpflug mentions the 
mechanism of transmission, which he (after Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman) states has two 
stages – awareness and acceptance – there is no attempt to describe or model this mechanism. 
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The other is that values are not assigned any role in this process. My intuition is that these 
omissions are connected. As long as values are seen as a black box problem there is a limit to 
the extent that the transmission of values can be modelled. 
Although the theories emerging from evolutionary psychology do provide relatively simple 
models of transmission, they are predominantly focused upon the interaction between 
transmitter and receiver and, therefore, in the larger social context they will be considered as 
part of the mechanism of transmission, i.e. an aspect of transmission rather than as full 
models of transmission. I want to turn now to several other theories which address aspects of 
transmission. 
 
 
2.6   Modes and Aspects of Transmission 
The four theories I want to look at – social capital, hegemony, resistance, and 
intersubjectivity – are not theories of transmission, but they look at aspects of the social 
world that are related to values transmission and resonate with certain aspects of the theory of 
value transmission that I have developed up to this point. After an overview of the main 
theoretical perspectives in each of these fields, I will comment on the relevance I feel it has to 
the development of the theoretical stance I am taking. 
2.6.1   Social Capital 
The idea of social capital, if not the terminology, has existed for as long as the social sciences 
(Portes, 1998). Though its use is widespread in the social sciences, the idea of social capital 
does not have a single definition, but should rather be viewed as a family of definitions 
(Paldam, 2000). Fundamentally, though, most definitions incorporate the idea that the 
interaction of members of a society creates a social ‘good’ that in some manner can be 
transformed into (or ‘spent’ on) other more tangible goods, particularly of an economic or a 
political nature. Croll (2004, p.398) describes social capital as arising from ‘social 
relationships and the personal networks which they create’, which then becomes ‘a resource 
which can be used to generate outcomes which are valued’. Human relationships therefore 
become a resource that have ‘productive capacity’ for society as a whole, not just for the 
individuals concerned (ibid). Bourdieu defines it as ‘The aggregate of the actual or potential 
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resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (cited in Portes, 2000, 
p. 45). An understanding of social capital may be very useful in understanding the dynamics 
within institutions and in their relationship to the wider society. 
Stepping back and taking a broad view, Croll (2004) identifies three dimensions of the 
analysis of social capital, by which the various commentators on the phenomenon can be 
distinguished: the extent to which it is dependent on relationships inside the family or outside 
the family; the degree to which it is related by the theorist to other types of capital; and the 
extent to which it is seen as principally a resource for the individual or the broader society 
(ibid). Adler and Kwon (2002), though, make a distinction of more particular relevance to our 
thinking in this research. They categorise social capital theorists according to whether they 
focus on the building of communal links, such as Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995) and 
Putnam (1995), the building of external links, such as Bordieu (1985) and Portes (2000), or 
incorporate both, such as Pennar (1997), Schiff (1992) and Woolcock (1998). In a similar 
vein Paldam (2000) claims that theories of social capital can be categorised according to 
whether the building of trust, the building of networks, or cooperation is considered to be the 
main feature of social relationships. Adler and Kwon conclude (2002, p.34) that the 
distinction between internal bonding and external linking is largely illusory as ‘external ties 
at a given level of analysis become internal ties at the higher levels of analysis, and, 
conversely, internal ties become external at the lower levels’.  
Most theorists see social capital as something that contributes to an ‘excess’ in society. 
However, Paldam (2000) warns against the potential for seduction by the positive aura 
attached to the notion of social capital. And Putnam points out that the distribution of benefit 
is not predetermined: ‘Who benefits from these connections, norms and trust – the individual, 
the wider community or some faction within the community – must be determined 
empirically, not definitionally’ (Putnam, 1995, pp.664-5). Bourdieu does not even accept the 
democratic nature of social capital. For him it is linked to other forms of capital, i.e. cultural, 
human and economic capital, and is one more means whereby those who benefit most 
transmit their advantage through society (Croll, 2004).  
There is something compelling about the idea of social capital that reinforces the idea that the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and also that value is somehow embedded in social 
relations. I have some reservations though. An idea for which there are so many definitions, 
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schools of thought, etc, suggests that it functions more as a metaphor for a number of 
connected features of society and a conceptual guideline for sociological research 
programmes than as a definable aspect of social reality. Portes (1998) believes that the 
heuristic value of the term itself loses viability if it is overextended. Adler and Kwon (op. 
cit.) have determined that social capital implies a hierarchy of communication networks. 
This, however, is simply an empirical fact of social being and does not entail the existence of 
social capital. These networks may be capitalised on by utilising them for financial or cultural 
transactions, but this requires the development of a particular range of entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills. Underlying these networks are personal relations built upon a range of 
values. Many of these values are not amenable to the exploitation of relationships for 
financial or other outcomes. However, Fukuyama (1995), identifies trust as one such value 
which is so convertible, capable of being scaled up and potentially self-replenishing. 
 
2.6.2   Hegemony 
The term ‘hegemony’, or ‘cultural hegemony’ to be more precise, as a theoretical idea in the 
social sciences has its origins in Marx but its first clear expression in Gramsci and Althusser. 
At one level it means ideological domination, but, more subtly, a wilful blindness to the state 
of dominion, such is its all-pervasive nature. However, even this does not completely capture 
its sense. According to Strinati (1995, pp.165-6) the existence of a hegemonic domination is 
in part due to a ‘spontaneous consensus’ of the ruled who find in its rules and values a 
potential for realising their own self-interest. Apple (1979, p. 18) locates this paradox in the 
dual senses of ideology:  
Functionally, ideology has been evaluated historically as a form of false consciousness 
which distorts one’s picture of social reality and serves the interests of the dominant 
classes in a society. However, it has also been treated, as Geertz puts it, as ‘systems of 
interacting symbols’ that provide the primary ways of making ‘otherwise 
incomprehensible social situations meaningful.’ 
 
Apple finds the resolution of these two views of ideology in the concept of hegemony. 
Hegemony, therefore, should not be viewed essentially as just a negative imposition, but a 
prevailing aspect of social reality, which enables us to function, however imperfectly, within 
society. Within education, Apple sees that: 
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The idea that ideological saturation permeates our lived experience enables one to see 
how people can employ frameworks which both assist them in organizing their world and 
enable them to believe they are neutral participants in the neutral instrumentation of 
schooling,…while at the same time, these frameworks serve particular economic and 
ideological interests which are hidden from them (ibid, p.22). 
 
There are interesting insights in the notion of hegemony, but essentially it seems to be the 
conflation of two empirical observations. The first is the commonplace that any believing, as 
any belonging, is the source of both individual orientation and of self-limitation. The second 
is that all societies function through differentiation of authority, role and status. In hegemony 
the rhetoric of Marxist class conflict has appropriated an allegorical interpretation of social 
differentiation as ‘ideology’, an ideology to which – it is claimed – we are all in thrall and in 
which we find both our orientation (false consciousness) and limitation (domination). That 
said, at its core there is an insight, which I find persuasive, that individually, and to some 
degree collectively, we accept worldviews and their attendant values that are pervasive to the 
degree that we cannot conceive of the world being otherwise; that is to say we are imprisoned 
within the perspective of our own perception. Apple’s use of the verb ‘permeate’ is 
particularly striking in this context and I will use this, in its noun form ‘permeation’ later in 
this research to describe the degree of institutional penetration of values. 
2.6.3   Resistance 
Resistance is a very broad term which includes many different theoretical and ideological 
persuasions. They are united by the sense that there is a dislocation between the role an 
individual is expected to play within a social system and the sense that this role in some 
manner compromises their intrinsic worth, leading to a state of rebellion, which can range 
from passive non-compliance to aggressive challenge. Two examples will be considered, in 
the work of Parsons and Willis. 
In a classic paper in which he discusses the socialising function of the school class, discussed 
in the next section, Parsons (1961) also develops an example of what has come to be known 
as (anomic) strain theory. In a culture (the example is specific to the US, though not limited 
to that case) in which achievement at school has become a defining standard of progress 
towards adulthood and therefore of the socialisation of the individual, this sets a bar, which 
for some becomes a barrier, differentiating the accomplished and therefore successfully 
socialised from the unaccomplished and, therefore in some manner, socially delinquent. For 
this reason, Parsons argues (ibid, pp.98-99) much of youth culture, particularly the 
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disaffected youth, reflects an anti-intellectual stance, and pointedly states that this is not the 
result ‘of a general failure of the educational process’; rather: 
Both the general upgrading process and the pressure to enhanced independence should be 
expected to increase strain on the lower, most marginal groups…those for whom 
adaptation to educational expectations at any level is difficult. As the acceptable 
minimum of educational qualification rises, persons near and below the margin will tend 
to be pushed into an attitude of repudiation of these expectations. Truancy and 
delinquency are ways of expressing this repudiation. Thus the very improvement of 
educational standards in the society at large may well be a major factor in the failure of 
the educational process for a growing number at the lower end of the status and ability 
distribution (ibid).  
 
Parsons parallels at this point a principle within education known as differentiation-
polarisation (Hargreaves, 1967; Lacey, 1970), which states that raising academic 
achievement, for example within a school, can only be bought at the price of alienating an 
increasing number of underperforming students, though Parsons applies his principle on a 
society-wide scale.  
What Parsons has to say is of particular interest because he grounds educational attainment in 
the widespread acceptance of the value of ‘achievement’, at least in its intellectual context, 
but possibly also more widely. The corollary of that would be that resistance to academic 
achievement at school may also be reflected in the rejection of social achievement in general. 
Parsons’ perspective was overwhelmingly deductive. However, such a phenomenon was 
observed by Paul Willis in his research into disaffected youth in a school in the 1970s (Willis, 
1977). Willis followed the progress of a group of youths (the ‘lads’) from working class 
backgrounds during the last two years of their schooling. They had consciously rejected the 
ethos of the school, of ‘middle-class’ attainment through academic achievement, and had 
accepted that their future was to be employed in doing physical labour or some menial job. 
There is a caveat to this, though; the lads had not necessarily rejected the values associated 
with success as such, but with the middle-class version of success which entailed working 
hard academically, accepting the discipline of school and the authority of teachers, in 
preparation for a life of mental work. Instead, they had chosen values which were 
concomitant with entering the workforce as manual workers, such as male solidarity, anti-
intellectualism, freedom from authority and practical skills. 
Resistance is a psychological process that, logically, must occur between the ‘awareness and 
acceptance’ (Schoenpflug, 2001b) aspects of transmission, discussed above, as negation (or 
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indirect route to acceptance) of transmission. It is connected with moral autonomy and the 
self-generation of values (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994), as is apparent from Willis’ research, 
and will form an important part of the understanding of the process of values transmission. 
2.6.4   Intersubjectivity 
Since Descartes formulation of the basis of knowledge, cogito ergo sum, Western philosophy 
has been saddled with an epistemological dilemma (Kolakowski, 1988): if thinking (res 
cogitans) and being (res extens) are incommensurable, as Descartes maintained, what is it 
that the subject actually knows, and how can what we believe or claim we know be 
definitively authenticated? The tradition of Western philosophy since can be understood in 
large part as an attempt to breach this impasse. While solipsism is intuitively rejected by most 
people, it is inescapably entailed by the logic of the Cartesian dichotomy. In the twentieth 
century there were three attempts to provide an intersubjective solution to this problem. By 
intersubjectivity is meant a shared realm of subjectivity, but the extent and means by which 
this was supposedly realised was given a different proposed solution in these three attempts, 
undertaken by Husserl, Heidegger and Habermas. 
Husserl proposed a solution by returning to Descartes and recasting his idea. Descartes had 
characterised subjectivity as thinking substance; Husserl, drawing on Brentano’s concept of 
the intentionality of consciousness, proposed instead the formulation ego-cogito-cogitatum, 
the self is not merely thinking but has an object of thought (Husserl, 1931). In this manner, 
Husserl sought to dissolve the distinction between subject and object and bring them together 
as experience, and establish the experienced phenomena as the proper realm of scientific and 
philosophical inquiry. He believed that by establishing that we experience the world, 
including the social world, directly, rather than through theoretical structures, this was a 
sufficient basis to claim that experience was intersubjective (Thompson, 2005). 
The phenomenological approach developed by Husserl dissolved the rigidity of the Cartesian 
polarisation of thinking and opened the way for a range of experience that had not hitherto 
been considered the proper subject of philosophical inquiry – such as social, religious and 
aesthetic experience – to now be taken into consideration. Indeed, the phenomenology of 
values has constituted an important part of the development of a theoretical stance in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, even Husserl’s supporters conceded that he had not resolved the 
epistemological dilemma of how to break out of the solipsistic subject, he had merely posited 
that experience was inherently intersubjective and not subjective (Thompson, 2005). 
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Heidegger took the radical step of recasting phenomenology from an ontological, rather than 
an epistemological, viewpoint. For Heidegger the proper realm of study was Being – 
existence – not consciousness, particularly the being of human being (Dasein), which was 
understood to be intrinsically social, being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962), from which we 
derive our sense of individuality only through a process of reflection after the fact 
(Thompson, 2005), a process the outcome of which determines whether we come to live our 
lives authentically or inauthentically. Accepting the fact that we are, perhaps primarily, social 
beings, does not entail intersubjectivity, however. The case for sociality being the outcome of 
reflective practice is more compelling, I think, than that for individuality. 
Based on the theories of George Herbert Mead, Habermas (1984) developed a theory of 
intersubjectivity based neither on consciousness nor being, but on language. According to 
Habermas (ibid, p.390), ‘Mead elevated symbolically mediated interaction to the new 
paradigm of reason and based reason on the communicative relation between subjects, which 
is rooted in the mimetic act of role-taking, that is, in ego’s making his own the expectations 
that alter directs to him’, which is to say that reason (hence subjectivity) emerges from the 
sharing of and response to signs and sign acts. There have been a number of critiques of 
Habermas’ idea of intersubjectivity. Frie (1997) delivers what I think must be a fatal blow 
when he claims that recognition of the signs others make presupposes subjectivity; it is not 
the basis of subjectivity.  
The idea of intersubjectivity is of interest because of the notion of ‘shared experience’ that 
underlies the concept of value that I have outlined. That does not mean shared in any sense of 
mystical transfer, but in the ordinary sense of establishing similarity of experience through 
the medium of discourse and empathetic identification. I suspect that intersubjectivity is a 
philosophical cul-de-sac; moreover, I believe it violates the principle of moral autonomy 
which is fundamental to the acquisition of values. 
2.7   Models of institutional transmission 
2.7.1   Parsons’ model of Socialisation 
Parsons looks at the school class as an agency of socialisation and selection. He looks at this 
rather than the whole school because ‘it is recognised both by the school system and by the 
individual pupil as the place where the ‘business’ of formal education actually takes place’ 
(Parsons, 1961, p. 85). He considers the school class to be ‘an agency through which 
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individual personalities are trained to be motivationally and technically adequate to the 
performance of adult roles’ (ibid), though not the only such agency: others include the family, 
churches, training courses and clubs. Essentially, Parsons has identified ‘closed’ groups or 
communities as agents of socialisation, which corresponds to the understanding developed 
here that values transmission occurs in closed social contexts. 
As well as socialisation, the school class also performs the function of selection. Parsons 
considers that the process already begins in the elementary school and occurs along ‘a single 
main axis of achievement’ (ibid, p.87). There are considered to be two components of this 
achievement. The first is the mastery of the academic, the learning of the skills needed to take 
up a role within the adult world, such as reading, writing and numeracy. The second is what 
Parsons characterises as ‘responsible citizenship’ of the school community, including ‘[s]uch 
things as respect for the teacher, consideration and co-operativeness in relation to fellow-
pupils and ‘good work-habits’…leading on to capacity for ‘leadership’ and ‘initiative’’ (ibid, 
p. 91). 
In this process the role of the teacher as vital. Firstly the teacher is a representative of the 
adult world into which the young are being socialised, but not just a representative but also an 
‘agent’ of that world catalysing the process through imposing the expectations of 
achievement on the class (ibid, p. 91). Primary identification of the student with the teacher is 
almost invariably an indicator of progress on to college, while stronger identification with the 
peer group correlates strongly with failure to so progress: 
The bifurcation of the class on the basis of identification with teacher or peer group so 
strikingly corresponds with the bifurcation into college-goers and non-college-goers that 
it would be hard to avoid the hypothesis that this structural dichotomization in the school 
system is the primary source of the selective dichotomization (ibid, p. 94). 
 
Parsons summarises the process occurring within the school class in four points: 
1. An emancipation of the child from primary emotional attachment to the 
family. 
2. An internalisation of a level of societal values and norms that is a step higher 
than those he can learn from his family alone. 
3. A differentiation of the school class in terms both of actual achievement and 
of differential valuation of achievement. 
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4. A selection and allocation of [society’s] human resources relative to the adult 
role system. 
He sees as integral to this process:  
the sharing of common values by the two adult agencies involved – the family and the 
school, in this case the core of the shared valuation of achievement. It includes, above all, 
recognition that it is fair to give differential rewards for different levels of achievement, 
so long as there has been fair access to opportunity…[T]he elementary school class is an 
embodiment of the fundamental American value of equality of opportunity, and…it 
places value both on initial equality and on differential achievement (ibid, p. 96). 
 
Parsons model of socialisation I would evaluate as a fairly complete model of institutional 
transmission. First, it differentiates between the transmission that occurs at school and that 
which occurs in the family. Then, although it is centred on the classroom, it deals with the 
micro and macro aspects of transmission. At the micro level the relationship between the 
teacher and pupil, roles and authority are all considered. It also tackles the issue of resistance 
and embeds that within the model. Furthermore, it looks beyond the school to the relationship 
between the teacher and parents and the wider societal norms and expectations. Parsons’ 
model works well with the single value of achievement. However, schools are expected to 
transmit a range of values that prepare pupils for adult life, so the model as a general model 
for values transmission is inadequate as it stands. Also, I think the model too readily 
legitimises failure within the system; a model for general value transmission must have more 
flexibility and adaptability built into it. 
2.7.2   Bourdieu’s theory of Reproduction 
According to Apple (1979, p.1): 
[E]ducation is not a neutral enterprise, …by the very nature of the institution, the educator 
[is] involved, whether he or she [is] conscious of it or not, in a political act…[I]n the last 
analysis educators [can] not fully separate their educational activity from the unequally 
responsive institutional arrangements and the forms of consciousness that dominate 
advanced industrial economies like our own. 
 
This leads to the phenomenon known as reproduction, in which education, perhaps 
unwittingly, participates in the perpetuation of macroscopic socio-cultural structural features 
of the society of which it is a part. Apple contrasts two theoretical stances on this. In one 
education is seen as a neutral mediator between individual consciousness and the larger 
society, in which the norms and conventions of a culture are ‘filtered down from the macro 
level of economic and political structures to the individual via work experience, educational 
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processes and family socialization’ (MacDonald, 1977, in Apple, 1979, p.33). There is, 
though, a far more critical tradition of reproduction theories for which ‘schools latently 
recreate cultural and economic disparities, though this is certainly not what most school 
people intend at all’ (Apple, 1979, pp.33-34). It is this latter tradition to which Pierre 
Bourdieu belongs. 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) advance the notion that education ‘reproduces’ the unequal 
distribution of privilege in society through the exercise of an arbitrary power in schools, 
derived from and mirroring the power of the state in society. He terms this power a ‘cultural 
arbitrary’ – arbitrary in two senses: first in that it hides its true nature under the guise of 
pedagogic language; secondly, that it claims a legitimacy for which the justification is non-
existent. The wielding of this arbitrary power results in ‘symbolic violence’, a concept which 
‘belongs to a general theory of violence and legitimate violence, as is directly attested to by 
the homology between the school system’s monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence and the 
State’s monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence’ (ibid, p. xi-xii). They (ibid, p.6) 
suggests that teaching (‘pedagogic action’) is a form of this symbolic violence as it acts 
arbitrarily (in the senses given above) to perpetuate the inequalities of society:  
Every institutionalised educational system owes the specific characteristics of its structure 
and functioning to the fact that, by the means proper to the institution, it has to produce 
and reproduce the institutional conditions whose existence and persistence (self-
reproduction of the system) are necessary both to the exercise of its essential function of 
inculcation and to the fulfilment of its function of reproducing a cultural arbitrary which it 
does not produce (cultural reproduction), the reproduction of which contributes to the 
reproduction of the relations between the groups or classes (social reproduction) (ibid, p. 
54). 
 
At the classroom level this takes place through ‘pedagogic work, a process of inculcation 
which must last long enough to produce a durable training, i.e. a habitus, the product of the 
principle of internalisation of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after 
pedagogic action has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices the principles of the 
internalised arbitrary’ (ibid, p.67). Teachers are the agents of cultural reproduction at the 
frontline of education, inculcating practices in their students which perpetuate the inequalities 
of the social system. 
Parsons and Bourdieu both accept the central role of schools in transmitting the values of 
society and reproducing the inequalities of that society, although they judge the nature of this 
inequality differently and also evaluate it differently. Bourdieu provides an analysis of the 
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power structures of schools as resting on the authority of the state and the legitimation of 
coercion. An interpretation of authority has yet to be built into the model of value 
transmission advocated here, something that will be necessary, as some form of coercive 
power, or at least the possibility of coercion, lies at the basis of all education, including, one 
supposes, the education of values. But the evidence from transmission studies, in section 
2.5.2, indicates that it is the quality of the relationship between transmitter and recipient that 
lies at the base of successful transmission. 
2.7.3   Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission 
Working in an independent tradition, but influenced by Bourdieu’s notion of cultural 
reproduction, Basil Bernstein (1975) sets out the basis of a theory of educational 
transmission. Bernstein declares himself to be influenced by the Durkheimian tradition of 
sociology in which social class plays a major part, and the distinction between the 
‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ forms of society is a recurrent motif. Bernstein’s theory of 
transmission is built around a series of ‘codes’, derived from empirical social observations, 
from which a deductive model of transmission is derived. Bernstein’s theory has two major 
aspects, which represent different phases of his academic trajectory; the first is in linguistic 
theory, the second in the sociology of education. 
Bernstein’s sociology of education is based on his work in linguistics, particularly on the 
rules of meaning that he referred to as ‘codes’. He distinguishes two types of codes, restricted 
and elaborated. Restricted codes are ‘in-group’ language, based on common experience, 
closed off to outsiders. Restricted codes can express deeper meaning with fewer words, 
because of the familiarity of context. By contrast, elaborated codes contain more extended 
explanations in which meaning is made explicit. It is, by contrast with restricted code, open 
and universal; there is no insider dimension to it. Bernstein reckoned that restricted codes are 
intrinsic to industrial work, because of the specialised and limited nature of the work, and 
characterised by deep knowledge of a particular area of economic activity, which by its very 
nature is not conducive to elaborated codes. However, the ‘symbolic labour’ of the middle 
classes employs both restricted codes and elaborated codes. Children brought up in working 
class and middle-class families are socialised into these respective codes. Schooling operates 
largely on elaborated codes, being an open and expressive medium for the transmission of 
universal knowledge. It is, by its nature, therefore, biased in favour of middle-class children. 
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Thus, through the idea of codes, Bernstein made a connection between language and social 
reproduction. 
Bernstein’s concept of educational transmission is built around a second pair of ‘codes’, 
referred to as ‘collection’ and ‘integrated’ and how these interact with two other significant 
ideas, classification and frame. Classification applies to the type of curriculum operating in a 
school, but not the contents of the curriculum but the ‘degree of boundary maintenance 
between contents’ (ibid, p.87) in the curriculum, that is, the extent to which the various 
subjects are insulated from each other. Where these boundaries are strong Bernstein refers to 
a ‘collection code’, where weak, an ‘integrated code’. In a similar manner, ‘frame’ ‘refers to 
the strength of the boundary between what may be transmitted and what may not be 
transmitted in the pedagogical relationship’ (ibid, p.88). Where this boundary is strong and 
‘sharp’, this constitutes a collection code, where weak and ‘blurred’ an integrated code (ibid). 
Based on these structural definitions, Bernstein undertakes an interpretation of power 
distribution and control within educational institutions. Within curriculum he distinguishes 
between the more hierarchical relationships in collection codes, where knowledge is 
specialised and access is controlled and mediated through the expert, knowledge is treated as 
‘esoteric’ and access to its ‘deep structure’ is only gained over many years, and integrated 
codes in which pupils have ‘increased discretion’ over the curriculum and pedagogy and 
access to the deep structure of knowledge from the beginning (ibid, pp. 101-102). 
Paradoxically, Bernstein claims that integrated codes require greater ideological conformity 
among the staff members, which can have an effect on recruitment. Moreover, integrated 
codes demand more of the pupil in terms of their expression of thoughts, feelings and values 
and this can instigate rebellion against open learning contexts just as occur with closed 
learning contexts (ibid, pp. 107-109). 
There are clear structural motifs that run through Bernstein's theories, and an analogy 
between the open and closed formats in language and education. Nevertheless, despite these 
motifs, I fail to see any deep connection between the linguistic theory and the educational 
theory. There are points of contact as where Bernstein states, ‘Educational knowledge is 
uncommonsense knowledge’ (ibid, p. 99), which suggests a link between elaborated codes 
and curriculum collection codes, as restricted codes are the commonsense knowledge of the 
‘uneducated’ industrial classes. But there is also an underlying inconsistency; collection 
codes are the bounded forms of specialised insider knowledge handed down from experts to 
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novices who have passed through a rite of passage; my sense is that this is morphologically 
closer to the restricted code than to the elaborated code with which it is identified. 
Bernstein's concept of closed and open boundary maintenance has some resonance with that 
of open and closed worlds in the theory of value outlined in section 2.4. There is one further 
aspect of Bernstein’s theories which is of particular interest. He distinguishes between an 
instrumental order through which the transmission of ‘facts, procedures and judgments’ 
occurs and an expressive order ‘which controls the transmission of the beliefs and the moral 
system’ (ibid, pp. 54-55). The expressive order is that aspect of the school dealing with its 
‘shared values’, that which gives the institution its cohesion. The expressive order is 
maintained through a high degree of ritualization. Ritualization itself takes two forms: 
consensual and differentiating. Consensual ritualization is that which applies equally to 
everyone, at least to all pupils and consists of things like school uniform and other school 
symbolism, traditions, assemblies and the systems of reward and punishment. Bernstein sees 
its essential function as shaping identity in relation to one of society’s dominant groups. 
Differentiating ritualization, by contrast is concerned with deepening respect. There are four 
aspects of differentiation: age differentiation or life stages which are expressed through 
various rites of passage; age relationship between junior and senior, between generations, 
expressed through respect; sex differentiation expressed through gender roles; and house 
differentiation expressed through loyalty (ibid, pp. 55-58). Bernstein here approaches what I 
would term a structural semiotics of the institution, through which important values – in this 
case, respect and loyalty – are transmitted through the school.  
2.8   Structures of Formalised Values Education 
Up to this point, the focus has been on issues of theoretical concern. The third part of this 
chapter turns to those matters related to the teaching of values in formal education and their 
analysis in laying the groundwork for a model of institutional values transmission. First, 
some consideration is given to forms of governance in schools in the United Kingdom, as this 
has relevance to the institutions which will constitute the field and from which the research 
sample must be chosen, and the sometimes vexed issue of faith schooling is reviewed. This is 
followed by a series of discourses that have occurred over the past three decades on aspects 
of values education on issues of values in the curriculum, values and character education, 
tradition and values and values and wellbeing, which are both of relevance to the 
development of the theory and of relevance to preparation for immersion in the field.  
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2.8.1   The school system, governance and faith in the UK (England, Wales and N. Ireland) 
As issues of authority enter into an understanding of the context in which values education in 
formal schooling is taking place, it is necessary to consider issues of governance. The school 
system in the UK is fairly complex with a number of variables; besides issues of governance, 
there is the question of funding, whether a school has to follow the National Curriculum 
(NC), whether pupil selection is allowed and whether the school is a faith school or not, all of 
which can be independent of each other.  The table on page 51 summarises the range of these 
variables for the most common types of school (Source: Gov.UK, 2013). 
Within the school system one of the most contentious issues is that of faith schools. Most 
types of schools can be faith schools, except for community schools. Since the 1944 
Education Act faith groups have been able to establish schools with a religious charter within 
the state school system, where a need has been established. In the same act two forms of state 
maintenance were established: Voluntary Control (VC), in which the state provided all 
maintenance costs, and Voluntary Aided (VA) in which 50% of costs were provided, the rest 
being made up by the foundation from fees and donations, which affords them a greater 
degree of autonomy. Anglican foundations are predominantly VC and Catholic VA. There 
are presently (in 2010) about 20, 000 maintained schools in England and of these about 7000 
are faith schools (Allen and West, 2011), which are defined as schools that have ‘a faith-
based ethos that is written into the school’s Instrument of Government’ (DfE, 2012). Of these 
68% are Church of England and 30% are Roman Catholic; just 2% represent other faiths 
(Allen and West, 2011; Gov.UK, 2012), including other Christian denominations, although 
this is the sector which has seen the most growth (Walford, 2008). 
Fig 04 Range of variables for types of school governance 
Type of 
school 
Source of 
Funding 
Day-to-day Control Follows 
NC 
Selection 
allowed 
Faith 
school 
Community Local Authority Local Authority Y N N 
State 
Grammar 
Local Authority Local Authority Y Y N 
Academy Government Board Y/N N Y/N 
Free Government Various organisations N N Y/N 
VC Local Authority Local Authority Y N Y 
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VA Board/LA Board Y N Y 
Independent Fees/bequests Board N Y Y/N 
 
Despite the historic association of schooling with religion and the longstanding presence of 
faith schools within the educational landscape of the UK, in an increasingly secular society 
they have become controversial, both within the educational establishment and among the 
public. Resistance from within the educational establishment is particularly strong on account 
of the support given to the establishment of faith schools as part of a drive to introduce 
greater selection in the choice of schools under the Blair Labour government, a policy which 
the present Conservative-led coalition government has continued. Opposition to faith schools 
is strong within the teaching unions, and the general public are more critical of the 
involvement of religious organisation in the establishment of schools (30%) than any other 
potential stakeholders, such as businesses, charities or universities (Clements, 2010, p.958). 
The religiously observant of all faiths, unsurprisingly, are more supportive of such 
involvement, as are Catholics in general regardless of observance (ibid, p.969). The 
controversy largely centres around two perspectives: the rights of parents to educate their 
children in their faith tradition or to seek an educational environment in which they believe 
their children will prosper academically and morally on one side; on the other, the perception 
that faith schools are socially divisive and lead to segregation. 
Walford (2008, p. 690) states that religious parents of all faiths would prefer their children to 
attend a religious school, even of a different religion. While the growth of secularism and 
multiculturalism has resulted in less emphasis on Christian worship in schools, Anglican 
schools, in particular, have been accepting children of different faiths and making room for 
their religious needs, within a general Christian ethos (ibid). Among these families, though, 
there is evidence that children from higher-income religious families are more likely to attend 
a faith school than the children of a lower-income religious family (Allen and West,2011, pp. 
707-708) and that there is stronger religious self-identification among higher social status 
families (ibid, p. 708). Ward (2008, pp. 321-322) contends that faith schools are a throwback 
to the educational models of the medieval period and that education in the twenty-first 
century should be based on inclusive schools that attain the high academic and moral 
standards of faith schools. He concurs with the opponents of faith schools that the current 
educational arrangements encourage division, although thinks it is unrealistic to expect that 
they will be changed soon. A further related issue is whether faith schools allow selection by 
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the back door. I view this as a matter of perspective: whether faith schools are ‘selective’ on 
the basis of religion, or whether they are serving the needs of particular communities. All 
schools are selective to some degree, although using different criteria, for example academic 
ability, ability to pay, religious faith, or school catchment areas. All make exceptions to these 
criteria, for example through bursaries in the case of independents, and all faith schools are 
required by law to admit children of whatever faith ‘if they apply and the school is 
undersubscribed’ (DfE, 2014, p.82). I would argue that selection becomes an issue mainly 
when access to a good education is in question. The relative rigidity of state school selection 
means that some children are denied entry to a good school solely on the basis of where they 
live – frequently poorer areas – and this has a tendency to perpetuate intergenerational 
underachievement. Faith schools, by contrast, are not necessarily limited by these 
considerations. Catholic schools, in particular, have a traditional role in educating the poor, 
and while maintaining a key role in existing Catholic communities, are increasingly hosting 
immigrant communities, including non-Christian ones (Interview, school A). CE schools are 
similarly increasingly multicultural while maintaining their Christian ethos (Walford, 2008). 
Though the arguments of both sides within the academic debate centre on evidence in favour 
of or against, it seems inconclusive. While the majority support the view that faith schools are 
divisive, there are those that hold that faith schools promote integration and academic 
achievement (Clements, 2010). According to Godfrey and Morris (2008, p. 220), large-scale 
research shows that on average pupils attending faith schools score higher academically and, 
although the margins are small, it depicts a real effect. Admittedly, much of this can be 
explained by the fact that many pupils at these schools take RE as an additional GCSE, thus 
boosting the schools in the points system, but this does not account for all the difference 
(ibid, p. 221). Macmullen (2004, p. 603) develops an argument that religious elementary 
(primary) schooling underlies the development of personal ethical autonomy; he argues that 
the ‘cultural coherence’ that a religious upbringing in conjunction with a religious education 
provides is necessary for the development of an ‘ethical autonomy’. It is vital, though, that 
this cooperative effort is marked by ‘rational authority’ rather than dogmatic authoritarianism 
(ibid, p.613). The benefit for religious parents, while implying the risk that their children may 
decide on an alternative lifestyle is that if they do continue in the tradition it is more likely to 
be a freely chosen and reasoned decision. 
Solutions to resolve the social dilemma that faith schools pose, between greater freedom of 
choice and greater social harmony, tend to take the form of either excluding religious practice 
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from schools altogether or favouring a more inclusive religious ethos. Ward (2008), as noted 
above, recognises the academic achievement and higher moral standards of faith schools 
generally as something that should be aspirational for all schools, but considers religious 
practice to be divisive and that observance should be excluded from school life (ibid, p.322). 
Pupils should be taught about religions, but the focus should be on truth and reason (ibid). 
Halstead (2007, p.841), by contrast, insists that the policies of integration in existing common 
schools jar with the values of religious pupils that they are taught at home and that the 
attempt at assimilation is leading to increased alienation. He suggests, as an alternative, 
multi-faith schools in which a religious ethos would support individual faith identity within a 
commitment to the British cultural values of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and 
respect. 
Religion is still, even in this secular society, a source of explicit values for many people, and 
even more so, I would argue, the source of many of our implicit values as a society. In a faith 
school the religious foundation will be an obvious source of the values that are expected to be 
transmitted by the teacher to the pupils. There are other, less tangible sources of values, such 
as historic traditions, and government policy is another source that may have to be 
considered. These factors will have some influence on the decision about the research 
sample. I want to turn now to the academic discourse relating to values.  
2.8.2   Values in the Curriculum 
Whether and to what extent values should form an explicit and distinct part of the school 
curriculum is something that has formed an integral part of the discourse on values education. 
In examining the philosophical, political and sociological dimensions of implementing values 
education into the school curriculum, Pring (1986, p.181) declares that it is inescapable that 
‘the educational activities promoted by any society are intimately connected to what that 
society believes to be a valuable form of life…[T]he particular values embodied in what is 
designated educational will be about the kind of persons that the society wishes its young 
people to grow up into.’ However, he believes that these values will not yield to 
‘philosophical analysis’. Instead he argues that values are local and historically conditioned, 
and cites in favour of this view the controversies and arguments over values even within our 
own society and its educational system. To educate someone ‘entail[s] the introduction to a 
valued form of life but ...what [that is] is essentially a matter for moral debate’ (ibid, p.182). 
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Awareness of the dangers of educating young people in a critical tradition that can result in 
the radical transformation of culture has meant that politics has always exercised some form 
of control over what schools teach and this has manifest itself in recent times in the call for 
schools to be involved in the education of values (ibid, p.182-183). Recognising this, Pring 
turns his attention to the substantive values that he believes can and should be transmitted 
‘through the content of the curriculum but also through the methods of teaching and through 
the general ethos of the school’:  
 The respect for rule-governed behaviour, and for the authorities. 
 The respect for persons, whether oneself or others. 
 Respect for the truth. 
 Trusting and unselfish relationships. 
 A sense of justice and fairness. 
He argues, though, that:  
it would be wrong to translate the general concern for personal and social development, 
and for developing in particular a set of defensible values, into the content of specific 
subjects…For that could be but a distraction from the more important questions that a 
school should be asking about the impact of the curriculum as a whole upon the values of 
individual pupils (ibid, p.189). 
 
Pring then draws on the evidence of a survey of twelve schools, which correlated outcomes in 
terms of exam results, behaviour and attendance with the general school ethos. By ‘ethos’ 
what is meant are ‘the various stable procedures through which business is conducted 
towards individuals and their work, towards the community as a whole, and towards those 
outside the school’ (ibid, p.190).  
Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) consider the role of values education to be that of 
humanising the curriculum, in directing it towards ‘educating for excellence in the life of 
virtue’. They see this as including moral, political and personal values. 
[V]alues exist [and] are found in and embodied across the whole curriculum. Values are 
not definable as though they were an autonomous element in the curriculum, as being in 
some way a separate subject, with its own body of theory, cognitive content, typical 
activities, disciplinary procedures or criteria for success. Values permeate everything that 
we do in the curriculum – including the naming, defining and inter-relating of all its parts. 
And that is because of the point made above, that description and evaluation are 
inextricably entwined activities (ibid, p.136). 
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What seems clear from these readings is that values are not to be considered as something 
apart from the information and activities that constitute the normal life of the school. That is 
not to say that values is an area that can safely be ignored; it is, rather, an area that requires 
particular attention, but one that should be integrated into the processes and procedures of the 
school. Such considerations have also informed the debate on the implementation of 
Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) education. Within the context of the provisions 
of the National Curriculum and the 1988 ERA, it is obvious that provision should be made 
within schools for the implementation of SMSC policy. The philosophical raison d’être has 
been variously expressed, as in this rather flowery statement: ‘Just as such biological 
development requires appropriate conditions – to do with such things as climate and soil in 
the case of plants – so, the (Ofsted) report claims, the personal development of pupils 
demands a favourable ‘climate and soil’…provided and promoted by the school’ (White 
1994, p. 370, cited in Dillon and Maguire, 1997). 
There are probably two areas from which strong support and push for the implementation of 
this policy derives. The first is among the general public, and particularly the parents of 
school pupils, perceiving an apparent decline in ‘moral standards, particularly among young 
people’ (SCAA, 1996, p.8). This perception has, over the past two decades, filtered through 
to government policy and local initiatives. The other comes from the opposite end of the 
process, in the Ofsted inspections to which schools are periodically subjected and which has 
kept the pressure on schools for the incremental implementation of SMSC policy. Left to 
themselves, most schools would probably have quietly dropped this provision of the National 
Curriculum due to the burden of the existing administrative and teaching loads. As it is, 
according to Dillon and Maguire (1997, p.184), ‘Many schools are choosing to write a policy 
statement on SMSC. When developing the policy, three key issues are paramount. These are 
the need to consult, the provision of a rationale to support the proposed framework and a 
strategy to put the policy into practice’.  
There are naturally difficulties to a successful implementation of any policy on this scale. 
Pring details five areas of difficulty in relation to Personal and Social development, which 
would be equally valid in the case of SMSC: conceptual, political, ethical, empirical and 
organisational (Pring, 1984, pp.4-7). Some of the tensions involved in setting out on a policy 
like SMSC were recognised by the government in the 1970s: 
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The educational system is charged [firstly] with equipping young people to take their 
place as citizens and workers…Secondly there is responsibility for educating the 
‘autonomous citizen’, a person able to resist exploitation, to innovate and…[defend] 
liberty. These two functions do not always sit easily together (DES, 1977, quoted in 
Pring, 1984). 
 
Several strategies have been proposed for the implementation of spiritual and moral 
education. Downey and Kelly (1978) propose four possible strategies for the implementation 
of moral education in schools: a specific, timetabled, subject ‘Moral Education’; through 
broadening the scope of the existing curriculum to include a moral dimension; through 
pastoral care supplementary to the existing curriculum; and through the school community. In 
considering the teaching of spiritual values Plunkett (1990) outlines a similar range of 
strategies and draws up the advantages and disadvantages of each. Discussing the use of the 
curriculum for teaching spirituality, for example, he states: 
…a pupil will often learn thinking skills, aesthetic standards, religious values, healthcare, 
interpersonal qualities, and so forth, not from a specific subject but from the pervasive of 
multiple and often uncoordinated inputs into the total programme…The curriculum has 
become an instrument of economic and social policy when it should be just as much a 
spiritual celebration of humanity’s inner and outer beauty (Plunkett, 1990, pp.128-9) 
 
As Dillon and Maguire have pointed out, most schools pursuing the implementation of SMSC 
have done so through the writing of a policy statement (1997, op. cit.). The hope is that this is 
in some way incorporated into the ‘ethos’ of the school, a factor of agreed significance by all 
interested parties (SCAA, 1996, p.11). Citizenship education and PSE(PSHE) is also seen by 
many as playing potentially significant roles in the implementation of this policy (SCAA, 
1996, pp.14-16), though some of the recommendations have already been implemented with 
as yet inconclusive results. 
One issue that has been discussed in relation to values is the ‘hidden curriculum’. Carr and 
Landon (1999) discuss the various senses in which values are thought to be hidden in the 
hidden curriculum, such as being a part of unofficial knowledge, being implicit, 
spontaneously emerging or being deliberately concealed (ibid). In order to understand their 
role in the hidden curriculum they develop a concept of values as ‘principled dispositions or 
preferences conducive to the promotion of defensible goals or individual and social 
flourishing’ (ibid, p.24). It is this practical nature of values that makes their concealment 
possible; they are hidden in practices which do not require that they be made explicit verbally 
(except, ironically, when those same practices are brought into question), which also makes 
their deliberate concealment possible by those who do not want the practices of the institution 
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to be too closely scrutinised (ibid). They disparage both conservative and liberal views on the 
values of the hidden curriculum based on a ‘weak consensus’ and call for a more robust 
commitment to inquiring into the ‘objective truth’ of judgements made on the basis of these 
values (ibid, pp.26-27). 
2.8.3   Values and Character Education 
Peters (1981) examines the apparent paradox that exists between following rules and 
traditions in order to arrive at a rational moral position. He draws finally on Aristotle’s 
dictum (Nicomachean Ethics, book II, chapter 3-4) that ‘the virtues we get by first exercising 
them...we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing 
brave acts’. In the context of educating children in morality, Peters claims that ‘it is only if 
habits are developed in a certain kind of way that the paradox of moral education can be 
avoided in practice’ (ibid, 1981, p.60). What this way is, is beyond the scope of philosophy, 
but empirical evidence from psychology suggests that the existence of a loving and trusting 
relationship between parents and children is an important factor (ibid, p.54). 
For some, the role that it was hoped that values education would play within the life of 
schools has largely been filled by citizenship education. There have been a number of 
critiques of citizenship education, but Kristjansson (2002) advances a critique from the 
perspective of a style of character education known as ‘non-expansive character education’, 
one which he maintains the proponents of that style have not themselves thought through or 
taken advantage of. Kristiansson’s first charge (ibid, p.209) is that the concept of democracy 
implied in citizenship education is a particularly Western and liberal one. 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) introduced a distinction into values education between 
‘non-expansive character education’ and ‘expansive character education’. Kristjansson 
(2002) refined those definitions, showing that while both employ methodological 
substantivism – basically a mixture of teaching methods – non-expansive character education 
takes an approach that he terms moral cosmopolitanism, the teaching of ‘transcultural values 
and ‘moral basics’’, whereas expansive character education takes an approach which he calls 
moral perspectivism, the teaching of a highly selective range of values (ibid, pp.209-10). 
Citizenship education, according to Kristjansson, ‘constitutes a quintessential programme of 
expansive character education’. The values with which Citizenship is concerned are those of 
‘democracy’, but not only with the transmission of facts about these values but the 
inculcation of these values through ‘an extensive programme of character moulding’ (ibid). 
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Kristjansson then raises his major objection to Citizenship education which is that it 
‘politicises values education beyond good reason, by assuming that political literacy and 
specific (democratic) social skills, rather than the transcultural ‘moral basics’, are the primary 
values to be transmitted’ (ibid, p.212). There is a danger implicit in the programme of 
citizenship in that ‘the emphasis on this new foundation subject runs the risk of 
overshadowing and sidelining the necessary core of all values teaching, including justice 
teaching, namely, the inter-human psychological capabilities and moral virtues that lay the 
basis for social and political skills. To put it bluntly, the danger is that the cart will be put 
before the horse’ (ibid, p.212). 
Kristjansson (2002, pp.214-216) moves on to detail three specific areas of disagreement 
between citizenship education and non-expansive character education. First, citizenship 
privileges the ‘right’ over the ‘good’, employing a more deontologically based concept of 
justice, in which moral goodness is subservient to social institutions and particularly the 
notion of ‘rights’. Non-expansive character education, on the other hand, asserts that justice 
and other values are fundamentally ‘personal virtues’ before they come to have social and 
institutional significance for the individual. Secondly, non-expansive character education is 
pluralist to a wider range of political settlements than the narrower democratic, rights-based 
view of citizenship, but is less accepting of a plurality of lifestyles. The value of tolerance is 
not given primacy to the extent that it is in citizenship, but non-expansive character education 
can countenance the idea of personal and communal justice existing even under conditions of 
unjust government, the corollary being that social justice can exist only where just individuals 
hold sway. The third disagreement is over the relationship between morality and politics. 
Kristjansson (ibid) perceives the danger of citizenship education is that primacy is given to 
the political over the moral, the latter becoming in some way derivative. He believes this 
would overturn almost the entire philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle 
who considered the morality of the individual logically anterior to the social virtues. 
Darom considers another distinction, or tension, that arises in implementing the education of 
values in school. He begins (Darom, 2000, p.16) by contrasting the often conflicting views of 
humanistic education and values education. He states that humanistic education ‘focuses on 
the individual whose growth and development, needs and aspirations are considered 
paramount in all educational processes’. By contrast, values education ‘emphasises 
involvement with others – individuals, communities, society – commitment and social action’ 
60 
 
(ibid). Darom sees his task as integrating these two perspective s within a common 
humanistic values education. 
Darom (2000) looks at the interdependence of four aspects of education, the cognitive, 
affective, values and behaviour. ‘Education can thus be considered a system having four sub-
systems, every one of which plays an equally decisive part in the system as a whole. If any 
one of them is neglected, the whole educational process is incomplete…By striving for the 
fullest possible integration of these four domains…education has a chance of truly touching 
young people, of sowing seeds of intellectual and moral honesty and personal commitment’ 
(ibid, p.20). In particular, an individual’s value system has three components: personal, 
interpersonal and social values. ‘These three are an indivisible whole; a structure whose 
stability – whose very existence – depends on their more or less successful blending’ (ibid). 
There seems a relative consensus that values education should take a holistic approach to 
educating the whole person, addressing the various dimensions of human life such as the 
social, spiritual, economic and political spheres, the academic, physical and cultural skills, 
and the individual, interpersonal and collective levels. On that basis Darom’s distinction 
between humanistic education and values education seems superficially redundant; however, 
it alludes to an issue already discussed, in 2.8.2, that of the dichotomous purpose of 
education: whether it is preparation for a critical evaluation of, or for participation within, the 
existing social and economic order. This research does not seek to answer that question, 
except inasmuch as it bears upon the related issue of the balance between the desire of 
agencies within society to inculcate their values and the desire of individuals to freely 
acquiesce in the values that seem in their own – hopefully enlightened – interest. 
2.8.4   Tradition and Values 
In the first of the Richards Peters lectures in 1985, Alasdair MacIntyre sounded a pessimistic 
note about the future of education. ‘Teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western 
modernity’ (MacIntyre, 1987, p.16), he opined, meaning that they are both at the forefront of 
the effort to maintain that culture and that their efforts are destined to fail. MacIntyre believes 
that the task which we have set for teachers is impossible to accomplish ‘because the two 
major purposes which teachers are required to serve are, under the conditions of Western 
modernity, mutually incompatible’ (ibid). These purposes are, first, to educate a young 
person to take up a role in social and economic life, a role pre-determined by that society; 
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and, secondly, to educate the young how to think and to gain intellectual autonomy. 
However,  
[T]hese two purposes can be combined only if the kind of social roles and occupation for 
which a given educational system is training the young are such that their exercise 
requires, or is at least compatible with, the possession of a general culture, mastery of 
which will enable each young person to think for him or herself (ibid, p.16).  
 
The coexistence of these two requirements can only occur, MacIntyre is arguing, only where 
there exists what he terms an ‘educated public’. There have been times in history when such 
an educated public has existed, for example in France, England and America, and the case he 
cites is the Scotland of the eighteenth century enlightenment. But ‘as a matter of contingent 
fact specifically modern post-enlightenment societies and cultures now exclude the 
conditions which make this coexistence possible’ (ibid, p.17). MacIntyre locates the 
conditions for the existence of an educated public in the contingent existence of a consensus 
on procedures and institutions for the conduct of rational debate, marked by an ‘agreement to 
participate in a particular ongoing debate, [where] allegiance to the purposes of the debate 
would have to be as important to the participants as their allegiance to their own point of 
view’ (ibid, p.33). It is the existence of these particular conditions that MacIntyre considers to 
have vanished with the advent of modernity. One of the causes of that dissolution is the 
sweeping of intellectual discourse from the broader society into the realm of 
‘professionalized and specialized academic discipline[s]’ (ibid):  
[T]he possibility of thinking for oneself, other than as a professional specialist, only opens 
up in the context of a certain type of community and that … kind of community is no 
longer available, indeed has not been generally available to post-Enlightenment culture 
for quite some time (ibid, p.34).  
 
He considers the one possibility of returning to such a culture is an education in which the 
reading of the Greek political and philosophical texts is central. 
The return to an intellectual tradition is one of the ongoing dialogues in the philosophy of 
education. This dialogue which began in Britain really with the publication of MacIntyre’s 
book After Virtue (1981) has been paralleled in America with cultural critiques such as T. S. 
Eliot’s Notes towards the Definition of Culture (1962) and Alan Bloom’s Closing of the 
American Mind (1987). Commenting on MacIntyre’s Richard Peters lecture, Haydon 
considers that: 
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It has sometimes seemed that either education, in transmitting values, will merely be an 
agency by which the domination of one cultural tradition over others is sustained; or that, 
in attempting to avoid that outcome, it will leave the way open to a scepticism about 
whether moral values and ethical life have any meaning at all it may be that [there is] an 
understanding of the ethical life that allows us to make realistic sense of a third 
possibility: that it is indeed part of the business of education to sustain the ethical life, but 
in a way that can embrace pluralism within the ethical life. If this is not a possibility, 
perhaps MacIntyre’s pessimism will be justified after all (Haydon, 1987, p.12). 
 
There are those, naturally, for whom the fragmentation of tradition is seen as both a natural 
and a positive development. Mendus traces the arguments of MacIntyre, Bloom and Eliot 
back to a ‘myth of the fall’ and a golden age when traditions were intact. She rejects this 
view, partly because it was a myth, and rejects the call for a return to the past because of ‘a 
belief that the past is not as good as it is said to be, and ... the belief that such a return is, 
where not possible, intellectually disreputable’ (Mendus, 1992, p.182). She claims that the 
return to such a mythical golden age requires ‘an innocence that we no longer have and which 
we can only ‘regain’ by intellectual deception’ (ibid). Mendus locates the source of this 
inauthenticity in the idea that the solutions to the problems of our age and, necessarily the 
problems of education, lie in a transcendental realm. Her own view is that modernity is 
characterised by ‘reflective consciousness’ and that education should be fostering that 
capacity in the young, not cultivating an inordinate respect for tradition. Education ‘must, of 
course, appeal to the past. But it must also remember that we possess the past; the past does 
not possess us, and our task now is not to return to a lost world, but to seek and create a new 
one’ (ibid). 
Responding to Mendus, Jonathan questions whether the crisis in education brought about by 
the fragmentation of value resulting from the relentless assault of critical rationality can 
really be solved by more of the same (Jonathan, 1993, p.171). While accepting that the 
supposed homogeneity of the pre-modern world is frequently exaggerated, she argues that 
one of the consequences of relentless criticism is a ‘quantitative and exponential increase in 
the rate of cultural fragmentation [that] has resulted in a qualitative change both in the social 
world and for the developing individual’ (ibid, p.173). While Jonathan does not suggest that 
the solution to this crisis is a return to tradition as such, she warns that the predicament that is 
already engulfing modernity cannot be resolved by continuing the same emphasis within 
liberal education (ibid, p174); otherwise, the result will be a social relativism in which the 
individual good is only that which the individual chooses and the social good reduced to that 
which allows the individual such latitude (ibid, p176). 
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Mendus’ stance that a return to a more innocent, traditional view of the world is 
‘intellectually disreputable’ I understand but find overstated. Ricoeur (1967), for example, 
maintains that while fully cognisant of the facticity of the historical origins of founding 
myths, indeed because we are so aware, we are, nevertheless, able to enter into a state of 
‘second naivety’ that is as profound as the ‘first naivety’ but richer because it is based on 
knowledge and conscious decision, rather than ignorance and uncritical acceptance. 
Moreover, Gadamer (1994, p.298) argues that it is the temporal distance between the events 
in mythic time to which a text refers and the present that creates the possibility for the 
discovery of truth, through a fusion of the horizon of the present with the horizon of the text. 
The culture of modernity, if it anywhere exists outside of university departments, is 
characterised by a lack of a socially cohesive worldview. But on the very grounds of 
rationalistic critique, such a worldview cannot exist, except perhaps in the reductive 
caricature that Jonathan outlines, where we are all thrown into a state of moral solipsism. Yet, 
both intellectually and intuitively we accept the existence of society, which means we 
uncritically accept a type of myth. Within all social institutions, including educational 
institutions, a plurality of myths are fostered, many of which embody the core values of the 
institution. Many of those are held in a state of ‘second naivety’ in which they are half-
believed but fully endorsed; in many of the most enduring and adaptable institutions these 
myths are reinterpreted into new and shifting contexts without dissolving the integrity of their 
mythic core. 
 
2.8.5   Values and wellbeing 
The issue of student wellbeing and its relationship to values education has emerged as a focus 
for educators in the early twenty first century. Much of this development has been focused in 
Australia where the government has been promoting a programme of values education based 
on a set of 9 common Australian values that define citizenship in the nation and in a global 
community, a programme that each state and territory education board is following, although 
the actual policies and methodologies are being left to each area, and even each school, to 
define, mixing cross-curriculum and stand-alone approaches (Lovat, 2010, pp.3-7). The 
intellectual paradigm that supports this programme is the ‘double helix effect’, which asserts, 
based on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, that the goals of ‘learning implied in 
quality teaching (intellectual depth, communicative competence, empathetic character, self-
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reflection) [are] more readily and easily achieved in the learning ambience created by values 
education’ (Lovat, ibid, p.7). The programme thus sets out to achieve benefits in two spheres: 
that of individual wellbeing and a reinvigorated sense of citizenship and, presumably, 
national engagement.  
Although the model of values education is openly declared to be one of inculcation at the 
classroom level (ibid), which has its critics and detractors, the organisation is locally based 
and proceeds with full student involvement. In schools which are operating these 
programmes there are four main components: a common language of values and shared 
expectations about personal and interpersonal behaviour that lie at the core of the school’s 
values education programme; a positive dynamic in the teacher-pupil interaction; the 
modelling of appropriate and expected behaviour by teachers; and the incorporation into the 
programme of an external service project that provides an opportunity for pupils to be 
involved in a public good (Toomey, 2010). Through this, in addition to the ‘double helix 
effect’, there is also a ‘troika effect’ emerging from the relationship ‘between values 
education, quality teaching and service learning’ (ibid, p.20). Students are involved in the 
establishment of this structure at an early stage through Student Action Teams that identify a 
need in the local community and plan a strategy and action programme of engagement (ibid). 
Toomey asserts that this is pedagogically sound and evidence-based as it has been shown to 
provide a sense of empowerment through taking initiative, social bonding through teamwork, 
and a sense of self-worth through giving to others. 
By contrast with the Australian experience with values education, which seems to be 
affirmative, progressive, incremental and joined up, balancing political will with local 
initiative, and based on cumulative evidence from pilot schemes and scientific evidence, the 
experience with values education in the UK seems to be an object lesson in how not to 
approach it (Haydon, 2010). As in Australia, it was a perception that values relativism was an 
underlying problem of social ills that prompted attempts to discover shared values that could 
be taught in schools. In 1996 the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) 
convened the National Forum on Values in Education and the Community, bringing together 
some 150 people from organisations representing all sectors of society. Their brief was to 
arrive at a consensus of values that were shared across British society. They came up with a 
Statement of Values that is now appended to the National Curriculum (National Forum on 
Values in Education and the Community, 1997). However, its recommendations, and that of 
subsequent policy initiatives in this area, were never given statutory force, and uptake has 
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been left almost entirely to individual schools (Haydon, 2010; Hawkes, 2010). Instead, values 
education in the UK has followed the twin paths of PSHE and Citizenship Education, which 
Haydon (2010) argues has compartmentalised wellbeing and personal responsibility, unlike 
the programme of values education in Australia, which has integrated these two functions 
effectively. 
Being based on a consensus model, the values the NFVEC’s Statement contains have a 
tendency to be generalised expression of values-based intent rather than very specific named 
values as in the case of the Australian government’s National Framework for Values 
Education in Australian Schools (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). My own view is that 
this different approach may have resulted from different perceptions of where the problem of 
value relativism lay. During the twentieth century Australian schooling abandoned its original 
charter to teach values and became values-neutral (Lovat, 2010), effectively removing 
standards against which pupil behaviour could be judged. The move to values education is 
thus a recovery of its original intent. By contrast, British schools have largely maintained a 
tradition of values education through RE and more recently through PSE/PSHE, although the 
1988 Education Reform Act clearly intended to enshrine this function in law (Great Britain, 
1988). The problem of value relativism, therefore, is more likely to have been located in 
society as a whole rather than in education in particular, and for this reason the response more 
diffuse and ambivalent. 
 
2.8.6   Emerging themes within the educational discourse 
Having reviewed the literature around values education and the formal education system in 
the UK, a number of themes have begun to emerge, prominent among which are: the source 
of values; the degree of autonomy/control over the curriculum; the rationale, reason or role of 
values education; the medium for values education and the strategy for implementation of a 
values education programme; the dimensions of values education; the degree of integration, 
both internal and external, of programmes; and conflicts, antimonies and unresolved aspects 
of values education. Each of these themes will be considered, synthesising information from 
the literature considered. 
2.8.6.1   Sources of institutional values 
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Religion and faith communities: Macmullen (2006, p. 603) argues that religious education 
and religious upbringing together provide the basis for an ‘ethical autonomy’ although this 
needs to be conducted within the context of rationality rather than dogmatic faith. While 
rejecting the aspect of religious observance in schools as divisive, Ward (2008) recognises 
the higher moral standards of faith schools as something that should be aspirational. Like 
Macmullen (2006) he believes that pupils should be taught about religions within a 
framework of rational inquiry. Halstead (2007) has a radically different perspective. Schools, 
he proposes, should support the religious observance and identity of the home and faith 
community through an inter-faith ethos built on the foundation of the British cultural values 
of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and respect. 
Traditions: Traditions are longstanding institutionalised behaviours, in which values – often 
implicit – are embedded, that are passed to succeeding generations. Clearly, religious beliefs 
and practices are an important source of values and traditions for many institutions, including 
schools, though McIntyre (1987), Eliot (1962) and Bloom (1987) all refer to an intellectual 
tradition in which the reading of the classics is fundamental. 
Government initiatives: Government has always had a measure of interest in the moral as 
well as the academic education of children (Arthur, n.d.), but it was only with the Education 
Reform Act (1988) that it started to play a more active role in promoting values within 
education. Apart from Religious Education, provision of which is mandatory for all 
schoolchildren up to 16, most schools, including independents, have some form of Personal, 
Health and Social Education (PSHE), although the contents are not mandated, and 
Citizenship, which is (until 2014) a part of the NC. 
Local communities: Pring (1986, p.182) argues that values, rather than being absolute or 
universal, the result of a rational analysis, are rooted in the particular view of a society and 
the moral decisions it makes, and in the local, historically conditioned communities that 
engender and introduce the rising generation into a ‘valued form of life’.  
2.8.6.2   Degree of autonomy/control over the curriculum 
There are a number of parameters through which the degree of autonomy or control over the 
curriculum, including the provision for values education, can be ascertained, though they tend 
to converge upon particular modes – what might be referred to as models – of governance. 
For example funding, status with regard to the National Curriculum and ability to select are 
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parameters of control which are, in theory, independent of each other, yet tend to be highly 
ideological markers of the to-and-fro of policy-making. State schools, including both 
community schools and VC and VA faith schools, follow the National Curriculum, have local 
government oversight and funding and, apart from the few remaining state grammar schools, 
are non-selective. Independent schools are self-governing and financing, are not required to 
follow the NC, although many opt to teach some parts of it, and are completely selective. 
Specifically regarding values education, as this is not included in the NC and the only 
requirement of Ofsted is that the spiritual needs of pupils are being met, this gives schools a 
relatively free hand in how and to what degree they meet this requirement. Clearly, faith 
schools of all types are committed to giving a religious education, both doctrinal and 
experiential, to their pupils. There are also a small but growing number of ‘values schools’ 
(part of a movement for values education rather than an officially-recognised designation), 
whose syllabus, pedagogy and daily routines are built around a set of core values (VbE, 
2014).  
2.8.6.3   Rationale, reason or role of values education 
Rationale, reason and role are not identical, but they bear a close relationship, rationale being 
closer to an explicit justification – often requiring documentation, such as a policy statement 
(Dillon and Maguire, 1997) – and role more of an implicit, understood purpose or function. 
The reasons given for values education are advanced more philosophically and address the 
moral requirements of society. For Pring (1986, p.182) that is the creation and perpetuation of 
the ‘form[s] of life’ that society considers ‘valuable’; for Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) it 
is to promote ‘excellence in the life of virtue’. The SCAA cites a more pragmatic and 
pressing reason: to address parents’ perception of apparent decline in the ‘moral 
standards…among young people’ (SCAA, 1996, p.8). 
2.8.6.4   Medium and implementation of values education 
The process of implementation of values education begins with an impetus and that seems to 
derive mostly from the public, represented particularly by those who are most directly 
involved, that is, the parents of children within school (SCAA, 1996). But a secondary 
driving force is also the inspection regime initiated in conjunction with the National 
Curriculum, Ofsted, which as part of its responsibilities checks for the provision of Spiritual, 
Moral, Social and Cultural education; but while it can recommend, there is no statutory 
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requirement for schools to have a policy in place (Hawkes, 2010). Implementation of a values 
education policy has three steps: a period of consultation; a rationale for the policy; and an 
implementation strategy (Dillon and Maguire, 1997). There are three basic strategies to 
implement a values education programme: through the curriculum, through pastoral care and 
through the whole community (Downey and Kelly, 1978); moreover, there is a decision 
whether to have a separate timetabled subject within the school curriculum or to adapt the 
existing curriculum. Bigger and Brown (1999) advocate a cross-curricular implementation of 
values education, but many schools favour a whole school approach of embedded values. The 
experience from Australia shows both approaches can work (Lovat, 2010). Pring (1984), 
though, doubts the cross-curricular approach and favours more the transmission of a core of 
values through the general ethos of the school and ways of teaching. Increasingly, there is 
also recognition that non-curricular and non-directive aspects of school life, the so-called 
‘hidden curriculum’, also play a part in the education of values (Carr and Landon, 1999).  
2.8.6.5   Dimensions of values education 
There is near universal agreement that values education is a complex phenomenon, 
interwoven into all strands of the educational process, which needs to address the multi-
dimensionality of human life as well as that of the social institutions of schooling. Darom 
(2000) attempts to encapsulate this within four educational sub-systems, that of the cognitive, 
affective, behavioural and values, the latter which is itself comprised of personal, 
interpersonal and social values. This, though, is a predominantly psychological reading of the 
issue. A differing interpretation, although I prefer to see it as complementary, is that offered 
from a socio-cultural perspective, that of the ‘ends’ of education – individual wellbeing and 
the public good – and the ‘means’ of education – the infrastructure, materials and processes 
necessary to promote the values within the cultural spheres of the political, economic, moral 
and spiritual (Plunkett, 1990; Dillon and Maguire, 1997; Aspin and Chapman, 2000; Darom, 
2000; Kristjansson, 2002; Haydon, 2010).  
2.8.6.6   Degree of integration – internal and external – of programmes 
To speak of a programme being integrated means that the various aspects such as the 
rationale for implementing the programme, the medium or means for delivering it, the people 
and agencies bringing their various skills to the programme, and means of assessing the 
outcomes, are part of a strategic oversight, both within an institution and in relation to the 
wider society. By this measure, the development of values education within state education in 
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the UK has to be considered to be poorly integrated. There has never been a fully developed 
strategic view, and even when the prospects for one seemed at their highest in the late 1990s, 
the proposals were watered-down and eventually led to a series of recommendations and a 
fairly weak assessment regime (Hawkes, 2010). The approach has rather been piecemeal, 
perhaps reflecting a national unease about ideologically-driven or inculcatory approaches to 
values. Values education in the past would have been delivered through Religious Education 
or some form of Moral Education, but the moral content of RE at least has been somewhat 
attenuated through the focus upon appreciating cultural difference and the differing cultural 
experience (Barnes, 2011). There has been an attempt to introduce values education and 
character education through PSHE and Citizenship (Arthur, n.d.), but Haydon (2010) has 
argued that this approach has effectively compartmentalised well-being and personal 
responsibility. Moreover, Kristjansson (2002) criticises Citizenship for giving precedence to 
political values over moral ones. By contrast, ‘values schools’ and others that have 
implemented explicit values education policies have tended to have integrated approaches 
consisting of such things as core values and a values language promoted throughout the 
school, common behavioural expectations and reflective practice (Hawkes, 2010). In 
Australia, the government has taken the initiative in promoting ‘Australian values’ through 
various state sponsored programmes. Although the specifics of the programmes are decided 
at regional and even school level they have common features: they are based on 
psychological and neuroscientific evidence that the combination of quality teaching and 
values education promotes good learning and personal outcomes (Lovat, 2010); and they 
consist of four essential elements of a language of values and expectations, positive relations 
between teachers and pupils, appropriate modelling of behaviour by teachers and the 
incorporation of an external service project (Toomey, 2010). 
2.8.6.7   Conflicts, paradoxes and unresolved aspects of values education 
Actual programmes of values education often fall short of the complex multidimensionality 
outlined in section 2.865, being too limited, too tentative or too partial. However, these are 
problems essentially of implementation. There are also unresolved theoretical issues, though 
some arise out of ideological differences or simply lack of empirical data. 
A number of commentators have pointed out various paradoxes in the overall moral purpose 
of education today. MacIntyre (1987, p.16), echoing a cautionary note sounded by the DES in 
1977 (cited in Pring, 1984), sees a fundamental contradiction between education as 
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preparation for working in the economy and education for intellectual autonomy. The 
Australian experiment with values education programmes, though it is young, seems to be 
confounding such pessimistic views and showing that all aspects of pupils’ lives can be 
enhanced. Perhaps values education does, as Aspin and Chapman (2000, p.122) argue, 
‘humanise the curriculum’, meaning that it allows all dimensions of human experience to be 
integrated through practices. Not everyone is convinced of this. Foster (2001), for example, 
maintains that the openly inculcatory practices of many programmes such as those in 
Australia undermine some fundamental democratic assumptions. 
Implicit in this discourse is the fundamental pedagogical conflict over whether education, and 
specifically values education, should be achieved through a process of inculcation, in which 
weight is given to the educator of a given set of values – political, religious or traditional – or 
through a process of acquisition, in which weight is given to the acquirer of values, probably 
by some form of self-realisation. My starting assumption would be that inculcation and 
acquisition both play some role in the transmission of values, and this research will test that 
assumption in the process of identifying a mechanism for transmission. 
Both Mendus (1992) and Jonathan (1993) see the incommensurability of critical rationalism 
with the existence of a tradition, though they evaluate this conflict differently, the former a 
more strident rationalist and the latter a more concerned rationalist. Certainly to my 
satisfaction, though, tradition and reason seem to find a resolution within the philosophical 
hermeneutics of Gadamer (1994) and Ricoeur (1967), in Gadamer’s idea of the fusion of the 
horizon of the past with the horizon of the present, and Ricoeur’s concept of the re-
mythologised ‘second naivety’.  
In this context it is worth mentioning the clash between faith and reason, which seems to be 
one of the recurrent motifs within education with direct relevance to values education, as 
discussed in section 2.81. There seems to be a default assumption that reason prevail, a 
position that I have strong sympathy with; yet, the dangers of over-rationalisation have been 
made clear, by Jonathan (1993) amongst others. Faith has played, and continues to play in my 
estimation, an important role in the cultural life of societies; it should be shaped and 
controlled by reason, but not consumed in a firestorm of reason. All values, including faith 
and reason, should be self-replenishing in stable, balanced and dynamic societies. However, 
our institutions should be multi-valued, not mono-valued, whether that be faith or reason or 
some other, although there is a good case, I believe, for institutions to be disposed to holding 
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to particular sets of values, and these differently-valued institutions competing in the social 
arena. 
Peters (1981) brings attention to a fundamental antinomy in moral education between 
following rules and a rational morality and locates its possible resolution in parental 
upbringing (ibid), something that finds empirical support in the research on intergenerational 
transmission of values (Schoepflug, 2001a; Euler et al., 2001; Barni et al., 2011). It boils 
down to, as Brighouse (2006, cited in Haydon, 2010, p.198) says, living it ‘from the inside’. 
Finally, Pring (1986) raises again the thorny issue, considered also in 2.3.4, of the paradox 
that the social values that are considered fundamental to social life – and in that sense 
absolute – are, nonetheless, locally and historically conditioned. In an interview that I 
conducted with him on 11th September 2009, Pring reiterated much the same view, which is 
that the development of a person’s values is contingent upon the nature of the community or 
communities in which they are raised, and this issue cuts to the question of the nature of 
community that schools should embody in order to transmit the appropriate values to the next 
generation. Pring seems to believe that the resolution of this implicit relativism, which 
particularly troubles moral philosophers such as MacIntyre (1981), lies somewhere between 
reasoned debate, an appeal to the intrinsic worth of human life and the requirement of social 
continuity: ‘You’ve got to create the kind of communities in which the values which are 
humanly important to provide social cohesion...are somehow embodied and these young 
people are introduced to them’. I hold essentially the same position as Pring on this, although 
I suspect that the conflict of values plays a more significant role than he allows and perhaps 
reasoned debate less than we would like (citation from interview used with approval of 
interviewee). 
2.9   Summary and Implications for Research Methodology 
The theory chapter is concerned with both a review of the relevant literatures of the fields 
denoted in the introduction and the development of the theoretical underpinnings of the entire 
research project. It is divided into three parts. The first part considers the limitations of the 
debate within the philosophy of value in terms of six ‘antinomies’ and attempts to resolve 
some of those difficulties through a concept of values derived from phenomenological and 
semiotic perspectives. In the second part various theories of interpersonal transmission, social 
transmission and institutional transmission are evaluated, in order to understand the important 
parameters of transmission that are likely to play a part in the formation of a theory of 
72 
 
institutional values transmission. The third part considers major themes that have emerged in 
the academic debates on and around values education during the last fifty years, such as 
governance, curriculum, character, tradition and wellbeing and pedagogy, both for theoretical 
relevance and strategic planning and preparation for the field research phase. 
Important themes have started to emerge from a consideration of the literature. The first is the 
importance of a joint phenomenological and semiotic approach to values, which suggests the 
equally important role this approach is likely to play in attempting to model institutional 
values transmission, and important concepts such as interiority and exteriority and invocation 
and evocation. The second, through a consideration of the literature of transmission, is the 
importance of authority and power at the institutional level, and interpersonal relationships. A 
number of themes were considered in the last section, on the educational discourse around 
values, notably the sources of values to be found in schools, the degree of autonomy a school 
has in determining its values education programme, the rationale for implementing a 
programme of values education or the role that it is considered to have in school life, the 
medium by which desired values are transmitted, and the psychological and socio-cultural 
dimensions of values education, all of which will be helpful in orienting research in the field 
and may contribute to an understanding of the mechanism of values transmission within 
schools. 
Any theory which hopes to deepen understanding of institutional values transmission will 
need not only to address the issues raised in this chapter, such as value transmission at the 
interpersonal level, the broader social dimensions of transmission and the institutional 
arrangements of schools in dealing with values education, but to demonstrate that they are 
interconnected. To be valid in more than just a parochial setting it must be shown to be robust 
across a number of cases and have features that are generalisable across a broader range of 
organisations. In chapter 3 I will look at the methodological considerations that had to be 
taken into account in undertaking such this research, some of the methodological challenges 
in the field and the decisions that were taken.  
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CHAPTER 3   METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this chapter the methodological considerations brought to bear in this research are 
reviewed, drawing on the relevant literature, and the parameters for this research set out. It 
covers its philosophical justification, the strategy, and the methodological decisions taken in 
the course of the research. The topics covered in this chapter are: basic challenges at the 
design stage; the structure of the research process; view of social reality; methodological 
approach and considerations of the field: the case for case studies; validity and reliability; 
data collection methods; data analysis; ethical guidance and ethical considerations. In 
designing this research Maxwell’s (1996, pp.4-6) interactive model of research design, an 
‘interconnected and flexible’ structure incorporating an ongoing dialectic between an 
‘external’ programme consisting of the research question(s), purpose and conceptual context, 
and an ‘internal’ consisting of the research question(s), methods and validity was a 
particularly useful starting point.  
3.1 Basic challenges at the design stage 
Probably the central problematic of this entire period of study was to design a research 
process that was methodologically coherent, appropriate for the area and subject of concern, 
and could deliver reliable and valid findings. Two major factors had to be taken into 
consideration: 
1) That there was a single overarching research question, but incorporating a number of 
interrelated secondary questions, each of which should be answered in the overall 
research. 
2) That the structure of the research would need to incorporate both the evaluation of the 
plausibility of a philosophical proposition and the development of that proposition 
into a generalisable theory of social systems. 
Before considering these factors in greater detail one other feature of the research should be 
addressed. In social research values are typically a given of the social systems being 
investigated. In this case values are the central focus of research, which renders it potentially 
foundational but also particularly vulnerable to self-fulfilling arguments and selective 
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evidence gathering. Therefore, it is of importance to lay out my personal motivation on 
entering the research field. 
While values have always been central to philosophy, certain features of modernity have, in 
my opinion, made the critical reflection on values of utmost importance in a social context. 
This has less to do with the periodic crises that wrack our contemporary world, particularly in 
the Western (and westernised) societies, but more to do with a cumulative sense that the 
Enlightenment project has stripped away, and in the guise of postmodernism is continuing to 
strip away, all our former certainties: religious belief for sure, and with it much of the 
justification for moral imperatives and social virtues and that elusive quality referred to as the 
intrinsic worth of human being; but also in the supreme act of self immolation, the very 
foundations of emancipatory history itself: reason, the integrity of the human subject and the 
assumption of free will. This reduced metaphysics, while perhaps self-validating within the 
current scientific paradigms, not only impoverishes us spiritually and culturally, but also 
makes us more susceptible to economic and political manipulation. A commitment to placing 
values at the centre of social theory may help restore the human perspective which has been 
lost while remaining true to the liberating aspects of the Enlightenment. 
Having made this stance, I recognise that there is a very strong motivation for verifying 
research demonstrating the reality and significance of values in social systems and that this 
constitutes a potential threat to validity. Therefore, all measures should be taken in the 
construction of the research to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings. 
3.1.1   The research questions 
To reiterate, the primary research question is:  
How are values transmitted in an institutional setting? 
and the four subsidiary questions: 
1)    What is the nature of values? 
2)   What implications might a theory of values have on the understanding of issues of 
the acquisition and inculcation of values? 
3)   How do schools approach values education? 
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4)   What could constitute the theoretical basis of values education in formal education 
taking into account the broader context of the social and political demands on schools? 
Chapter 2 focussed largely on the first and second of these subsidiary questions; this chapter 
is built more around answering, or setting up the conditions in order to answer, the third and 
fourth. Question 3 centres around the issue of gaining the right kind of data from the schools 
while question 4 is about the analytic tools that can lead from raw data to well-founded 
theoretical findings. This leads on to looking at the structural requirements and the actual 
structure of the research. 
3.1.2   The structural requirements of the research 
The research as a whole has attempted to introduce more philosophical insight into the 
concept of values within the social sciences and then to develop and investigate the 
plausibility of this conceptualisation in real-world contexts. Therefore, the overall research 
structure is theory testing as well as theory generating, having both deductive and 
inductive phases, locating itself somewhere between the positivist and social constructivist 
perspectives (Patton, 2002). There are reservations about such hybrid programmes and the 
methodological choices they imply (Guba and Lincoln, 1988), but Patton (2002) argues that 
any research programme is located along a deductive/inductive continuum and that human 
reason is sufficiently flexible to accommodate data from different sources and make reasoned 
arguments from it; moreover, the prejudice belies the fact that as methods transcend their 
origins and enter the mainstream of social research practice, they are as intrinsically 
adaptable as any other tool. 
In what sense is the research process intended to be theory testing? In the hard sciences the 
criterion for testing has ranged between verifiability (the logical positivists, for example) and 
falsifiability (Popper, 1959), but both positions are premised on the notion that the observable 
parameters are small in number and can be constrained under experimental conditions. This is 
not realistic in the social sciences, as the observed phenomena are inherently complex; nor 
can they be sufficiently isolated. There is also the issue of reflexivity, in which the observer is 
inextricably bound up in the phenomena being observed. Therefore, strict criteria of 
verifiability or falsifiability are not appropriate. What is appropriate is the conceptual 
plausibility of a theory supported by observational evidence within a methodological 
framework that is transparent and processes that are reliable, a stance not very different 
to the paradigmatic concept of scientific research (Kuhn, 1962). 
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From the philosophical analysis of value, summarised in chapter 2, the concepts of invocation 
and evocation emerged as foundational in a deductive model of value transmission and thus 
as ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer, 1954) in the shaping and establishment of the research 
programme.  In order to apprehend the reality of values transmission, though, and hence test 
the concept of transmission based on invocation and evocation for plausibility, within this 
quasi-experimental framework the methodological approach needed to be able to model real 
world institutions and capture their inner world. In doing so, the framework also became 
theory-generating. The process was, therefore, one of refinement, as the concept of value 
transmission was translated from a ‘thin’ philosophical proposition to a ‘thick’ social theory 
(Geertz, 1973). 
3.2   The Structure of the Research  
Based on the points discussed above, the need to both test theory and to generate theory, and 
also to build robust triangulation into the research methodology, I proposed a two tier 
approach, consisting of a core research aspect, which was be the main focus throughout, and 
a derivative hypothesis evaluation aspect, which played a supporting evaluative role in the 
overall research. The structure of the research is outlined in the following diagram. 
 
Fig 05 Structure of the research 
3.2.1   The Core Research  
The core research was an inductive approach of data gathering from a sample of schools and 
through analysis of the data the formulation of theory from the emerging themes. This was 
guided by the concepts of invocation and evocation as sensitising concepts, as discussed 
above, which means, based on the idea of invocation, that I looked in particular at the way in 
which values were communicated throughout the school and from the school to the pupils, in 
the classroom but also in a more distributed way though the school as a whole. I was also 
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looking, based on the idea of evocation, at the ways in which the communication of values 
was linked with the idea of community and the promotion of a communal ethos in the school.  
3.2.2   Derivative Hypothesis Evaluation  
There is considerable controversy over whether hypotheses are allowable within qualitative 
analysis, as they are normally the preserve of quantitative analysis. However, Guest et al. 
(2012, p.7) describe a ‘confirmatory (hypothesis-driven)’ approach to qualitative data 
analysis. They argue that some exploratory qualitative approaches generate theory and 
grounded theory explicitly builds theoretical models, which are then tested; the implication is 
that these are points on a continuum. Confirmatory approaches tend to use existing data 
(ibid); in this case the data will be that generated by the core research. 
The derivative hypothesis research consisted of ten hypotheses derived from the core 
concepts of invocation and evocation or from the arguments leading up to their derivation, 
concerning the nature of values. These hypotheses made predictions, based on the theoretical 
stance, about possible cognitive, behavioural and social consequences that should arise were 
the theory to be essentially correct. They were connected to the subsidiary research questions 
1 and 2 with implications for question 3. Some of them, in principal, were thought to be 
empirically testable, although that was outside of the scope of this research; their plausibility, 
or otherwise, was evaluated in the data from the field, along with any themes emerging from 
the main research, though theoretical sampling. It was thought that this should result in a 
fairly straightforward indication of the likely validity of the theoretical assumptions, though 
neither this nor the core research would be able to demonstrate more than the plausibility of 
the mechanism for transmission that I intended to develop through this.  
Each of the hypotheses is stated, and then its source in the theory located and any further 
explanation given. Hypotheses 1-5 proceed from the theory to address the more general 
philosophical implications of the theory; hypotheses 6-10 address the specific context of 
values education in schools based on the ontology of values outlined. 
Hypothesis 1:   Values do not precede social or moral behaviours. Rather they emerge in 
individual consciousness through the growing socialisation of the individual, through 
reflection upon experience in the context of a culturally transmitted narrative. 
This is based on the idea of values as shared experience. Values as concepts can, of course, 
precede the practice of the virtuous behaviours that they name for any individual, but a value 
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as an acquired value is the conceptualisation of an experience shared with others in a 
professing community. This experience is only likely as the culmination of a process of 
acculturation into the norms and expectations of a given community, although the demands 
and initiation rites of social groupings vary considerably in terms of stringency, duration and 
formality, and hence of the commitment required. To profess a value is to accept the moral 
requirements of the value as requirements of oneself. To do otherwise is a logical 
contradiction. 
Hypothesis 2:   Once established, values justify various behaviours, moral codes and 
worldviews, though they do so most readily in a collective setting. 
This is based on the idea that appropriated values coexist with closed social groups. Although 
values are acquired on the basis of the acceptance of particular social and moral norms, once 
acquired they become the ‘anchor points’ by which individuals justify the existence and 
maintenance of those very norms; this is true both for individuals and for groups. That to 
which one is both emotionally and conceptually wedded, which, as argued, is the nature of 
value acquisition, and additionally something in which one is socially participant, is an 
extremely stable stance psychologically and one from which it is very difficult to detach 
oneself. Even counter-factual evidence is likely to be interpreted in a favourable light to one’s 
communal stance. 
Hypothesis 3:   There is no a priori hierarchy of values. A value is generated only by the 
naming of a shared experience. While a value will be considered a good of a particular 
community, group or institution, there is no Archimedean standpoint from which to declare 
that one value is superior to another. The near universality of certain values and the 
marginalisation of others represents an a posteriori distributive outcome of a selection 
process, by which over time we have found that some values have proved a better fit to 
human society than others. 
This is based on the ontological equality of values as conceptualised shared experience. It is 
not an argument that there is no priority of values as such, as experience strongly suggests 
there is, and even reason may dictate that, given the parameters of human nature and 
sociality, some values might be more probable than others; it is that this priority can really 
only be established empirically and that all values are potentially viable. While this 
introduces an element of relativism, it is more of a methodological relativism in determining 
the approach to the multiplicity of values that exists within social institutions in reality; its 
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position is more one of value pluralism, but one which posits an underlying convergence of 
all values in promoting the socialisation of the individual. 
Hypothesis 4:   Knowledge of a value, or discussion about values, are different to their 
acquisition, though the two things are always in an equilibrium of sorts. Knowledge and 
discussion take place in an open communicative system in which the function of language is 
conceptual, whereas acquisition takes place in a closed system, with a strong awareness of 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in which the function of language is symbolic and performative.  
This is based on the dual aspects of value, as concept-like and symbol-like. It reiterates the 
main points made in hypothesis 1, with a different emphasis. The stress in less on the 
acquisition of value and more on its ontological structure as language at the boundary 
between symbolisation (evocation through invocation) and information flow (through 
discourse). This makes possible both the commitment to values particular to specific contexts 
and the objectification of knowledge about those or other symbolic discourses through 
rational discourse. 
Hypothesis 5:   All values theoretically exist in a state of tension, as they underlie 
fundamentally incompatible worldviews, or groups and institution with competing or 
conflicting interests. Paradoxically though, the stability of large and complex societies lies 
in maintaining and even strengthening a dynamic equilibrium between different outlooks on 
life based on different values that may be exclusive and incompatible.  
This hypothesis makes a deduction from the ontology of values as shared experience within a 
closed communal structure, namely that commitment to a particular value (or set of values) is 
grounds for the dismissal of other values on the basis simply that they are not shared by the 
group in question, for example faith and reason. The paradox is that though this is the logic of 
values, the coexistence of incompatible values promotes value plurality under generally 
tolerant social circumstances and hence greater social integration. It also, from an 
evolutionary perspective, provides for greater adaptability of the society to change as a result 
of environmental stress.  
Hypothesis 6:   My analysis suggests that, as reflection upon experience, values are likely to 
be a chronologically late mental acquisition. Discussion of values or values clarification at 
this stage can mitigate the closed worldviews in which values are generated, by teaching us 
how to live in a multi-valued world. We learn to do this by negotiating an internal 
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compromise between values which are largely incompatible. It is questionable whether it 
would be wise to expose young minds too early to the process of discussion of values or 
‘values clarification’. It may in fact be counterproductive. 
This is based on the idea of values as conceptualised shared experience. On the basis of 
hypothesis 1, getting children to engage in values clarification is tantamount to asking them 
to decide on their own moral norms. The responsibility of any teacher is to transmit what they 
understand to be the best that their culture and society has to offer in terms of moral and 
behavioural standards, to model their own behaviour on that and to expect their students to 
meet those standards. Young people can be expected to encounter a number of alternative 
views of life, to apply rational discernment and to arrive at their own unique life-world. This 
process should not be short-circuited by asking them to decide based on very limited 
experience. 
Hypothesis 7:   The acquisition of values coincides with the mastery of a type of knowledge 
and the development of an internal reflective capability, such as moral or aesthetic sensibility. 
If this is so then values education in its most general sense is only the application of the 
standards of good teaching across the curriculum, and does not entail a specific 
requirement that knowledge of values be taught. 
This is really a development of hypothesis 6. It does not preclude that values are taught, even 
explicitly. However, values should always be integrated into a practice, a practice which can 
generate the experience from which the acquisition of specific values can emerge. In other 
words young people can be taught values, but it would be a mistake to teach them about 
values in a decontextualised setting. There should be a place, though, for a sympathetic and 
empathetic comparison of the values of different cultures. 
Hypothesis 8:   With regard to values education in the more specific sense of moral 
education, there seems to me also no requirement that a timetabled subject with a curriculum 
entitled ‘moral education’ is needed. What is needed above all is the assertion of 
standards of behaviour to which students should be required to conform. This seems to 
me the basic requirement of any community, whether that be a school, or any other social 
grouping. The fact that, from a historical perspective, most standards of right and wrong that 
have been asserted can be seen to be relative is not very pertinent, for the function of 
standards is always socialisation leading to the acquisition of values. The normative 
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content of moral education must be to lead the individual away from a preoccupation 
with the self to others and the wider community. 
This is based on the idea of value as shared experience within a closed community. This 
hypothesis really only reiterates what has been stated in hypotheses 3 and 7. The underlying 
ontology of all values is that of shared experience, leading the individual towards a more 
socially-oriented worldview. It is one of the important functions of schools that they create 
the circumstances in which their pupils experience participation in a communal framework 
that draws out broadminded and altruistic attitudes and a more socially-oriented mindset. 
Hypothesis 9:   For values to be acquired they must permeate the institution at all levels 
This is again based on the idea of value as shared experience within a closed community. An 
institution is usually a complex social entity, being at the nexus of competing social forces 
and agendas, and having a stratified internal structure consisting of a number of levels and 
departments. Each level/department may have its own priorities and values unique to its 
specialisation. Some of those may be transmissible values, but some will be purely 
operational (instrumental). Values that the institution as a whole considers important and 
worth transmitting should be found at every level, from the most senior administrator/leader 
to the intended recipients: being mentioned, acted upon, signed, discussed and reflected upon. 
Hypothesis 10:   For values to be acquired they must be exemplified by those in authority 
The notion of invocation, as previously discussed, implies the idea of charismatic authority. 
This authority is constituted in part by sign-acts that embody particular virtues, which 
contribute to the evocation of shared experience within a communal structure. 
These ten hypotheses will not feature in the main research or in the findings which come out 
of it. They will be reserved for discussion in the evaluation of the research undertaken in the 
final chapter. 
3.3   View of Social Reality 
Since research must be carried out in the real world and data collection made in a defined 
field, the decision on a practical course of social research depends not only on the topic of 
research and the research questions but also on the philosophical perspective of social reality. 
Cohen and Manion (1989) outline four aspects of the view of social reality that the researcher 
has to settle before being able to decide upon a course of social research: the ontological 
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conception of social reality; the epistemological question of the source of knowledge about 
society; the nature and role of human consciousness; and, based on the aforementioned, the 
methods pursued in gaining data for social research. A similar set of requirements has been 
set out by Morgan and Smircich (1980) and Burrell and Morgan (1979). I will briefly discuss 
some of the views expressed in these areas before locating my views. 
Social ontology has traditionally veered towards emphasising either social structure or social 
agency having primacy. A realistic stance would be that structure and agency both play a 
part, a view reflected in the work of most modern theorists, such as Bourdieu and Passeron 
(1977) and Giddens (1984). Searle (1995) asserts that social reality consists of both ‘observer 
independent facts’, such as matter and the forces of nature, and ‘observer related facts’ and 
describes social institutions as bearing ‘deontologies’, such as laws and obligations. 
According to Hodgson (2006, p.18), ‘Institutions are systems of established and embedded 
social rules that structure social interactions’. Morgan and Smircich (1980) describe a 
continuum of assumptions about social reality, stretching from extreme subjectivist, where 
reality is a ‘projection of the imagination’, to extreme objectivist, in which reality is 
comprised of ‘concrete structures’. It seems a reasonable point to be located somewhere 
between these extremes. As Searle (1995) points out, social being is living among people and 
things, but it is also to be bound to and to interact with people and things in non-physical 
ways. However, I would locate myself slightly closer to the subjectivist side. In the same way 
that a sign, qua sign, is defined by its semiosis, not by the material substrate, so social 
institutions are more properly defined by their deontologies than by the ‘bricks and mortar’ or 
‘flesh and blood’ in which they are housed. In terms of the development of values, the 
theoretical considerations undertaken in chapter 2 imply a philosophical primacy of human 
narrative interaction, but that the group structure arising through that interaction comes to 
take on a semi-autonomous existence, creating the social space in which the next ‘generation’ 
of agents interact, underlying the tendency of institutions both to persist and to change. 
Just as there is a range of ontological stances on social reality, there is a range of 
corresponding epistemological stances on the source of knowledge about social reality that 
stretches from positivist through to anti-positivist. Positivism is the view that the only valid 
source of knowledge is the scientific method. In sociological terms this would imply an 
empirical approach to social research and a reliance on quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis. Few sociologists would accept a purely positivist approach today, as 
many aspects of social reality are understood as constructed in the interaction between social 
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agents. Anti-positivism or subjectivism views social realities as entirely mentally constructed 
with no contribution from external, physical realities. This is the stance taken in post-
structuralist, postmodern views of society (Crotty, 1998). For subjectivism meaning is 
individual and localised, so in terms of data gathering the preference is for qualitative 
methods like ethnomethodology (Stebbins, 1975).  Between objectivism and subjectivism lie 
various forms of constructivism, which accepts that social reality is both generated and 
understood in terms of the interaction between the subject and the object, including other 
subjects. I would put myself largely in the symbolic interactionist camp, as that has been 
defined by Blumer (1986) in terms of three premises: ‘that human beings act towards things 
on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them’; meaning [arises] ‘in the process 
of interaction between people’; and ‘the use of meanings by an actor occurs through a 
process of interpretation’ (ibid, pp.2-4, [italics original]). Symbolic interactionism has a 
strong correspondence with the view of value as arising through the conceptualisation of 
shared experience that I outlined in chapter 2 and the phenomenological and semiotic 
standpoint (Adler and Adler, 1994; Denzin, 1987) that I have declared. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) present four ‘paradigms’ of understanding social reality through 
organisational structure: the functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical 
structuralist. The radical paradigms are concerned with issues of social alienation, which lie 
outside the scope of this research, the focus of which is to develop an understanding of social 
process, in this case the transmission of values. The functionalist and radical structuralist 
paradigms share a structuralist ontology and positivist epistemology, but diverge in 
methodological orientation, functionalism being concerned with theory testing and radical 
structuralism with social critique. The interpretive paradigm, which seeks to understand the 
social world through the meanings arising through human interaction, is far more conducive 
to the research I am proposing. 
From where I had located myself among the various alternatives, the clear methodological 
choice was to design research in which qualitative research methods predominate 
(Crotty, 1998). This choice needed to be justified, however, against a background in which 
there is a long-established tradition of quantitative research into values, for example that of 
Rokeach (1973) and the American Values Survey, and similar programmes that it has 
inspired. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, there was an element of theory 
testing proposed, through the secondary derivative hypotheses. I will respond briefly to those 
two points. First, as values are understood as being communicative (in a transitive sense) and 
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inherently transmissible, to understand the transmission of values it was necessary to 
investigate the structures of meaning that people employ in institutional interactions, and 
indeed this researchers own reflexivity on entering the field. This strongly biased the research 
towards a qualitative research methodology. Secondly, the criterion of testability in this 
research was neither verifiability nor falsifiability (Popper, 1959), but the weaker plausibility. 
If no evidence is found that specifically contradicts a statement, there is circumstantial 
support, and the statement falls within the parameters of generally agreed knowledge, then it 
can be considered plausible (Hill, 1965). Qualitative methods of data collection are sufficient 
to supply data adequate to establish plausibility. 
3.4   Methodological approach and considerations of the field 
3.4.1   Justification for Case Study Research 
Although the case for qualitative research was clear, there were a number of options for the 
actual research approach. Qualitative research is a very broad term that covers a number of 
distinct methodological approaches and strategies which have in common a period of field 
work, an attempt to grasp a holistic picture of the phenomenon of interest, and a focus on the 
perceptions of the actors within the field of the phenomenon under investigation (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Some were not deemed appropriate to the purpose of this research, for 
example action research and ethnomethodology, as the focus of this research was to locate 
structural constants in an educational process and a generalisable institutional theory. Some 
were more appropriate to the research, such as ethnography, mixed methods research and 
purely phenomenological and semiotic approaches. In the end I chose a case study approach 
because I felt it offered the best opportunity to model the institutions investigated as systems 
for value transmission and incorporate a mixed methods approach, including both 
phenomenological and semiotic analytic methods.  
Because the case study can be regarded as a closed system (Bassey, 1999), in which ‘The 
distinguishing feature...is the belief that human systems develop a characteristic wholeness or 
integrity and are not simply a loose collection of traits’ (Sturman, 1994, pp.61-6), this is 
consistent with the aim of modelling the institutions studied. There is also considerable 
flexibility in the format of case studies: a case can be an individual, group, an organisation or 
any other conceivable social unit; they can be for singular or for multiple cases; they are 
frequently longtitudinal studies, but they can also be used for snapshots at a point in time 
(Rose, 1991).  Case studies typically employ multiple methods as a means of triangulating 
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data and avoiding bias. They are also used as the basis for cross case analysis, which can 
proceed by replicating the format of a single in-depth study and seeking identical emergent 
features (Yin, 2009) or by comparison of a diverse range of cases. Case studies, unlike 
ethnographic approaches, also allow the incorporation of theory at the outset (Yin, 2009), 
rather than beginning with a presuppositionless collection of data. Given that the model of 
institutional values transmission should be robust across a range of variability, this suggested 
that the format of the research should be a number of case studies together with a cross case 
analysis.  
Yin (2009, p.8) recommends case studies when the research aims are formulated as ‘how?’ 
and ‘why?’ questions, where no control is required over ‘behavioural events’ and  the focus is 
on ‘contemporary events’. As the main research question concerned how values are 
transmitted institutionally, and the other research questions were subsumed within this, this 
made the case study approach a strong contender. Moreover, there was no requirement for 
behavioural control; rather, the purpose was to observe what was happening institutionally in 
order to understand the processes occurring and the structured meaning established through 
institutional interaction. The focus was also on contemporary events; some history may add 
interest or depth, but was of no relevance to the question of how values are transmitted 
institutionally. Therefore, case studies were an appropriate format for this research. 
3.4.2   Type of Case Study 
In the literature on case studies, there are a number of options as to the type of case study. For 
example Stake (1995) describes two possible formats: intrinsic and instrumental case studies. 
Merriam (1988) suggests descriptive, interpretive and evaluative forms. Yin (2009) also 
defines three basic types: explanatory, descriptive and exploratory. The best option for this 
research was the explanatory case study, which was appropriate to uncovering causal links in 
a process that might not have been accessible to other research methods (Yin, ibid). It could 
also have been considered an instrumental case study because it was being studied for a 
particular reason, to understand the nature of values transmission, rather than just for its 
intrinsic interest (Stake, 1995). 
Other factors determined the nature of the case study to be constructed. One was the 
limitations imposed on the research in terms of time availability, which ruled out a 
longitudinal study in favour of a ‘snapshot’ view of the institution (Rose, 1991). Additionally, 
a longitudinal study would have thrown more light on the question of whether value 
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transmission had been successful than the mechanism by which it was occurring. Another 
factor was the nature of the sample. Dealing with separate schools entailed a multiple-case 
design rather than a single case. Yin (2009, pp.54-55) lays down a strict criterion for such 
multiple-case studies: the individual cases should be replicating each other, in order that 
commonalities in emergent features can be considered robust and that significant differences 
are accounted for within the design framework. In this research the individual schools, which 
constituted the cases, were all approached in the same manner: identical data collection 
methods were used (where variation was employed, rather than occurring in a few minor 
instances for reasons beyond control, it was strategic and used to test the robustness of 
findings) and the data were analysed by identical methods; any adjustments/correctives to the 
design made during the course of the fieldwork or analysis were subsequently incorporated 
into each case, following the linear-iterative process outlined by Yin (2009).  
3.4.3   Decision on the Sample 
The fourth of the research questions - What could constitute the theoretical basis of values 
education in formal education taking into account the broader context of the social and 
political demands on schools? – makes explicit that a sample of schools would constitute 
the field. But, what of the parameters of the sample: type of school, composition of student 
body and number? Silverman (2000) distinguishes between two types of sampling: purposive 
and theoretical. Purposive sampling means having a reason and certain criteria for choosing 
the sample, rather than random sampling. Theoretical sampling is similar, but the reasoning 
arises from theoretical considerations. In this research there were both purposive and 
theoretical aspects to the sampling decision. Formality was a constraint, which means that the 
schools should be publicly recognised educational institutions that fall within the purview of 
the government’s educational oversight. The last part of the research question, however, 
refers to social and political demands as a context for variability, meaning that the sample 
should represent a range in terms of governance and constituency, as any model of 
institutional values transmission must be shown to be robust in the face of such variables. 
Examples of types of school and the factors relevant to governance were considered in 
chapter 2 (2.8.1). This opened up the range of schools considerably: state comprehensive, 
grammar, independent, faith, academy, specialist (such as Steiner), and now free schools.  
This had to be balanced against limitations of time and resources. Moreover, the specific 
requirements of the research did not indicate that a numerically large sample was called for, 
but rather a smaller sample of fairly in-depth studies. It was decided to limit the field to three 
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types of school: one faith school, one independent and one state comprehensive, in which a 
range of the variables related to governance, shown in the table on page 51, were present. 
Regarding the composition of the student body, one of the implications arising from the 
theoretical arguments is that values are a relatively late stage development, emerging with the 
capacity for reflective consciousness. Therefore, the age range of the student body should be 
the same and the focus should be on secondary schools rather than on primary schools. Since 
the research question is neutral towards gender, ability/disability, sexuality and ethnicity, the 
decision was that the schools should be as inclusive as possible: mixed gender and reasonably 
representative of the youth population as a whole; partly because inclusion is a statutory 
requirement of all schools, but, more importantly, in order to throw the focus on those areas 
of autonomy of potentially particular relevance to any policy on the acquisition of preferred 
values, such as a religious worldview or a particular tradition. There was an expectation that 
sampling within the case should be representative of the case as a whole. The decisions of 
who would participate in the research was essentially taken out of my hands and decided by 
the schools. Across the participant schools, though, the sample was fairly representative. 
3.5   Ethical guidelines and ethical considerations 
The research followed the appropriate guidelines established by the British Educational 
Research Association (BERA, 2004) and the Code of Research Ethics for Derby University 
(2011), to the overall aims of non-malfeasance and beneficence, particularly relating to the 
areas of informed consent, legal requirements in working with schoolchildren, bureaucratic 
burden, anonymity, privacy and confidentiality, respondent validation and data protection. It 
was felt that these would be the issues that would impact on the research as it is constituted. 
Examples of consent forms are in Appendix 1 
Informed consent 
All participants were aware of the nature of the research, at least their part in it and frequently 
the broader perspective. Interviewees explicitly gave their consent to be recorded. In regard 
to work in schools, it was the decision of the school whether in their judgement the parents of 
participating pupils needed to be informed. No coercion was applied to any participant or 
potential participant during any part of the research. Due to the theoretical nature of the 
analysis to which the data would be put, there was a limit to how informed participants were, 
but there were no issues of deception involved and no issues over which disclosure of the 
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general nature of the research compromised the research process. All participants and all 
participating institutions were informed of their right to withdraw from participation in the 
research process. 
Protection of participants/ Legal requirements in working with schoolchildren 
According to the guidelines, the research should pose no physical, psychological or emotional 
threat beyond that encountered in daily life. The research imposed no such dangers, being a 
series of interviews and observations in the schools in question. Surveys were carried out by 
the pupils’ own teachers. 
The legal requirement is that all people working with children over extended periods must 
have Criminal Record Board clearance. Whether the degree of contact in each case was 
covered by this requirement was decided by the schools in question, as was the decision on 
informing the parents of any children participating in the research. I informed the schools that 
I was CRB-checked and the schools made any arrangements with parents that they felt they 
needed to. 
Bureaucratic burden 
Clearly, any research introduces some burden onto a participating institution, but the research 
was designed not to impinge excessively on already busy schedules. The following is taken 
from a sample letter to a school. 
The research is designed to be minimally intrusive and to disrupt the normal life and schedule of the school 
as little as possible. The important findings will hopefully emerge from the overlapping perspectives of the 
data generated.  
The terms of research were discussed and negotiated with the school at the start of the 
process, and in each case a principal contact was appointed. Any changes and all stages of the 
research process were negotiated through that contact. 
Anonymity, Privacy and confidentiality 
All participants were ensured that their contribution to this research would be anonymous, all 
references to their institution and its location removed, and that casual references to objects, 
practices and structures, which could be easily traced through an internet search, would be 
suitably disguised as far as possible without distorting the data from the field. 
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School documents not in the public sphere and information communicated personally to the 
researcher by any of the respondents concerning the school, particular members of staff or 
pupils, are covered by the rules of privacy and confidentially, and were only be used to the 
extent that they have a bearing on the research, whereupon they were covered by the rule of 
anonymity. Sensitive information brought to the attention of the researcher was not used 
unless it was integral to the research purposes, or if a request for non-inclusion was made by 
a participant. 
Respondent validation and debriefing 
Participants were informed at particular points in the processing of information in which they 
participated, such as the completion of transcription of interviews, and had an opportunity to 
view, comment and correct any errors or mistakenly identified views. Participants also had 
the opportunity to comment on analyses of data to which they had contributed. Feedback on 
the progress of the research was built into some of the research activities in the school. A 
final report was also submitted to the Head of the school for further distribution at their 
discretion. 
Data Protection 
All data sources were stored in at least one format. Original documents, photocopies of 
documents, field notes such as those recorded on interview questionnaires and observation 
sheets, and completed questionnaires were filed and shelved. Ring binders and box files were 
clearly labelled. The relevant data from these documents was collated into Word documents, 
stored in computer files. Cassette tapes made of the original interviews were stored in a box 
and shelved. Their contents were transcribed to Word documents. Later interviews were 
carried out using a digital recorder and directly transferred to MP3 audio files.  
Many Word files, and all transcriptions, were backed up by a hard copy, filed as described 
above. All computer files relating to the research were backed up on a USB stick and a CD. 
In addition to the home computer disc drive, all the files relating to the research were 
duplicated on the researcher’s personal computer at work, which was backed up daily on the 
company server. Particularly important information was emailed between the home and work 
addresses as an additional back up. 
Although governed by conditions of anonymity and confidentiality, the nature of the research 
was not particularly sensitive, so no special security measures applied beyond the basic and 
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reasonable ones to protect loss of data. All computer and hard files at home were easily 
accessible by other members of the family, but reasonably secure otherwise. At work the 
computer on which the files were stored is password protected, so inaccessible to all but me. 
The USB and CD on which the files are backed up were kept in a safe place. A separate USB 
was used to move files between home and office, but only those files being actively worked 
on.  
3.6   Validity and Reliability 
The dual issues of validity and reliability are central to all research, in whatever field. 
Validity is fundamentally to do with the logical flow from premises to conclusions, that there 
is a line of reasoning and arguments connecting the initial hypotheses, data in the field and 
eventual findings in which no invalid steps are made. For empirical research, such as 
grounded theory based research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), the rooting of concepts and 
categories, leading up to theory, in the field data is of paramount importance for validity. 
Brindberg and McGrath (1985) argue that the meaning of validity undergoes a subtle shift at 
every stage of the research process; in research design it denotes the coherence of the various 
elements of the programme; in the process of empirical research it is the correspondence 
between the real world systems and conceptual development; and in interpretation and 
explanation it is the robustness and generalisability of the findings. Hammersley (1992, 
p.131) points out that the validity of research is established inter-communicatively rather than 
individualistically due to the role of the academic community in ‘checking the results of 
particular studies, and the fact that it deploys, or should deploy, a more sceptical form of 
assessment than is typical elsewhere’. 
Reliability has to do with the robustness of the findings of a research programme. In the 
sciences the criterion of repeatability is the measure of the robustness of findings, whether an 
independent observer following the same process would arrive at the same conclusion. While 
the requirements of qualitative social science are not as stringent, there is a reasonable 
expectation that an independent researcher entering the field with the same methodology 
would be led to similar findings. A tradition of research has established a paradigm for 
research, within which reliable research is carried out. Kirk and Miller (1986) outline four 
stages in the development of any qualitative research programme: design, discovery, 
interpretation and explanation. Perfect validity can never be realised, but reliability, which is 
the basis of the validity of the research programme, can be established through the four 
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stages, each of which must be present in that order. In qualitative research there is great 
importance attached to field notes, not only as a record of the procedures which the research 
utilised, but also the greater context in which it took place, particularly the assumptions, 
prejudices, values, behaviour and experiences of the observer, which are considered part of 
the relevant ‘theories’ in play, in addition to the purely academic theories to which the 
observer claims allegiance (Kirk and Miller,1986). 
For this case study based research I drew on the definitions of validity and reliability given by 
Yin (2009), as they are systematic, clear, detailed and specific; moreover they are allied to 
‘tactics’ (ibid, pp.40-41) which are demonstrable and checkable. Yin describes four criteria 
for the production of high quality case study: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability (ibid). I will consider each of these in turn and explain how these 
criteria were met within this research. 
3.6.1   Construct Validity 
Construct validity means establishing the proper procedures within the research programme 
to enable the aims and objectives of the research to be met, that is the research questions to be 
answered. Yin (2009) suggests three tactics: the use of ‘multiple sources of evidence’; 
establishing ‘a chain of evidence’; and allowing participants in the research to review drafts 
of the study. In this research a mix of data collection methods was employed (discussed in 
section 3.7), leading to the creation of evidence from multiple data sources. In the Findings 
chapter the audit trail leading from raw data to the emergent concepts and categories is shown 
and the arguments for each decision evaluated. Transcriptions of interviews and observations, 
primary analyses of interviews and observations, syntheses of institutional data, and 
examples of ‘conceptual clustering’ were all shared with the appropriate participant. In 
addition, some aspects of documentary analysis were shared in each of the interviews. Some 
researchers raise questions about the limits of these tactics. Silverman (2000), for example 
doubts whether the different philosophical perspectives underlying different methodologies in 
mixed methods approaches can be so easily accommodated to create a singular perspective 
that is inherently superior to that derived from a single method used well. Moreover, he 
questions the validity of respondent validation, particularly if that account is granted a 
‘privileged status’ above that of the researcher’s own judgement (ibid, p.177). While 
accepting Silverman’s reservations about mixed methods, I would argue that within a case 
study format even methods that are philosophically incompatible contribute to building up a 
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multi-dimensional  and multi-perspectival model of the case, and cross-case analysis allows 
for the emergence of entirely new features. 
3.6.2   Internal Validity 
For case study research internal validity is to do with checking inferences, that is establishing 
that any connection made between a particular phenomenon and its purported cause is a valid 
one (Yin, 2009). Yin offers a number of tactics for establishing internal validity, but only two 
were of relevance to this research: ‘pattern matching’ and ‘cross-case synthesis’ (ibid, pp.42-
43). Pattern matching involves comparing patterns emerging from empirical data with those 
predicted from a theoretical position (ibid). If a match is found this strengthens the internal 
validity of the case (ibid). The corollary of this is that if threats to validity have been 
identified, such as evidence that would falsify a theory, but no evidence matching this has 
been found, then this also strengthens internal validity. Silverman (2000, p.178) raises the 
‘principle of refutability’ based on Popper’s (1959) concept of ‘falsifiability’, which regards 
it as the hallmark of good research that attempts are made to ‘test’ emerging ideas. Such 
methods include ‘constant comparison’ and analysing ‘deviant cases’. This research, as 
described under ‘The Structure of the Research’, specifically had two routes built into it in 
order to cross check the findings. One was comprised of a set of hypotheses deduced from the 
fundamental theory. In chapter 7 the evidence from the data is compared to each of these 
hypotheses; not only positive confirmation, but also negative confirmation and evidence of 
disconfirmation. The research process, as a multi-case study, had also built cross-case 
analysis into it, in which corresponding sets of data were compared, allowing further 
theoretical inferences to be drawn. 
3.6.3   External Validity 
External validity deals with the concept of the generalisability of the results from a case 
study. Yin (2009, p.43) is careful to make a distinction between ‘statistical generalisation’, 
which is the projection of patterns emerging in a sufficiently robust sample to the wider 
society, and ‘analytic generalisation’, which is argument from a specific case to a more 
general social theory. Stake (1995) takes the radically different view; for Stake the principal 
focus is the intrinsic case study, something studied because of its intrinsic interest, and the 
issue here is not generalisability but particularisation. The final chapter looks at the broader 
implications of the findings and the degree to which the mechanism for values transmission 
suggested is scalable and transferable to other contexts. 
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3.6.4   Reliability 
As already discussed, reliability is concerned most fundamentally with the repeatability of the 
research leading to the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009; Silverman, 2000). While a 
few social researchers argue that the nature of the social world as a constructed reality makes 
issues of reliability redundant (Marshall and Rossman, 1989), for the majority such a stance 
renders any form of meaningful research impossible. Yin makes two suggestions for tasks 
that can establish the reliability of case study research: the creation of a ‘case study protocol’ 
and a ‘case study database’ (Yin, 2009). The case study protocol is a scheme – somewhat like 
a recipe – for the recreation of the case that could be followed by a subsequent researcher and 
would lead to the reproduction of the findings of the research programme. The case study 
database consists of the raw data from the research programme. Yin (ibid) draws a distinction 
between this data and the subsequent reports or articles which are based on it, as this 
distinction is not always observed in case study research. To assist in the process of analysis I 
created a data bank comprised of the raw data from all the data sources in all the schools in 
the field sample: recordings of interviews, focus groups and observations, together with 
transcriptions of those recordings; compiled results from the surveys; and primary analyses 
and syntheses. Together with the survey returns and notes from the observations this 
constituted the database for this research. 
3.7   Data collection methods 
Six methods were chosen in all, all qualitative methods except a small-scale survey. While 
six is rather a large number for a small piece of research, it is justified in this case. As 
discussed earlier, the research approach was to explore the complex interactions and 
meanings in relation to values within each school, which required a multi-dimensional 
approach. This also contributed to the validity and reliability of the research process, 
discussed separately above. There is a corollary of this multi-method mix: within the 
constraints of the field it meant that, with some slight exceptions, each method could only be 
deployed once in each school. Given more time, more data could have been collected. 
However, there was a reason for not doing so and a reason it was considered unnecessary. 
First, the entry into each school required a negotiation in which access was granted on the 
basis of an initial flexible and limited approach so as to minimise the ‘bureaucratic burden’ 
on the school (discussed under Ethics, above), and each additional method required separate 
negotiation with the principal contact at the school. Second, the multi-dimensional approach 
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to the research question of how values are transmitted within the institution did not require 
multiple data instances from each source; instead, each source was an instance in a process of 
cross-method and cross-case analysis, from which the findings emerged. 
The six methods can be divided into three groups of two, each of which supplied a different 
perspective on the school. Documents and interviews gave the top-down ‘official’ perspective 
of the Head, senior management group, local authority/trustees and governors; observations 
and field notes provided the side-on ‘chalk face’ perspective of the teaching staff; and the 
surveys and focus groups gave an insight into the bottom-up ‘recipient’ perspective of the 
pupils. Each pair of methods provided a contrast itself. Three (documents, observation and 
survey) were more collective and more objective in data focus; the other three (interview, 
field notes and focus group) were more individual and more subjective in data focus. The 
various perspectives on the methods chosen are summarised in the table on page 95, which 
offers an overview of the particular methods mix involved in the case study design as a multi-
dimensional exploration of the schools investigated.  
In each school the data collection was carried out in the order in which the methods are listed 
in the table. While in principle the ordering of these methods could have been different, there 
seemed a strong pragmatic reason for this particular order. Before fully entering the field, 
learning as much as possible about the educational traditions, philosophy and priorities of the 
school was paramount. Document reading was also a low-impact and unobtrusive way of 
becoming acquainted with the school and building a relationship with key staff for the 
research process. The documents formed the basis for questions to be put in the interview 
and, conversely, the interview to pursue questions arising from the reading of the documents. 
While the interview was conducted with a single person, the Head or a representative, the 
observation was moving to the heart of the school, the classroom, to further insights gained 
through the interview. The survey was, of the four, the most sensitive, as it required the 
pupils to express their opinions (albeit anonymously) about the school, but outside the 
influence of the school. Beyond these four, the focus group required that a certain trust be 
already established between the school and the researcher, who would be taking charge of a 
small group of pupils unsupervised on the school premises and within the school timetable. 
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Fig 06: Parameters in Design of Methods Mix in a Multi-Method Case Study 
 
Order I II III IV V VI 
Data Source Documents Interview Observation Survey Focus Group Field Notes 
Data type Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Qualitative Qualitative Quantitative/ 
Qualitative 
Qualitative Qualitative 
Data point Variable Individual Collective Multiple Multiple Individual 
Interpretive 
setting 
Static Dynamic Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic 
Interpretive 
standpoint 
Subjective Objective/ 
interactive  
Objective Subjective  Objective/ 
interactive 
Mixed 
Perspective 
(stakeholders, 
participants) 
School, governing 
body, local 
authorities, 
government 
Principal, head 
teacher, senior 
management  
Teacher, pupils  Pupils Pupils Teacher 
Perspective 
(level) 
Official, 
management 
(strategic) 
Official, 
management 
(strategic) 
Classroom 
(administrative, 
transmission) 
Pupil (recipient) Pupil (recipient) Classroom 
(administrative, 
transmission) 
Perspective 
(hierarchy) 
Top down Top down Sideways on Bottom up Bottom up Sideways on 
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Having looked at the overall design of the case study, I will now turn to a consideration of the 
individual methods. 
3.7.1   Documentation 
Documents are an initial window on understanding the nature of the institution to be 
investigated. Documents are considered a special genre of text (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004) 
which audit both the internal decisions of the institution and requirements imposed from 
without. They are also involved, according to Hodder (2000, p.704), in the ‘legitimation of 
power’ within the institution. For these reasons they can be a rich source of information about 
both the present constitution of the institution and also the history leading up to the present. 
There are also disadvantages to documents, or certainly aspects to be aware of in handling 
them; Yin (2009) lists several consideration: they can be difficult to gain access to if not 
publicly available (for example on a website); a limited or partial (biased) view of the 
institute can be gained if the documentary evidence is incomplete; bias in the presentation of 
information, representing the particular views of an author or for the purpose of presenting a 
particular image of the institution; and access can be denied, especially if they cover 
confidential or sensitive matters. They also suffer from being an almost immediately 
‘fossilised’ form of knowledge, though for some the act of recording policies, strategies, 
processes and institutional structures creates a ‘distance’ between the author(s) of a document 
and the reader that allows space for the reader to interpret the document (Hodder, 2000; 
Gadamer, 1994, p.298). For these reasons documents should never be relied on as the sole 
source of data, but only to corroborate data from, or prepare for other data collection 
methods. 
The documents I requested from the schools in the sample all related to the values of the 
school or the provision for values or values-related education at the school, including the 
school rules, mission statement, school policies, provision for pastoral care and the ethos of 
the school, and any material distributed to prospective parents. The list appears in Appendix 
2. Much of this material would have been available to the public, but there were a few more 
internal items, some of them passed to me once a certain relationship had been built up. 
Access to all the required documentation required some negotiation, but the issues dealt with 
in my research would not have been considered sensitive, so there was no reason for denial of 
access. Beyond the list I considered the school to be the expert on the documentation that 
covered this area, so I left it to their judgement; I wanted to create the feeling that this was a 
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cooperative venture, which I felt would be the best way to gain further access and to be able 
to view the inner workings of the school, particularly the web of relationships and meanings 
generated through this. I did look at some secondary sources, such as Ofsted reports, for 
verifiability purposes, and the local press, for any issues related to the schools. 
3.7.2   Interviews 
Interviews are a central feature of any case study. They enable a researcher to hone in on a 
topic of significant interest and can provide real insight, if not necessarily of reality as such, 
of the reality as that is perceived by the person being interviewed (Yin, 2009; Miller and 
Glassner, 2004). There are two paradigmatic forms of the interview, the structured and the 
unstructured. The structured interview aims for objectivity and rationality, through an 
inflexible schedule, minimising interaction and excluding emotional responses, whereas the 
unstructured is flexible, interactive and seeks specifically an understanding of how people 
experience the social world in terms of their own categories (Fontana and Frey, 2000). There 
is also an intermediate form, known as the semi-structured interview, in which there is an 
interview schedule. For Silverman (2001, p.87) the purpose of all forms of interview is to 
‘generate data which give an authentic insight into people’s experiences’. Semi-structured 
and unstructured are the most common interview forms in case study research, which often 
take the form of ‘focus interviews’ and ‘in-depth interviews’, respectively (Yin, 2009, p.107). 
There are drawbacks to the qualitative interview, which need to be taken into account: 
inaccuracies in the data gathered, due either to poor questioning technique or poor recording 
on the part of the researcher, is one; bias due to the respondent withholding vital information 
or tailoring their responses to fit the interviewers expectations is another (ibid). 
In this research both semi-structured and unstructured (or largely unstructured) forms were 
used, as they were appropriate to gaining an insight into the internal world of the school. 
Across all the schools a semi-structured interview was used to conduct an interview with the 
Head or, in one case, an appointed representative. This interview was conducted using a 
schedule based on a common template of 16 questions, which appears in Appendix 2, with a 
number of questions added based on information gathered from a reading of the school 
documents. The interview with the teacher, who was also the principal contact at the school, 
occurred at the end of the data-gathering process for that school and was based on a synthesis 
of data taken from all sources across the school. It had two purposes: ostensibly, it was to 
report and discuss some of the findings from the research and fill in some of the gaps in data, 
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which was guided by the synthesis; but, it was also a chance to get a teacher’s view of the 
ways in which they felt the school transmitted its values, ways they felt they contributed to 
the education in values of the pupils and what they thought these important values were. 
Being largely unstructured, it moved freely between these two purposes. Although considered 
here as an unstructured interview, because of its discursive nature it has been categorised as 
part of the Field Notes, considered below. All interviews were recorded with the respondent’s 
permission. 
The questions in the semi-structured interview followed a narrative course, starting with 
some personal questions, moving on to the school, and on to topics relating to values 
education, before concluding on a more personal note about what they felt they had 
contributed or planned to achieve at the school in the future. There was, though, another 
structure implicit in the interview schedule, which was to build up a more 'intentional' picture 
of the interiority of the school life through involving the interviewee, usually the Head, in a 
more reflective exercise, asking more speculative question or asking them to confront issues 
of conflict within the school or between the school and other agencies. A breakdown of 
question types and some examples are given in the table below. 
Fig 07 Structure of Questions on the Interview Schedule 
Type of question Question no. Example 
Personal 1, 13, 15, 16 What do you think has been your main contribution 
to the school? 
Internal 2, 3, 7, 8 Do you see any of what you do here as being to do 
with values education? 
External 9, 10, 14 Do you think that the state has a role in legislating 
what schools should do in this area of values 
education? 
Evaluation 4, 11, 12, 13 Are you aware of or do you experience in any sense 
a clash of values in the school? 
Speculation 5, 6 Do you see values education as being something 
similar to or distinct from moral education? 
 
3.7.3   Observation 
Within the school the classroom is the place where the business of educational transmission 
takes place (Bernstein, 1975). The transmission of values is a more diffuse affair (Taylor, 
1998), but the class is a social microcosm (Parsons, 1961) and the observation of a class in 
action is an opportunity to gauge the extent to which teachers, whether explicitly, implicitly 
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or even unconsciously, engage in the education of their pupils in values and to potentially 
observe the mode of transmission. For Yin (2009, p.102) observation is the chance to 
immerse oneself in the ‘context’ of the case in the ‘natural setting’ (ibid, p.109) of the case. 
However, observation is not a straightforward matter. Any observer has to take a critical 
stance to his or her presence in the classroom. Ackroyd and Hughes (1992) note that there are 
four basic stances that should be part of the researcher’s self-awareness and a vital aspect of 
strategic decision-making to be taken beforehand: complete participant, participant-as-
observer, observer-as-participant and complete observer. The issue is one of reflexivity; the 
presence of an observer potentially changes the nature of that which is being observed (Yin, 
2009). Since the observer as pure observer, as a totally neutral presence, is an impossible 
ideal, there are varying degrees of compromise. Complete participation, the temporary 
suspension of the observer’s role and total immersion in the field and identification with the 
concerns of the ‘observed’ in the case study, is possible in some circumstances, but requires 
extensive periods of open-ended time and also raises its own – sometimes serious – ethical 
issues (ibid). Lincoln and Guba (1985) raise two threats to validity arising in qualitative 
research in general, but particularly with reference to observations, that of reactivity, changes 
in behaviour due to awareness of being observed, and interaction with the observer. 
In the schools I visited for this research I made a request to observe a class in which activity 
related to values education was taking place. Although the activity, group size, content and 
environment were different in each case, they were all related to the PSHE/Citizenship 
curriculum. In each case the visit took place within a limited time frame and the only option 
was as an observer with a limited scope for incidental participation. For the observation I 
used an observation sheet that allowed the recording of information about the participants and 
their interactions, activities, routines and ritualistic elements, social organisation, and 
communal narratives. The sheet had to take account of the temporal element, classroom 
layout and leave room for interpretations (Adler and Adler, 1994). Observational notes were 
made in a column divided into 5-minute blocks. A sample is shown in Appendix 2. 
Additionally, the classes were audio-recorded with the school’s and teacher’s permission. 
3.7.4   Survey 
Surveys are not usually included in a case study, because of their association with 
quantitative research methods. For this research, looking at the transmission of values, I felt it 
would be appropriate, because of the need to sample the potential recipients of values 
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education, something that was not possible with the class observation alone, and to contribute 
a vital aspect to the multi-perspective model of the institution. The questionnaire was built 
around a series of questions I wanted answered, but which were too abstract to address 
directly to the pupils, so a series of exercises was developed with the help of a colleague with 
secondary school experience, to resemble the sort of task/activity sheet that the pupils might 
be familiar with, introducing enough variety to sustain their interest and varying the response 
mode sufficiently to prevent rote responses. The questionnaire can be found in appendix 2. 
Shying away from the format of quantitative analyses, I avoided answers involving Likert 
scales. Activities included choosing from a list of options, ordering a list in terms of 
importance, responding to imaginary scenarios, and one totally open question in which they 
were asked to write about things they learned in school outside of the classroom, exploring 
the ‘hidden curriculum’. Thus the questionnaire was designed to elicit, as much as possible, 
information of a qualitative nature. There were other constraints. In each school the survey 
was administered by a teacher, who incorporated it into their classroom activity as part of 
sociology or citizenship classes. Therefore, it had to be answerable well within the normal 
time period for a class. It also had to be as clear and explicit as possible, as I would not be on 
hand to offer explanations. 
3.7.5   Focus group 
A focus group is a discussion group set up for the purpose of discussing a particular topic and 
generating research data through the group interaction (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999). One of 
the advantages of this format is that it can produce a large volume of information within a 
limited time frame (Morgan, 1988). However, focus groups operate in ‘fundamentally 
unnatural social settings’ (ibid). The challenge of the focus group is that it is a choreographed 
event around a topic that is determined by, and of interest to, the researcher, but must 
simulate the spontaneity of a conversation among friends or colleagues discussing topics of 
common interest. Its success, therefore, relies on a combination of the eloquence and 
biddability of the participants with the skill of the researcher in fostering a group dynamic in 
which data of significance to the research is elicited. For Kitzinger and Barbour (1999, p.5) 
focus groups generate a social network which provides the best context in which to explore 
‘people’s experiences, opinions, wishes and concerns’. A survey can provide information 
about how many people hold a particular opinion, but ‘focus groups are better for exploring 
how points of view are constituted and expressed’ (ibid, p.5). 
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Whereas the survey used in the case studies was able to give some indication of the range of 
opinion of the student body, the degree of perception of issues relating to values, awareness 
of values education within a school, and values-based responses to moral dilemmas, there 
was little sense of how this reflected values transmission within the school. The focus group 
provided the opportunity to explore that issue in more depth. A request was made to each 
school to provide a small group of pupils, preferable of mixed sex, preferably of volunteers 
and preferably those who had taken part in the survey, to form a focus group. Each school 
was able to provide such a group for one school period. The ideal was to have an open 
discussion; that happened to a limited extent, where a good group dynamic emerged, but 
there was a tendency for the pupils to address me and for me to lead the conversation. 
Nevertheless, some very interesting insights emerged from these sessions. The discussions 
were recorded with all the participants’ agreement. 
3.7.6   Field Notes 
Field notes have traditionally been an important part of anthropological and ethnographic 
research. The advent of modern recording and communication technologies has obviated 
some of the necessity of keeping written notes, but it still has a part to play in recording 
events, observations and experiences perhaps incidental to the main research, but which, 
nevertheless, forms some of the context of the case. I have used the term rather liberally here 
to encompass anything which is not included within another category but which is relevant to 
the research. As mentioned in the section on interviews, the feedback discussions with the 
teachers form an important part of the field notes. The category also includes correspondence 
(letters and emails) with the schools, notes on impressions from meeting with participants, 
reports and updates to my supervisors, a research journal kept during the course of the 
research recording the challenges and rewards of the research process, and analytic memos 
created during the course of data analysis. No additional ethical issues were raised by the 
field notes. Teacher feedback was recorded with permission and a transcript was made 
available for validation. Notes made of any discussion of procedural matters relating to the 
conduct of the research were fed back to the discussant as a brief report by mutual agreement, 
but did not anyway form part of the research data.  
3.8   Data Analysis 
For this research I was guided in particular by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) guide to grounded 
theory and Miles and Huberman’s (1994) guide to data analysis, particularly the development 
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of matrices for analysing data. I also made use of a variation of content analysis, which I will 
describe in detail. Then there were a number of analytic techniques that were applied only to 
particular data sources. Some critical textual analysis was applied to the school documents at 
an early stage to discover whether there was any evidence of intra-institutional conflicts. 
However, this sort of analysis was not central to the purposes of the research. More 
importantly, phenomenologically and semiotically-based analyses were applied to the 
observations in each school in order to uncover structure, strategy, roles, relationships and 
power play within the unfolding events in class, and were also applied in synthesising data 
from across the dataset for each case. There was a small amount of survey-specific analysis, 
which will be described, but there was no attempt to undertake any complex quantitative 
analysis; as explained in the Methods section, the purpose of the survey was to gain a wider 
spread of qualitative data. 
According to Yin (2009) there is no substitute for having a clear strategy for data analysis 
from the beginning of the research. Admittedly, this seems sensible; however, apart from the 
overall strategic aim of modelling the transmission of values in each of the schools, how this 
might be accomplished was a realisation that only evolved as I became more familiar with the 
various analytic tools and the data from the schools. Returning to the theoretical roots of the 
research I conceived that the core of the analysis had to be a model of the institute in which 
values were central. To model the institute required recognising the complexity of the 
institutional structure, as that was also acknowledged in the justification for the methods mix, 
shown in the table on page 95, exhibiting three levels: the official, the teacher-classroom and 
the pupils.  The process of analysis, while not mirroring this structure, had to exhibit a 
complexity that reflected the interconnectedness, process and logic in the institutional 
structure. That turned out to be, not three strata within the school, but the hierarchy of part, 
whole and context (micro, meso and macro). In terms of methodology this corresponds to 
minor in-cases analyses, major in-case analyses and cross-case analysis. The entire 
analytical model is shown in the table on page 103, which will be the basis for the 
explanation of the analytical methods. 
One technique that was used in the analytic process for all data sources and at all stages was 
that of writing memos. A memo can be anything from a note of a few lines to a short essay, 
but as envisioned by grounded theorists in particular, it represents a hiatus from the 
sometimes rote processes of analysis to re-order thoughts, record new insights and to theorise 
more abstractly and creatively (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). The memos I wrote were dated 
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and sometimes titled (if they dealt with a single issue). They sometimes became the basis for 
new directions in analysis and later findings. A few have been incorporated into or quoted in 
the relevant sections. 
Fig 08 Overall Analytical Model 
TYPE DATA SOURCE PRODUCT CONTRIBUTION 
Minor in-case analyses Interview transcripts, 
documents, survey 
results 
Analytic reports, 
matrices 
Concepts, categories 
Major in-case analyses Data from all sources Syntheses (IFVA, 
WCDR) 
Partial theories 
Cross-case analysis Partial theories Saturated model Integrated theory 
 
3.8.1   Minor in-case analyses 
These analyses were initial analyses carried out on individual sources, which resulted in 
analytic products like critical summaries and matrices. Despite analysis, they remained very 
close to the source material, so had the sort of richness, colour and depth which made them 
ideal for the descriptive aspects of the case study reports. Although they were not very 
conceptually sophisticated, they had suggestive insights which contributed to the next level. I 
will describe the analyses of the four primary data sources (documents, interview, 
observation and survey) in some detail. 
3.8.1.1   Documents 
Documents are a valuable source of information about how the institution sees itself, by what 
they say and how they say it, and what they do not say. Taken collectively, they embody the 
most important values of that institution, and are likely to give an insight into the goals and 
ambitions of the institution, its priorities and strategies, and some of the challenges faced in 
achieving those things. Even in public documents some idea of the external forces operating 
on an institution can be gleaned; for schools these are typically central and local government, 
though there may be input at some schools from church organisations or parents groups. 
Maybe also present, but less obvious, could be tensions and conflicts within the school. 
Although the central concern of this research was to understand the transmission of values, 
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the nature of that transmission may not be separable from the nature of the institution in 
which it is taking place, so it was felt that some account of these factors should be given.  
Initial analysis of the documents was based on a simple form of literary criticism (Gillespie, 
2010). It began with a summary of each document, its main content, its purpose, its principal 
guiding ideas, goals and pedagogical strategies. This was looking at the document from the 
viewpoint of the school itself and the overt ideology of the school. A second level looked at 
the structure of each document, considering the rhetorical devices at work and whether, for 
example, the document was a compilation of other documents. This gave some idea of the 
processes in the school and responses to external factors. A final level involved a more 
critical reading of the text, examining how the language used may reveal less obvious aspects 
of the life of the institution, at the internal dynamics, such as hidden undercurrents of 
dissatisfaction. Reading each document at these three levels was not always possible, for two 
reasons. One was that there was comparatively little to see beyond a summary of its main 
contents; it may have been simple, transparent and single-authored. The other is that there 
was too much to see, and that the analysis risked becoming a major diversion. A balance had 
to be drawn between the summary being too superficial and being too extensive. The right 
balance was felt to be a reasonably short account embodying a perceptive insight into the 
school in question. These analyses became the basis for some of the questions added to the 
interview template. 
Subsequently, the documents were subject to content analysis. Content analysis is usually 
considered a form of quantitative analysis, involving counting the number of instances of 
selected words in the document (Holsti, 1969); however, it can also be used in qualitative 
analysis, in order to understand the categories, in this case, of the participant institutions 
(Silverman, 2001). I have taken a middle line, noting the incidence of all values in the texts 
(though not the number of times it appears) together with any strategy for disseminating the 
value mentioned in the text. I found that although few documents overtly discuss values, 
values are firmly embedded in the texts, whenever an idea of the ‘preferable’ (Rokeach, 
1973, p.5) is expressed, even indirectly or unconsciously. The purpose of the analysis was to 
extract the values from the matrix of ordinary language, to de-contextualise them. To do this 
it was first necessary to go back an axiom established in chapter 2 (2.4.4), that values’ 
linguistic form is always that of abstract nouns (occasionally noun phrases). However, it was 
not as simple as isolating all the value nouns, as not all values are explicit; some are implicit 
in other linguistic forms, such as verbs, adjectives and adverbs; others are hidden, but 
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strongly suggested by the context. These latter two forms can be converted and recorded as 
explicit value forms. There is, in this, also an element of interpretation and some judgement is 
called for; not every value word actually denotes a value if the context is rightly read. The 
range (rather than the number) of values recorded for each document (and for all the 
documents collectively) should give some indication of the richness of the life-world of the 
institution.  
To begin with, the values – as defined above – in each document were highlighted (with a 
note if implicit or hidden) and then listed as a group on a ‘table of documents’ for the school 
under a column ‘values’ for that particular document. Also added was the strategy for 
dissemination, which might have been no more than the document itself, or there might have 
been reference to a particular transmission route for the content of the document, for example 
a poster with the school rules displayed. The table was then ‘inverted’, a form of 
transformation encouraged by Miles and Huberman (1994), by taking the values group in the 
values column and listing each separately in alphabetical order together with a document 
reference and the transmission strategy. As the same value often appeared on several 
documents, this meant that entries were amalgamated, displaying the range of dissemination 
strategies for each value. An example (extract) of a table of documents and an inversion are 
shown in Appendix 3. This list of values became an important basis for the synthesis 
Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA). 
3.8.1.2   Interview 
The interview provided an opportunity to engage with an official representative of each 
school, not just as part of the management team, but someone versed in the educational 
philosophy of the school. The intention of the interview and the analytic process that 
followed was to delve more deeply into the nature of the institution revealed by the 
documents, to uncover its particular worldview and its sense of purpose.  
The interviews were recorded on a digital recorder and the recordings uploaded to MP3 files. 
Some notes were taken during the interview, and afterwards any impressions noted. The 
recordings were transcribed and when completed to my satisfaction lightly edited and 
despatched to the interviewee for validation and/or correction. Some analyses begin with the 
recorded version if, for example, the researcher is interested in aspects of non-lexical 
interaction such as hesitations and interrupted sentences. However, for the purposes of this 
research the overwhelming interest was in the content of what was said, transcending the 
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circumlocutions of actual human communication. To the extent that a pause or a thought 
changing in mid-sentence might be significantly revealing, they were captured in the 
transcript anyway, and it was the validated and corrected transcript with which this analysis 
began. 
After reading the transcript through several times an extended memo was written in which 
initial impressions of the interviewee’s responses to the research questions were recorded. 
This had three purposes. One is that it shaped analytic familiarity with the text in question 
and fore-shaped themes that were later to emerge in the more focused analysis. This process 
also allowed me to explore aspects of my own worldview in relationship to one being 
encountered for the first time. Finally, it allowed aspects of the interviewee’s stance to be 
recorded which could be missed in the later closer analysis, a case of sometimes not seeing 
the wood for the trees. 
The next stage was analysing the text of the interview following the route recommended by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998). This initially involved three steps: coding, categorising and re-
organising. 
Coding 
In order to code, the transcription was read line by line and significant ideas at the level of 
individual words or more commonly phrases or sentences were extracted, copied to a new 
document and given a reference (based on the timings of each section of the interview). Some 
codes could be taken word for word from the transcription, when the interviewee had framed 
a concept in a way that could, not be bettered, an ‘in vivo code’. Coding usually involves 
some change in linguistic style, often changing the verb to a gerund, creating an ‘action code’ 
(Charmaz, 2006, p.7). Codes can also be created for sections, but I preferred to do this in the 
second step of the analysis. Naturally, few if any of the interviewer’s utterances were coded, 
but if an idea was well expressed and the interviewee gave it full assent it was entered as if 
part of the response. 
Categorising 
When the whole transcript had been examined the product was a list of codes arranged in the 
same chronological order as the transcription. It was important now to see if there was an 
embedded institutional narrative in the discourse, one elicited by, rather than guided by, the 
questioning. I found that reading through the codes certain ideas began to cluster. I began to 
107 
 
create sections around these clusters, introducing breaks between them. Eventually, one code 
emerged as the dominant category for that section. I preferred to use an extant code if 
possible; if not, I created one. 
Re-organising 
The process of categorising does not proceed far before another technique comes into play, 
that of reorganising the material. As a cluster forms, some codes in the proximity do not fit; 
in fact an insight into where a stray code fit often arose and it could be moved there. For the 
first time the codes moved out of chronological order and into an order determined by the 
narrative, but carrying with them the reference to their source. Sometimes a new category 
was created for ideas that did not fit anywhere else or existing categories split or merged. 
This re-organisation was not driven by any pre-determined framework. While it would be 
futile to deny that the researcher comes to the interpretive task with preconceptions, I tried to 
allow the data to dictate what the final shape of the narrative would be, to be surprised by the 
result. Sometimes an even higher order structure suggested itself, groupings of groups. The 
process finished when all codes had been included in a cluster and when there were no more 
to move. 
The reorganised codes subsequently became the basis for the third stage in the analysis of the 
interview data, that of creating a matrix to explore the lived worlds of the schools in the 
research field. To a greater degree than any of the other analytic processes, this analysis 
developed itself. According to Miles and Huberman (1994, p.239), ‘It requires you to make 
full analyses, ignoring no relevant information; and it focuses and organizes your information 
coherently’. Matrix building proved a good way of laying out the data spatially and being 
able to see hitherto unseen relationships, and forcing a return to the data to fill the gaps 
created. The parameters along both the vertical and the horizontal axes were derived from the 
analysed data, but few of them were predicted. In the end what emerged for each analysis was 
a narrative about the worldview of the school as much as its principal representative. An 
example of (part of) a matrix of an interview is included in appendix 3. 
3.8.1.3   Observation 
Two types of data were collected in the observations of the classes: audio recordings and 
notes made on an observation sheet. Prior to analysis it was necessary to begin with a 
reconstruction of the classroom event, which amalgamated a transcription of the audio 
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recording of the class with the timed notes made on the observation sheet. Then, in a similar 
manner to the interview, a lengthy analytic summary was written first. This differed from the 
memo of the interview, though, in that it was constrained by pre-established analytic criteria, 
that of morphology, dynamics, cohesion and content, which are described below.  
The classroom is the primary interface between the school and the pupils and the principal 
locus of transmission, not only of academic knowledge but also of values. But the classroom 
is also a stage upon which a dramatic performance is acted out in every lesson. It cannot be 
understood as simply an occasion for passing information, but grasped as a complex linking 
of emotional undercurrents, sign acts and symbolic structures. The totality of the event, then, 
can only be approached through phenomenological and semiotic analyses of the whole and 
constituent parts of the class. Each of the methods used will be described in terms of its 
relation to the concept of values outlined in chapter 2, and the aspects of invocation and 
evocation as fundamental to values transmission, as described earlier in this chapter. In order 
to offer some context to this assertion, I have included the following account of an important 
breakthrough insight as a researcher, taken from my research journal. 
It would be fair to say that placing the concept of invocation at the heart of the research, as the 
posited transmission mechanism for values represented one of the significant turning points in the 
whole research project, for it enabled a viable connection to be made between early philosophical 
speculation on the nature of values and field research into values education and became the turning 
point upon which the research began to take its present form. Until then, invocation represented a 
terminus in a line of speculation, but not one that I had considered particularly significant. The 
insight came, as these things often do, quite incidentally. I had been listening to a colleague 
reporting on a conference he had attended, and with great interest to his account of a panel on the 
anthropology of dance. I was struck by a thought that the performative power of dance could be 
likened to the rhetorical power of a charismatic figure, like a religious or political leader or even a 
great teacher, and that evening set out to deduce the characteristics of invocation through a 
phenomenology of the imagined invocatory context. The original notes have been lost, but some 
time later found a fuller expression in the interpretation of an observed class and a brief 
commentary. 
[The observed class] provided an example of the principle of invocation in values transmission. Clearly 
there was an institutional setting in the established vertical tutor groups and the organisation of [tutor] time 
in the school calendar. There was the invocation of the traditions of [tutor] time: ‘First of all, tell us, what 
is [tutor] time about...What do you do at [tutor] time? Thank you. Have contact with people you otherwise 
wouldn’t have any contact with. Anything else? [indistinct] socialise....Thank you.’ Then there was the 
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ritual of the pairing, in this case by using randomly chosen cards, greeting appropriately, cooperating, etc., 
which fell within the rules of the activity: ‘The ground rules are...focus on me , please...the ground rules 
are you must show respect for whoever it is you are paired with.’ There is also the taboo behaviour and its 
objects, alluded to in the passage just quoted, distraction and anything which causes distraction. There is 
no explicit text referred to, though the story in which the moral dilemma is embedded effectively functions 
in its place. Discussing and suggesting solutions to the dilemma (moral reasoning) formed the task the 
pupils were engaged in. The speaker acted as the exemplar, modelling the required behaviour as well as 
directing the activity. The speaker also invoked the values central to the whole activity. 
 
Clearly there are strong parallels to religious forms here. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the 
areas of values is imbued with the sacred; by its very structure and nature a value has something of the 
sacred about it, even when it is entirely secular or technical; it embodies a distillation of the good as that is 
perceived by the attending observer and is limned by a transgressive boundary. Secondly, religions have 
been one of the key institutions in every culture, especially in the pre-modern world, and one of the most 
well developed, and exemplified the characteristics of a value-transmitting life form which has been 
[thoroughly described in the theory chapter]. Thirdly, as a result of the other two points, religions have 
come to define much of the language in which we can speak of value-related matters. 
[Appendix to Observation Analysis, School A, May 2011] 
 
Aspects of the deductive model (given in italics) were added to slightly in subsequent 
interpretations of observed classes, but remained largely stable. The model suggests that invocation 
requires basically three things: a sacred context, a rhetoric of core values and an exemplary actor. 
Morphology 
The first analysis was to perceive the overall shape of the lesson through the duration of the 
class. It was, in other words, an attempt to understand the structuring of a performance. All 
lessons have a structure; that is part of the training of a teacher: to bring order and coherence 
to the delivery of information and, therefore to the teaching and learning situation. The 
structure of interest here, though, was of a different order, something of which even the 
teacher themselves might have been unaware, such as a hidden symmetry or pattern in the 
delivery, arising from an underlying rhetorical or ritualistic aspect of performance, but 
connected to an overall intention or strategy for the class. Silverman (2001, p.124) refers to 
these as ‘narrative structures’, but they are also related to the rhetorical structures of the 
performance. An example is given at 5.3.1.3, ii). 
After that I turned to the details of the observation reconstruction and broke it down into 
discrete elements, each of which was a specific event. To each event I gave an interpretation 
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based on a ritualistic semiotics suggested in the memo just quoted, which connects the 
dramatic context to the sense of the sacred at the heart of the value experience (Eliade, 1957), 
which was discussed in chapter 2 and which embody the concepts of invocation and 
evocation. This ritualistic semiotics is consonant with that anthropological tradition that 
undertakes a ‘mythic’ interpretation of culture, in the sense of relating to a ‘sacred tradition, 
primordial revelation, exemplary model’ (Eliade, 1963, p.1). A sample of this analysis from 
the observation at school A (St Augustine) is given in the following table. 
Fig 09  Morphology of observed class 
Assertion of authority 03.55 T: Turn around please 
05.33 T: OK, listen up please 
06.02 S: Focus on me 
07.45 S: The ground rules are...focus on me , please... 
09.25 S: Listen up please. Focus on me 
Taboo 06.02 S: ... Put anything that’s going to distract you down out of the 
way, make sure it doesn’t distract you 
06.55 S: OK. Can you make sure what is distracting you is put 
away...make sure what is distracting you is put away 
Tradition 06.02 S: ... First of all, tell us, what is Augment time about...What do you 
do at Augment time? Thank you. Have contact with people you 
otherwise wouldn’t have any contact with. Anything else? [indistinct] 
socialise....Thank you 
Rules 07.45 S:...the ground rules are you must show respect for whoever it is 
you are paired with 
22.00 S:.....just think of a simple thing....thank you for being my partner, 
or could be more complicated ‘Thank you for sharing your views with 
me...22.50 S: So each of you say thank you to your partner, now please 
Ritual 08.00 S: ... The using of names is very important...saying ‘good morning’ 
is perfectly polite. If I say ‘good morning Mr Trubshaw’ that is immensely 
more powerful 
12- Gives out cards. Asks pupils to hold up their cards and then find their 
partner who has the matching card (notes) 
09.40 S: You see...your choice....sit next to the person who has the same 
card as you. I’ll give you ten seconds to find your partner 
11.25 S: Face your partner, please. Say good morning and use their 
name...there are people who are embarrassed, but try not to show it. 
Even if it’s a false grin, try and give them some sort of [unclear] 
 
Dynamics 
To explore the concept of invocation further an analysis of the roles in the class, the relations 
and the distribution of power was required. The hierarchy of power in a school accounts - not 
totally, but in part - for the authority of the teacher in class and the possibility of formal 
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education in groups, including values education. But the dynamics of power may have a 
much more direct influence on the transmission of values, not only the exertion of power, but 
also the withholding of coercive force and the empowering of the individual. This analysis 
regards the class as a system in which roles, power dynamics and information flows need to 
be examined and described. The following example is from the observation at school B 
(Broughampton). In this class five significant relationships were identified in terms of the 
three roles – Teacher (T), Student (S) and Observer (O) – and two modalities – formal (f) and 
informal (i) and the relative empowerment/disempowerment in each relationship. 
Fig 10 Dynamics of observed class 
Relationship Teacher Student Observer 
TSf empowered disempowered neutral 
TSi empowered empowered neutral 
SS neutral empowered neutral 
TO empowered neutral disempowered 
SO neutral disempowered neutral 
 
Content 
The classes being observed were ostensibly those dealing with values education, and were in 
any case being examined from the perspective of values transmission. Therefore, the moral 
content of the class was under special consideration. While ‘values’ is generally accepted as a 
term with a broader connotation than morality, and includes such areas as the technical and 
professional, there can be no doubt that ‘values education’ as such is primarily concerned 
with moral and ethical issues. Moral content has several parameters, at least one of which 
must be present. There is the presentation and/or discussion of moral and ethical issues; there 
is the explicit or implicit invocation of certain values; there is the scope for the exercise of 
moral imagination; finally, consideration should be made of whether they are taught and 
encouraged to behave morally and, allied to that, whether they are shown an example of the 
behaviour which they are encouraged to emulate. To be a moral person should mean to be 
reflectively moral as well as inhabiting a culture’s moral rules (Peters, 1981) and to have the 
language, means and examples to accomplish that; therefore, moral education should 
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encompass all these aspects, though, naturally, not necessarily in a single lesson. The 
following is an example from the observation at school C (Chelmswood High). 
Fig 11 Content of observed class 
 
a) Evidence of moral discourse and moral reasoning being engaged in during the class 
 
While there is little evidence of overt moral discourse or moral reasoning during the class, 
there is something of a narrative of good and evil in a number of interpolations made by the 
teacher into pupil responses. Here is an example, bolded italics added for emphasis:  
 
TEACHER: we were talking particularly to match with anti-bullying week, weren’t we, about a 
particular use of the word ‘gay’ in a particular way. And what was that, can someone remember? 
Yes 
STUDENT: It’s saying about something that it’s gay. 
TEACHER: Saying something’s gay. So what might people mean by that? 
STUDENT: That it’s weird. 
TEACHER: So why should it not be used in that way then, do you think? Is that what we were 
talking about? 
STUDENT: Yeah, because people are gay [indistinct] weird if they’re gay. 
TEACHER: So it’s a derogatory use of the word, saying something is weird or rubbish or not very 
good. Therefore you’re saying that somebody who’s gay is not very good. Is that what you were 
going to say? 
 
Group Cohesion 
As explained in the theory chapter, the invocation of values is accompanied by the evocation 
of the moral community, as values are not private and must be exercised in a communal 
setting. A government advisory paper on the spiritual and moral development of young 
people (SCAA, 1996, p.9) reminds us that in addition to knowledge of standards and the 
ability to reason morally (which are essentially covered in the previous section), morality 
requires ‘a sense of responsibility’ and ‘a willingness to act responsibly’. Both of these 
require a social context to be meaningful. Therefore, it would be expected that the teaching of 
values would include instructions, efforts, exhortations, narratives and behavioural modelling 
to create a bond among the members of the group or class, that is, to encourage participation 
in the moral community. The example is taken from the observation at school B. 
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The layout of the room contributed to the cohesion of the group. As mentioned, the location of the 
screen meant that all the girls had to move into a group when the teacher wanted to demonstrate a 
point. There was already a strong bonding among the group, and the teacher mentioned that they 
usually conduct their tutorials in a different place under more informal conditions. There is a 
reference to the nested hierarchy of belonging: ‘…what’s been going on within the year group, but 
actually the wider community, it’s not just within [___ House]; there have been other issues within 
this school and there are wider implications’ [OBS-0425/9], but mostly the teacher seems to be 
appealing to the enlightened self-interest of the pupils. 
Matrix 
At the conclusion of the previous analyses the data was transferred to a more detailed and 
graphic time flow matrix. An extract from a matrix is shown in appendix 3. The vertical 
represents time flowing from top to bottom and the significant events are listed in one column 
in chronological order. To the left of this column two more columns show the structure of the 
class, aligned with the events. One is a straightforward interpretation of the major stages of 
the lesson, the categories into which the individual events can be grouped. The other is the 
overarching morphology of the lesson. To the right of the events column is another in which 
the events listed are translated into dramatic-symbolic categories. Next are two columns 
which trace the changing formality/informality dynamic in the class and the empowerment-
disempowerment dynamic. Finally, the matrix concludes with a column which assesses the 
participation of the pupils in a moral ‘universe’. The matrix exhibits a weak causality in the 
horizontal axis, from left to right.  
3.8.1.4   Survey 
The survey was significantly different to the other methods used in the research as it 
introduced an element of quantitative research into the mix. The extent of this should not be 
exaggerated, however. The sample in each school was relatively small (the average was 
around 30) and the main focus was on the qualitative data it could generate. In the pre-
analysis stage the data were simply collated under the categories of the survey questions, 
which were based on research questions for which data was desired, as outlined in the 
methods section above. Several approaches to analysis were tried, before settling on a fairly 
simple, minimalist approach. The data was processed in a way that enabled it to illustrate 
some fairly straightforward statements about the character of the institution in question, 
awareness of values and the teaching of values. The information of real theoretical interest 
emerged in the cross-case analysis. 
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The one question where some analysis was carried out was on a question concerning 
situational responses to imaginary scenarios. The intention was to allow students to express 
their moral reasoning when placed in a moral dilemma. After collating the responses I saw 
there was also a possibility of generating some quantitative data, by grading the responses on 
a scale of 1 to 5 representing the intensity ( i ) of or degree of assimilation of the measured 
value implied in the imagined situation. There was, of necessity, a degree of subjective 
interpretation of the responses, but the range of responses was fairly limited and the same 
criteria were applied across the cases and checked for unintentional bias. This provided some 
data for comparative purposes. The example below is taken from school B. 
Fig 12     Scaled Values in Situational Responses 
 
1. Your friend has left their lunch money at home (measure of Generosity) 
 
i Aggregate Response (number) 
5 9 Give/share yours, pay for theirs (7) 
Give them some money (2) 
4 0  
3 6 Lend them some money (6) 
 
2 2 Lend them enough for one thing (1) 
Reprimand and offer to buy (1) 
1 3 (inappropriate/humorous response) (3) 
 
 
The analytical methods so far discussed are all classified as ‘minor’ for two reasons. One is 
that they are only applied to a single data source. Then, probably as a result of the first point, 
they did not lead on to the highest levels of abstraction necessary for theory generation, but 
remained wedded to the particular and the local. This gave them a certain resonance, which 
made them suitable for the case study reports, but represented something of an analytical cul 
de sac. Having said this, they were a necessary first step. They gave rise to insights and to 
conceptual narratives that shaped the developments at the higher level. The content analysis 
used on the documents also became an important analytical tool for the major in-case analysis 
‘Institutional Focus Value Analysis’. 
3.8.1.5   Other sources: focus group and field notes 
The purpose of the focus group and the report/discussion meeting with the teacher were not 
originally treated as primary data sources but as sources of feedback for purposes of filling in 
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gaps in the data, so they were not subject to the first round of analysis (minor in-case 
analyses). This does not mean they were unimportant sources of information. Indeed, this 
omission from primary analysis is one point for methodological reflection. Like all the data 
from the field, though, these sources were fully utilised in the next round of analysis, the 
major in-case analyses. 
3.8.2   Major in-case analyses 
The major in-case analyses differ from the minor in that they draw on the entire database of 
the case, data, that is, from all six sources (documents, interview, observation, survey, focus 
group and field notes) in each case. The two major in-case analyses, the Institutional Focus 
Value Analysis (IFVA) and the Whole Case Data Review (WCDR), also referred to as 
‘syntheses’ in the research, deal with the same material in different ways. The IFVA subjects 
the dataset to content analysis and the WCDR to coding (or re-coding) and categorisation. A 
second difference is that the IFVA is the end product of an analytic process and is already a 
partial theoretical model as it is highly conceptualised; by contrast, the WCDR is an iterative 
process for generating high level concepts for theory building. 
3.8.2.1   Institutional Focus Value Analysis 
The Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) did not emerge fully formed through a single 
analytic process but though a number of steps each of which took the analysis of data to more 
refined and abstracted levels, but also ultimately turned it into a vivid, if selective, description 
of the life of the schools under consideration. The IFVA formed a central part of the case 
study report for each school. Three steps in its development should be considered. 
The first step began with the list of values developed from the analysis of documents. This 
list was then expanded by performing content analysis, as described above, on all the other 
texts produced during data collection at one school, including all transcriptions, some 
analyses and  the collated survey results, and adding them to the list, including references to 
sources and to transmission strategies – if any – associated with the value. Since all possible 
values, explicit, implicit and hidden, embedded in the texts had been included in the list, the 
decision was made, before proceeding to the second step, to focus on certain values and to 
ignore others, effectively eliminating them from any further enquiry. There were two reasons 
for this. Firstly, the sheer scale of the task of giving attention to every value mentioned would 
have made the project untenable. More importantly, some values were obviously incidental to 
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the value discourse of the institution, so it was more a case of deciding about which values it 
was meaningful to consider. These values were then highlighted on the list. A second 
decision then had to be made, about grouping certain values together which it was felt 
belonged together because of a ‘family’ relationship among them. This criterion had to be 
balanced against the availability of data; for some values there was a wealth of data, others a 
paucity, so a degree of parsimony guided the decision. 
Having decided the grouping of values, the second step was to look at the distribution of the 
value or value group across the whole institution. A two-dimensional grid for each value or 
value group was created for this purpose: one dimension represented the three perspectives of 
the school: the official, the classroom/teacher and the pupils’; the second dimension 
represented the semiotic and phenomenological perspectives on values, that were used 
initially to determine the nature of values, that of semiotic structure and intentional world. 
Each grid had four columns and two rows. The three perspectives went into the first three 
columns from the left, which were each divided into a top half and a bottom half. Into the top 
half was placed data related to semiotic structure and into the bottom the intentional world of 
the value. A grid was filled in for each of the values or value groups decided in step one, by 
taking information from the list of values and, when necessary, the original data sources. This 
meant that for each sector of the school there was information relating to the (semiotic) 
structures through which values are transmitted and information relating to the (intentional) 
experience of that particular value or value group. An example of a completed grid is shown 
in Appendix 3. 
Inevitably there were gaps in the data and another set of decisions had to be made. Could this 
be solved by further amalgamation, if the distinctions between values were fine enough? In 
many cases this was not possible so two classes were created, one of relatively well-
populated grids to which more attention should be given and the other of poorly-populated 
grids, inevitably less. This was a fluid boundary, as I felt that some values for which there 
was little data were, nevertheless, important or particular to the school’s identity. 
The fourth column on the right was not divided and was used for comments, followed by a 
short assessment of the extent to which it was felt the particular value or group of values had 
been acquired by pupils, and thus transmitted, based on the existing data. In a memo written 
during the stage of development of this format some guidance notes to help with this 
assessment were developed: 
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Fig 13 Markers for successful transmission 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Markers for Successful Transmission: 
Recognition of important values by name 
Some comprehension/conceptualisation of the term ‘values’ 
Awareness of values education (not necessarily the term) 
Acceptance of transmitted values as virtues (good) 
Practice of virtues under peer/authority pressure 
Willing and justified practice 
Fully reflective practice 
The above could be said to constitute a hierarchy representing personal growth, 
although this view would need to be more firmly anchored and evidence-based. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Although not consciously so at the time, such a hierarchy is reminiscent of Laurence 
Kohlberg’s (1981) stages of moral education. It was, though, simply an attempt to rationalise 
a range of responses evident in the data. In fact the hierarchy is discontinuous; there are at 
least two hierarchies: a cognitive one and an ethical one. However, the point was not to be 
systematic as such, but create categories for assessment through which a meaningful 
comparison of the value/value groups could be undertaken. Clearly, assessments based on a 
few fragments of data are susceptible to challenge. The point, though, for this research is not 
whether a particular pupil has acquired a certain value or not, nor even whether the school as 
a whole is successful in transmitting its values; the purpose is to generate as much analytical 
and conceptual data as possible, which may point to clues about the nature of institutional 
value transmission itself. 
One more point should be noted. An arbitrary decision was taken that the grid should not 
extend beyond a single page. The main reason was aesthetic. The grids did not represent the 
final synthesis, but collectively were more of a sampler; it was more appealing and more 
useful to be able to place pages side by side and compare them, a factor that was important 
when the grids were used in the feedback discussions with the principal contact. These 
occasions were also an opportunity to fill in some of the remaining gaps, as a result of which 
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some values could be promoted to the first tier. Finally, I ended up with about 20-30 grids for 
each school. Although there were subjective decisions made in the process of compiling the 
grids, I could be reasonably confident that they represented the most important values 
recognised across the schools.  
The third step was the actual creation of an IFVA for each school. These were based on both 
the grids created in step two and the expanded list of values created in step one, which 
contained key information about transmission strategies not contained in the grids. On the 
grids values were analysed individually or grouped due to similarity, e.g. accomplishment 
and attainment. For the synthesis, however, I regrouped them into six categories: social, 
moral, spiritual, (academic) achievement, political and welfare. The basis of this 
categorisation was the five aspects of education mandated in the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
to which much of subsequent discussion or practice of values education in the UK has 
hearkened back, namely academic, social, moral, spiritual and physical, to which I added the 
political category, as Citizenship has had a significant impact on the values taught in schools. 
However, as I struggled to decide where to place certain values, I realised that an auxiliary 
narrative was needed. This resulted in the creation of a set of working definitions for the 
categories based on the sources and lived-experience of the values more relevant to the 
context of schools, although perhaps different to how they are typically defined. They are:  
Fig 14 Grouping categories for transmitted values 
Social group:  structural values (i.e. those important in structuring social 
groupings) 
Moral group:  rules-based values, particularly distinguishing right and wrong 
Spiritual group: spontaneous values, unpremeditated situational responses 
Achievement:  those values based on desire 
Political group: values derived from social policy 
Welfare group: values judged good for individual flourishing 
 
In the IFVA each value group was considered from the viewpoint of strategy, semiotic 
structure and intentional world, followed by an assessment. This document was written as a 
continuous report, using the grids and lists but drawing on the original data sources and their 
analyses as well. In this way a three-dimensional theoretical model of the school as an 
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institutional transmitter of values was created, which formed a basis for cross case 
comparison in the later stages of the research.  
3.8.2.2   Whole Case Data Review 
Applying a theoretical model in analysis carries a risk that any findings that emerge through 
the research process might reflect inbuilt theoretical assumptions rather than the evidence in 
the data. For this reason I built in checks to this possibility in order to strengthen the validity 
of the research process. The Whole Case Data Review (WCDR) was one such check. The 
WCDR instituted a review and analysis of all the raw data collected at a school. This meant 
that none of the analyses carried out on the data hitherto had any part to play in this analysis, 
which is to say that it started again ‘from scratch’ using the data sources for each case: school 
documents, interview and discussion transcripts (Head, principal contact, teachers and pupils) 
and audio recordings (of the same), survey questionnaires and summaries and field notes. The 
purpose of the analysis was twofold: 
1) To allow a totally fresh approach to the data, putting all the material on an equal basis 
and blurring the distinction between the sources of information, in order to build a 
whole case analysis from the ground upwards, consisting only and entirely of the 
perspectives of the school. 
2) Following the principles of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), viewing the 
material from a (ideally) presuppositionless perspective, to allow new concepts to 
emerge overlooked in the previous analyses that need to be integrated into the overall 
picture of the school, thus deepening and enriching the model of the institution. 
An early version of this process was carried out with the data from the first school. However, 
it only consisted of the documents, interview and focus group transcription. Nevertheless, the 
process itself was revealing of the effectiveness of the method. At first I printed off all these 
sources in a continuous text which I bound together using a document tie. I carried this 
around, reading sections of it when travelling or waiting, underlining passages of interest and 
pencilling in comments, attempting to derive some codes. After about two weeks of this 
rather tedious pursuit, the first hint of a category that applied across the material appeared. 
Thereafter, in a short period of time, seven other categories appeared. The next task was to 
provide some justification for these categories. A table was drawn up with the category and 
examples of text from each source that provided a measure of justification for the naming of a 
category. The final step was to build a model that assimilated all the categories into a single 
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‘narrative’. Although the resulting ‘partial’ model only indirectly addressed the central 
research questions of transmission, it was satisfying and both provided categories for further 
research and for posing questions that needed to be answered. After this, the scope of the 
WCDR was expanded to cover the materials listed above and became the basis for a type of 
cross-case analysis, as described below. 
3.8.3   Cross-case analysis 
Cross-case analysis is the highest level of analysis. There is a need, however, to distinguish 
between two forms of cross case analysis. The first type consists of the comparison of the 
institutional models of values education as those have taken shape through the various levels 
of analysis of the raw data, and are presented in the case studies, of which only extracts are 
given in this chapter and in Appendix 3. In the process described under ‘Data Analysis’ data 
from the various sources was analysed and these analyses, together with the synthesis IFVA, 
constituted the individual cases, that is an analytic picture of the schools as systems in which 
values education was taking place. This was insufficient, though, to establish a clear picture 
of value transmission within each school. That began to emerge in a comparison of these 
cases, with the similarities and differences pointing towards features of an ‘institutional 
ontology’.  This comparative cross-case analysis is described in chapter 4.  
There is another, less obvious form of cross-case analysis, which is an extension of the 
Whole Case Data Review (WCDR) carried out within each case, extended to one between all 
the cases and employed in theory generation across all cases. This process had two stages. In 
the first, the categories from the partial theories at one case level were applied to the data of a 
second case and evidence sought to support, broaden or even challenge and dissolve the 
categorisation. This is also referred to as exploring the ‘range of variability’ of the category 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.143). In the second stage, which could occur as a by-product of 
the first, or be carried our independently, the categories of the first case were effectively 
‘suspended’ while a WCDR was carried out on the data of the second case. Any new 
categories emerging from the second case were added to those of the first and then the whole 
applied to a third case and the process repeated. This process effectively continued, 
circulating between the cases until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached, the point at which 
there was no further development of the categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.143; 
Charmaz, 2006, pp.113-114; Hammersley, 1989, p.175). This is shown for a three-case 
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model, such as the one in this research, in the figure below. The results of this recursive 
process are shown and discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Fig 15 Recursive cross case analysis 
The two types of cross-case analysis identified were ultimately connected, because they were 
working with the same data for the same ends. Chapter 6 integrates the findings of these two 
approaches into a dynamic model of institutional value transmission. Throughout, this 
process was guided by two constraints: first, it had to account for all the data available (Yin, 
2009), given that a significant anomaly could have nudged the development in an unforeseen 
direction; then there was the integrity of the emerging model itself: incompleteness would 
have been indicative of the need for further theoretical development. 
3.9   Summary 
The chapter has laid out the justification for a methodological approach that seeks to capture 
the occurrence of value transmission in three schools differentiated by governance, ideology 
and demography, which constitute the chosen field. That approach was a cross-case 
comparison of identical theoretical institutional models of the schools built on 
phenomenological and semiotic perspectives and employing a range of data collection and 
data analysis methods compatible with those perspectives. Data collection occured on three 
levels – the official, the classroom/teacher, and the recipient – with two methods employed at 
each level, and data analysis passes through three stages – minor in-case analyses, major in-
case analyses (syntheses), and cross-case analyses. 
Three schools were chosen that spanned the range of parameters required to establish a 
representative field, namely an urban faith (Catholic VA) school, a rural independent school 
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and a suburban state community school. The schools were visited during a three year period 
of field work, during which time several interviews, a class observation and a survey were 
carried out in each. Compilation and analysis of the data collected at each school allowed the 
creation of identical case studies that became the material for cross-case analysis. 
The relative complexity of the methodology is justified both by the invisible, sporadic and 
ephemeral nature of the phenomenon under study – that of the transmission of values – and 
by the practical limitation of gaining a snapshot view of the schools under study during a 
handful of visits to each. The methodology allowed the creation of a sophisticated qualitative 
data collection instrument, essentially a theoretical model of the institutions studied, and an 
analytical process that sought a mechanism for the transmission of values at different levels, 
through coding, matrix-building, synthesising, comparing and re-analysing.  
 
123 
 
CHAPTER 4    CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Comparison of the three schools is carried out under three headings: institutional character, 
institutional values and institutional transmission. These are the main headings in which data 
was presented in the case studies. The sub-divisions of these sections are based on a 
typological reading of the case study data (Denzin, 1989, cited in Khan and VanWynsberge, 
2008) and the presentation based on the ‘stacking’ method of Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Institutional character compares some of the qualitative differences between the schools and 
summarises in notational form points discussed in more depth in the case studies. Institutional 
values compares some of the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in the surveys; all 
figures are given in percentages to facilitate this comparison; actual figures are given in the 
case studies. Institutional transmission compares the values pedagogy observed in a sample 
class at each school and consists of data taken from the observations and analyses of the 
observation in notational form. Each of these sections concludes with a consideration of 
‘institutional ontology’, that is, generalised concepts about the nature of institutions, from the 
perspective of values in particular, that arise from the foregoing comparisons. These concepts 
are marked in the passages in bold. They are important concepts that are used in building up a 
model of institutions as places where value transmission takes place.  
4.1   Institutional Character 
4.1.1   Type, Governance and Constituency 
St Augustine Voluntary aided Roman Catholic secondary state school. Under the joint 
authority of the local council and the regional diocesan council. Catholic 
communities city-wide and others on selective basis, including those from 
poorest wards. High proportion of immigrant and ESL pupils. 
BroughamptonIndependent mixed secondary school, Church of England foundation. Board of 
governors. Selection by Common Entrance Exam. Predominantly middle 
class, white, Christian background. Wealthy clients. 
Chelmswood State secondary school. Local authority. Local catchment area. Majority lower 
middle class white UK and Asian. Ethnically and racially mixed 
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4.1.2   Setting, Relationship to Parents and Local Community 
St Augustine Suburban middle class. Poor parental attendance at school events due to 
geographical dispersion, lack of support for disciplinary measures. Some 
historic conflicts over land access. 
BroughamptonRural village. Sometimes tense relationship to parents due to high expectations 
from both sides. Well-attended high profile events. Occasional communal 
problems though some events/facilities open to villagers. 
Chelmswood Suburban middle class. Strong support from parents and good attendance at 
events. Pupils live locally. Unaware of any communal issues. 
 
4.1.3  Ethos, Educational Philosophy, Educational Priority 
St Augustine Acquisition of humanistic Christian virtues. Social liberalism, moral 
conservatism and Catholic spirituality. Intellectual empowerment, broad-based 
education for life. 
BroughamptonNurturing of individual talents. Liberal Anglicanism, conservative 
traditionalism. Well-rounded individuals, strong sporting tradition 
Chelmswood High academic and behavioural expectations. Multiculturalism, institutional 
self-belief, moral pragmatism. Academic excellence. 
 
4.1.4 Leadership style, Institutional ‘Cement’, Communal Structure/Promoter 
St Augustine Delegation, empowering. Implicit trust. House system, vertical tutor groups, 
Mass, communal worship. 
BroughamptonHierarchical. ‘Shared success’. Live-in house system, chapel worship, bounds 
and special privileges, insider talk. 
Chelmswood Managerial, cooperative. Individual care. Whole-school assembly, year 
groups, pride and recognition, strong support of parents. 
125 
 
 
4.1.5   Institutional Model, Spatial Categories, Temporal (narrative logic) Categories 
St Augustine Humanistic-constituency. School (place, people, purpose, principle), Church 
(chaplain, Catholic community), World (‘the poor’, ‘the middle classes’), 
Government, Other (RC) schools. Controlling idea, strategic concept/value, 
pedagogical strategy, reported consequences. 
BroughamptonOrganic-hierarchical. Core (chapel), Ethos, Character, Ethics (values), 
Community (houses), Boundary (walls), Buffer (village), Environment 
(world), Competitors (other independents), Outlier (sister school). Narrative 
idea, evaluation, strategy, resistance, resolution, consequences. 
Chelmswood Systemic-cooperative. Whole school, ethos and values, senior management, 
staff, pupils, tutor/year groups, the minority, parents, local community, 
national/local government. Principles (aspiration, cooperation, autonomy), 
Practices (normal circumstances, difficult circumstances), Outcomes (stability, 
achievement). 
4.1.6.   Institutional Ontology 
There are many ways in which the information gathered from the field could be dissected, but 
the focus of the research is the transmission of values, so the analysis will seek to understand 
the institutions studied from that point of view. Looking at the institutional character is a 
window into understanding the source of the values that are important for the institute and the 
resources available to undertake transmission and also the reasons for undertaking 
transmission. Though it is a contention that all institutions transmit values, they do not do so 
absent of a justification for doing so.  
The first thing to say is that all institutions have a source of authority. For schools this is 
wholly or partly the state. Of the three schools only Chelmswood comes entirely under the 
jurisdiction of the state, although that authority is in part delegated to local government. St 
Augustine has a second source in the regional diocesan council of the Catholic Church, but 
even this is not entirely independent of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. 
Broughampton, meanwhile, is a charitable foundation. The relationship to the source of 
authority can sometimes be difficult as there is a natural tension between dependence and the 
126 
 
desire for autonomy. Although it may be self-evident, it is worth stating that authority is 
important to the transmission of values in order to maintain the institutional architecture of 
transmission and the right to educate formally those to whom the values are to be transmitted. 
All institutions have a constituency from which they populate themselves, and each of these 
schools draws upon rather different (though sufficiently diverse that they would overlap) 
constituencies. Chelmswood derives its intake from the local catchment area contiguous to 
the school, while St Augustine mainly from the dispersed Catholic communities and 
Broughampton predominantly from among well-to-do families. From the transmission 
perspective the constituency not only supplies the young people who are the input that 
schools, being processing systems, continually need; there is also something of a value 
economy in the relationship between the constituency and the school, a sort of supply and 
demand: in each of these cases there is a demand from the parents for what the school 
supplies in terms of its fundamental values to their children, be that academic or more 
spiritual and moral; reciprocally, the school needs a demand for what it has to offer. 
The ethos of any institution is its repository of values. This may be explicit, as in the case of 
St Augustine, or it may be largely implicit in an understood tradition, as in the case of 
Broughampton, or partly written partly implicit in processes as it is at Chelmswood. Even 
where a document exists, this will only express a fraction of the total, for every ethos 
represents something like the collective moral consciousness of the institution, something 
beyond simple embodiment. The philosophy of education is the educational narrative in 
which the discourse of values is embedded and the focus of education is the schools’ attempt 
to answer the question of what an educated person is, that is, the product of value acquisition 
within the institution. 
In order to promote and transmit its values every institution must create a sense of 
community; as discussed in the previous section, as well as in the theory chapter, values 
represent shared experience and can only be acquired in a communal context. Schools do this 
partly by creating a common identity, through things like a school uniform, badges, and 
mottos – what might be called communal markers – and partly by creating communal 
structures, typically micro-communities within the larger body. Both Broughampton and St 
Augustine have house systems that intensify the in-group/out-group distinction. Part of this is 
also establishing a boundary, which is partly geographical, but more significantly where the 
writ of the institution begins and ends. 
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The next section of this cross case analysis will look at institutional values to see what 
patterns of commonality and difference appear in the data from these three schools. 
4.2   Institutional Values 
Looking at the values espoused by and manifested throughout the three schools is one way of 
understanding their institutional character, both in terms of what they share in common and 
also what significant differences there are between them. For each school three sources of 
data on the institution’s values are drawn on: a ‘foundation’ document - a ‘mission statement’ 
or some other document which states the aims and/or ethos of the school; the Institutional 
Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) for each school, based on a matrix of all the values across the 
school; and the results of the survey carried out among pupils in the school. The three sources 
overlap as the IFVA drew on all data collected at each school to create an overall 
understanding of the incidence of values at that school. However, that was a very generalised 
picture; the foundation document states the principal values to which the institute is 
committed; the survey allows a more quantitative comparison of the attitudes of the pupils at 
the different schools.  
4.2.1   Foundation Documents 
 DOCUMENT VALUES 
St Augustine Mission Statement, 
Ethos 
MS: love, community, potential, excellence, 
harmony, dignity (respect), justice (fairness); Ethos: 
consideration, thoughtfulness, courtesy, helpfulness, 
cooperation, friendliness, diligence, honesty, trust, 
fairness, openness. 
Broughampton Aims section of the 
school rule book 
Responsibility, uniqueness, potential, achievement, 
order, community, inspiration, (moral and spiritual) 
awareness, self-esteem, confidence, respect, 
enjoyment. 
Chelmswood ‘Aims and Ethos’ 
document 
Order, purpose, care, support, community, equality, 
opportunity, potential, balance, relevance, 
accessibility, punctuality, SMSC values, 
responsibility, opportunity, independence, 
determination, self-esteem 
 
4.2.2    Institutional Focus Value Analysis 
 SOCIAL MORAL SPIRITUAL 
St Augustine Belonging, 
cooperation, family, 
 Altruism, care, 
generosity, 
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trust, respect, fairness, 
responsibility 
compassion, intrinsic 
value 
Broughampton Community, 
cooperation, respect, 
freedom, responsibility, 
tolerance, privilege, 
compromise, fairness 
Honesty, impartiality, 
self-control, chasteness, 
attendance, punctuality, 
self-discipline 
Altruism, generosity, 
compassion, empathy, 
spirituality, self-
understanding, 
awareness 
Chelmswood Cooperation, cohesion, 
order, community, 
organisation, trust, 
respect, , fairness, 
openness, friendliness, 
amicability 
Courtesy, honesty, 
appropriateness, 
tidiness, cleanliness, 
punctuality 
Empathy, generosity, 
care, compassion, 
helpfulness 
 
 
 POLITICAL ACCOMPLISHMENT WELL-BEING 
St Augustine  Achievement, 
attainment, knowledge, 
pride 
Autonomy, identity, 
independence 
Broughampton equality Achievement, 
ambition, pride, 
determination, 
diligence, self-esteem, 
confidence 
Health, welfare, well-
being, safety, 
protection, 
commonsense, 
judgement 
Chelmswood Diversity, 
multiculturalism 
Determination, 
commitment, learning, 
success, understanding, 
achievement, 
attainment 
Safety, independence, 
difference, variety, 
balance, commonsense 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3   Student Values and Attitudes (all figures are given in percentages) 
i. Important Personal Values 
 Values Comments 
St Augustine trust (68), respect (44), loyalty 
(36), determination (28), 
ambition (28), confidence (20) 
The values question on the survey was 
not open; respondents had to choose 
from a list of about 20; nevertheless, the 
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Broughampton ambition (44), respect, (39), trust 
(33), honesty (33), confidence 
(33) 
convergence is significant. Responses 
were ignored below 20%, leaving 5-6 
values; of these, 3 – ambition, respect 
and trust – are common and 3 more – 
confidence, determination and honesty – 
feature in two schools each. 
Chelmswood trust (46), respect (39), 
determination (25), honesty (23), 
ambition (20) 
 
 
ii. Measured Values in Situational Responses 
 A B C Comments 
Generosity 
i=5,4 
i=3 
i=2,1 
 
40.5 
53 
7.5 
 
45 
30 
25 
 
46.5 
46 
7.5 
For all values in situational responses, pupils 
at school B have lower positive responses, 
that is, according to their recorded responses 
they appear less generous overall, less honest, 
less compassionate and less diligent than 
pupils at schools A and C. Comparing these 
latter two schools, pupils at school C are 
slightly more generous and honest, while 
pupils at school A are slightly more 
compassionate and diligent. For B the most 
generous proportion is only fractionally 
smaller than that of C, and higher than that of 
A, but for other situations the most positive 
proportion is significantly smaller than those 
for A and C and its most negative proportion 
significantly larger than those for A and C. 
Honesty 
i=5,4 
i=3 
i=2,1 
 
75 
11 
14 
 
40 
35 
25 
 
78 
14.5 
7.5 
Concern/ 
Compassion 
i=5,4 
i=3 
i=2,1 
 
 
85.5 
3.5 
10.5 
 
 
50 
20 
30 
 
 
65.5 
19.5 
14.5 
Diligence 
i=5,4 
i=3 
i=2,1 
 
60 
4 
36 
 
35 
5 
60 
 
50 
7.5 
42.5 
 
 
 
iii. Perception of taught attitudes 
 A B C Comments 
Similarities 
Work hard 
Get good grades  
Be the best you can 
Be responsible/ mature 
Be independent 
Help strugglers 
Contribute to society 
 
96 
96 
93 
82 
75 
64 
43 
 
100 
84 
89.5 
89.5 
79 
63 
42 
 
100 
90 
92.5 
88 
80.5 
63.5 
41.5 
Many of these results would be expected; 
where there are differences, for example 
in the emphasis on getting good grades, it 
is not thought to be statistically 
significant. The perception that students 
do not generally think they are being 
taught to contribute to society should 
perhaps be noted. 
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Differences 
Learn from others 
Be decisive 
Obey the teacher 
Be inquisitive 
Take interest in study 
Respect older pupils 
Be better than others 
Get along with others 
 
 
68 
50 
82 
82 
78.5 
50 
28.5 
85.5 
 
47 
52.5 
73.5 
73.5 
63 
89.5 
42 
100 
 
51 
39 
92.5 
68 
66 
31.5 
2.5 
80.5 
Perhaps because school A is slightly less 
competitive academically, there may be 
more emphasis on group work; however, 
the implementation of thinking skills may 
have encourage pupils there to take a 
more active interest in  their learning. B is 
clearly a highly competitive environment, 
but as a hierarchically structured 
establishment, respect for older pupils is 
expected. 
 
 
iv. Attitude to School Rules 
Response/Reason A B C Comments 
Generally keep 
Commonsense 
Not worth disobeying 
Right to obey 
Fear of breaking 
 
18.5 
18.5 
15 
7.5 
 
15.5 
15.5 
5 
5 
 
14 
16 
11 
7 
Attitudes to the school rules are fairly 
consistent across the schools with no 
statistically significant differences. 
Clearly, most students want to think of 
themselves as autonomous moral beings, 
generally staying on the right side of the 
rules, but serving their own interests 
where this conflicts with a rule and the 
rule is perceived to be unfair, thus 
preserving the ‘moral high ground’. 
Keep/Break 
Depends on fairness 
Depends on feeling 
 
37 
3.5 
 
 
42 
15.5 
 
37 
7 
 
 
v. Positively impressed by: 
 A B C Comments 
Similarities 
Opportunity to socialise 
Particular teacher(s) 
 
63 
37 
 
65 
29 
 
67 
23 
Roughly 2/3 of students enjoy school for 
the opportunity to socialise with their 
friends and classmates and around 1/3 
have a good experience because of their 
teacher or teachers. The other results for 
B are anomalous, almost certainly due to 
the very favourable environment; 
possibly, this has caused pupils there to 
downplay the significance of particular 
subjects. 
Differences 
Particular subject(s) 
Being part of a 
community 
The sense of security 
The building or facilities 
 
85 
11 
 
 - 
4 
 
29 
47 
 
23 
35 
 
63 
16 
 
14 
9 
 
 
4.2.4   Institutional Ontology 
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There is a great deal of information compressed in the tables given in this section, and I wish 
to draw out some plausible inferences from the data comparison about the values of the 
schools and how these reflect their institutional character and structure. Any conclusions are 
tentative, though, and dependent on confirmation from a larger sample. It is worth reiterating 
that such quantitative analysis is a minor part of this research and any patterns suggested by 
the data are evaluated against analyses arrived at qualitatively.  
First, across the three schools it is possible to see emerging a picture of the values which are 
considered most important. This picture is built up of a number of perspectives, none of 
which should be taken as definitive, but which together create a fairly strong case.  There is 
the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) which has mapped the incidence of values 
across each school in the data from the various sources to gauge the extent of permeation of 
values though the institutional structure. Then there are the foundation documents which state 
the principal values of the school, both operational values – those which are of primary 
importance in running the organisation – and transmission values, which it is of importance 
to the school to communicate to the pupils, the values and attitudes perceived as important to 
the school by the pupils and the values considered important by the pupils themselves. A 
comparison of these could give something like a crude idea of the transmission flow in the 
institute, the extent to which target values had permeated. When summed up across the three 
schools this is the list: 
 
Fig 16 Maximally distributed values as an index of permeation 
SOCIAL: Cooperation, Respect, Fairness, Trust   
MORAL: Honesty, Responsibility, Appropriateness 
SPIRITUAL: Care, Compassion, Generosity 
ACCOMPLISHMENT: Achievement, Ambition 
These are the values that are most distributed across the three schools and which are also 
present, to a large extent, at the beginning and end of the process. None of the values meet all 
the criteria across all the schools, but some do in at least one school and all come close. 
A second point is that the data, particularly the response to the school rules, shows that there 
is a strong sense of moral autonomy guided by a positive value, fairness. Pupils want to 
follow the rules for the most part, because they are rational and understand the need for rules 
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or perhaps they do not see the need for rules because they believe in following their 
commonsense, but do not want to get into trouble. However, if a rule is perceived as unfair 
they feel no compunction about breaking it, perhaps not openly, flagrantly, but quietly so as 
not to draw attention. What is perceived as unfair depends somewhat on context, but seems 
frequently to do with their growing awareness of their sexuality. For example, at all schools 
girls thought that not being allowed to wear jewellery or makeup was unfair, while a girl at 
Broughampton complained specifically about the rule forbidding any romantic liaisons. A 
senior teacher at the same school recognised that in general there was a problem in the lack of 
privileges granted to senior pupils in this respect. A related issue also came up in 
Broughampton regarding the tension between the consistency of the rules and the autonomy 
of the houses, and in general part of the institutional architecture is going to be systemic 
tension between autonomy and collective responsibility leading to resistance, whether that 
be individual resistance to a rule or the school’s resistance to the interference of government. 
Thirdly, there is a different type of tension which arises, not as a manifestation of a 
hierarchically-structured resistance to authority, but between the spontaneous sociality of the 
student body and the sense of belonging to a community. There is a discrepancy between 
socialising and being part of a community despite their being part of the same thing: ‘I think 
at school you’re not going to get on with everybody, sometimes it's hard to feel part of the 
community and if you feel a bit you don't fit in sometimes, then you might enjoy more 
socialising with a select few people’ [A/QQ-7/FG-18]. As the data across the schools 
indicates fully two-thirds of students value their school as a place for socialising, but the 
pupils’ response to the idea of community at St Augustine and Chelmswood is not 
encouraging, despite the concept being made much of in the official versions of the schools 
as ‘communities’. It may be worth exploring why this is so, and what makes such a difference 
at Broughampton, where almost half view the idea of belonging to a community positively. 
There are several possible reasons. At Broughampton the social mix is less heterogeneous 
and although the pupil body is international, the ethnic proportion is relatively low and easily 
integrated. Significantly, every respondent in the survey at Broughampton believed that they 
are taught to get along with others and the senior tutor said that students of differing social 
and ethnic backgrounds are put together in studies [B/FN-1108]. In both St Augustine and 
Chelmswood there is a high ethnic mix, and particularly at St Augustine a very high 
proportion of immigrant children with English as a second language. Participants in the focus 
group at Chelmswood mentioned that the Asian pupils stick together, not due to racism but 
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just because these were the people they knew best [C/FG-2314]. The Head of Chelmswood 
used the concept of the critical mass to speak about the spontaneous socialising of the 
‘disaffected’ minority and the need to prevent it from developing and disrupting the learning 
of the school [C/INT-5023]. However, this term can be applied more generally. At 
Broughampton it is the existence of a critical mass of culturally homogeneous students that, 
together with a culture of tolerance and acceptance of difference [B/FN-1108], allows the 
integration of the ‘other’, where spontaneous sociality coincides with the communal mix. At 
St Augustine and Chelmswood, where critical masses of spontaneously socialising ‘others’ 
coexist, an ‘ordered community’ can be imposed, but the sense of community will not be as 
strong. It seems that the lack of the sense of community arises not from resistance to the 
imposition of order but from the lack of a critical mass of integrated members of the 
organisation. 
The final point that arises from the data is that a strongly ideological ethos seems to lead to a 
stronger positive response to imaginary scenarios. At St Augustine there is a strong Catholic 
ethos, and despite the superficial appearance of religion being downplayed in the responses of 
the students, there is little doubt that they are influenced by those values [A/FG-9]. At 
Chelmswood, a strong secularist ideology is prevalent throughout the school, which 
emphasises diversity, equality and a multicultural perspective. There is little evidence of 
resistance to those values, and they seem to be espoused as much by the students as the staff. 
In the responses to the survey question asking what they would do in a range of situations, 
students at St Augustine and at Chelmswood had strong positive indices (i=1-2) of  
generosity, honesty, compassion and diligence and mostly weak negative indices (i=4-5), 
apart from diligence. By contrast, Broughampton, which has little in the way of institutional 
ideology, except that of encouraging individual talent, the positive indices, apart from 
generosity, are weaker and the neutral (i=3) and negative indices are stronger. This does not 
necessarily mean that pupils at Broughampton are less generous, honest, etc. overall, as these 
are only imaginary scenarios, but it does suggest that a strongly ideological ethos functions as 
a sensitising force in priming the minds of pupils to respond in an institutionally expected 
manner. 
4.3   Institutional Transmission 
The final part of this cross-case analysis looks at the transmission strategies used in an 
observed class at each school. The class settings, size and composition, content and approach 
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were sufficiently varied that the validity of any structural commonalities inferred from the 
data is likely to be strong.  
4.3.1   Description of Observed Classes 
St Augustine Vertical tutor group (years 7-13), 25 students (M+F). Moral/Citizenship 
Education (connected to Respect Agenda) + thinking skills. Responding to a 
moral dilemma in random pairs; working together, discussing and feeding 
back; treating partner with respect. 25 min. 
BroughamptonTutor group (year 11), 12 F students. PSHE/ Citizenship Education. Use and 
abuse of social networking, consequences for employment prospects. Tutor 
presentations and individual internet searches. 20 min of 40 min class. 
Chelmswood Citizenship class (year 8), 30 students (50/50 M/F). Assessed Citizenship 
programme. Diversity: benefits and problems. Teacher presentations and pupil 
responses. 60 min. 
4.3.2   Approach and Character of Teaching 
St Augustine Eliciting moral reasoning; role-playing respectful behaviours. Behavioural 
modification (practice). 
BroughamptonWarning, awareness-raising; self-education about dangers (practice). 
Behavioural modification (intent). 
Chelmswood Eliciting responses to a hypothetical situation; eliciting pupils’ experiences 
and knowledge of events; note-taking. Attitudinal modification (practice), 
behavioural modification (intent) 
4.3.3   Invocation of Values 
St Augustine Yes: respect, politeness, cooperation, gratitude 
BroughamptonYes: community, privacy; implied: dignity, safety 
Chelmswood Yes: diversity, equality, acceptance; implied: tolerance, multiculturalism 
4.3.4   Evocation of a Moral Community 
St Augustine Extrinsic through moral dilemma posed; intrinsic through role-playing respect 
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BroughamptonExtrinsic, through reference to moral judgements of potential employers; 
possibly intrinsic through reference to their (implied) responsibility to the 
school community 
Chelmswood Intrinsic, through reflection upon the issues of difference as those apply with 
particular reference to the school community 
4.3.5   Parameters of Invocation and Evocation 
St Augustine Broughampton Chelmswood 
Structure 
Events 
Symbolic-dramatic 
categories 
Empowering/disempowering 
Formal/informal 
Participation in moral   
universe 
Structure 
Events 
Symbolic-dramatic 
categories 
Empowering/disempowering 
Formal/informal 
Participation in moral 
universe 
Structure 
Events 
Symbolic-dramatic 
categories 
Empowering/disempowering 
Formal/informal 
Participation in moral 
universe 
 
4.3.6   Parameters of Control 
St Augustine Authority, shared experience, taboo, tradition, exemplar, instruction, rules, 
ritual, text, task, interpretation, teaching 
BroughamptonAuthority, custom, disclosure, warning (prediction), task, text, resistance and 
assertion of power, narrative, interpretation, teaching 
Chelmswood Authority, teaching, foretelling, ritual, image, recollection, probing, 
announcement, instruction, explanation, text, encouragement, narrative, 
acceptance, summarising, example, discussion, advice, distinction, indication, 
recitation, elicitation, disputation, clarification, reassurance 
4.3.7   Institutional Ontology 
The invocation of values is a concept which emerged in the philosophical reflection on the 
nature of values in chapter 2. It means more than simply the utterance of a value term, more 
like the unveiling of its symbolic power at the heart of a life form, a theoretically closed 
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group. Values, then, are not merely conceptual but correlate with a particular experience 
shared among the group. In the real, messy social world values rarely attain such singular 
prominence, partly because groups are always permeable and they are multi-valued as are the 
individuals who make them up. Yet all institutions, schools included, attempt to strengthen 
cohesion and loyalty by promoting in-group/ out-group distinctions and by defining key 
values, sometime unintentionally, by embedding them in important (foundation) documents. 
Tutor groups, which are often the primary pastoral context, are ideal places to observe the 
invocation of values, sometime being small and being brought together for the purpose of 
values education. However, because invocation cannot be merely a discourse in which values 
are embedded, such occasions must be suffused with attempts to establish the dominance of 
the value and deconstruct, or conceptually ‘unpack’, its meaning for the group, for example 
getting a group to think about the meaning of a term and provide examples of it, as was done 
in the class at Chelmswood with the ideas of sameness and difference used to explore 
diversity [C/OBS-0343/3-1449/12].  
Along with invocation of values comes its counterpart, the evocation of a moral 
community. As stated above, values, particularly in the sense of the acquisition of values, 
has to be understood as a collective phenomenon. To acquire a value, therefore, it is 
necessary to experience the collectivity in which the value functions. In the observed class at 
St Augustine the students are required to role-play respect, politeness, cooperation and 
gratitude by expressing the appropriate expressions and actions ‘even if it’s...false’ [A/OBS-
1125/14]. Evocation is experiential in another sense; to acquire the value is more than to pass 
through the deconstruction of the concept in a collective setting, it is also to experience the 
moral force of the value, its ‘oughtness’ or moral imperative (Kant). Clearly this cannot be 
observed, but anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of this approach in reducing conflict 
and bullying was supplied by the speaker [A/FN(3)]. This experiential aspect of a value is 
referred to as participation, as in ‘participation in the moral community’ or ‘participation in 
the moral universe of the value’. The example from St Augustine is an example of the most 
important kind of evocation, known as intrinsic evocation, meaning that the community that 
is being invoked is the very one which is constituted by the addressees and in which they are 
participating.  At Broughampton another kind of evocation is encountered, extrinsic 
evocation, where the moral community that is evoked, that of the world of potential 
employers, is hypothetical, in that it is not that of the addressed group and it is evoked more 
for consideration than for participation. At Broughampton there is also a more ambivalent 
137 
 
case for intrinsic evocation. The tutor reminds the pupils of the possible consequences of 
their actions, and the actions of others, on the whole school community [B/OBS-0425/9]. It 
could be argued that, by invoking the disvalues of shame and threats (to the reputation of the 
school) and then experiencing the consequences of similar actions vicariously through 
accounts of others’ experiences, the tutor is evoking a participant moral community in their 
midst. 
In each case study a critical analysis of the class observation was carried out, using various 
analytical methods such a structural analysis, systems analysis and content analysis. The 
results were then tabulated in a matrix with two temporal dimensions. An example is shown 
in appendix 3. The vertical axis was built around a straightforward chronology of the main 
events that occurred during the class, suitably separated out or bundled as appropriate. In the 
column(s) to the left of the events the categories of the structural analysis were matched to 
the main events. To the right of the events the categories of the systems analysis and the 
content analysis, respectively, were placed and matched to the chronology of the events. To 
the immediate right of the events, between the events column and that given to the systems 
analysis, a new column was inserted in which each event was interpreted (in semiotic terms) 
as categories of symbolic-dramatic power (the basis and reasons for this are discussed fully in 
the methodology chapter, section 3.8.1.3, pages 107-113). The horizontal axis now consists 
of a set of categories – those given in section e., Parameters of Invocation and Evocation, 
above – which constitute a relationship of causality, which can be simplified into four 
categories: strategy, sign, power and participation. The table below sets out the steps from 
analysis to simplification of categories. 
Fig 17 Structural analysis of observed teaching events 
Type of Analysis Categories Simplified Categories 
Morphological Sections Strategy 
Phases/cycles/circles 
Chronological Events (separated/bundled) Sign 
Semiotic Symbolic-dramatic 
categories 
Systems Empowering/disempowering Power 
Active/passive 
Formal/informal 
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Content Participation in moral 
universe 
Participation 
In/out 
 
The process of structural analysis has allowed the inference post facto of the tutor’s strategy 
in each lesson - to paraphrase Schleiermacher - better than they knew it themselves. While 
this might be an exaggeration, in each case the critical analysis was presented to the relevant 
tutor; none raised any objection to the analysis and one in particular was impressed ‘that you 
could find so much in there’ (email correspondence).  
Events, reinterpreted in symbolic-dramatic terms are collectively signs. They are, however, 
signs understood as markers of transmission. A blank sheet of paper in front of a student is a 
sign that the student may be disengaged, but it is also a sign that the teacher may not have 
engaged the student sufficiently for transmission to be taking place. The principal interest is 
on the teacher as sign-bearer and the signs as forms of control over the environment in which 
acquisition can take place. These signs can be overt, as when a verbal or written instruction is 
given or when a standard gesture is used, or implied in more subtle forms of ‘charismatic’ 
control through linguistic use, described below.  
Section 4.3.6 ‘Parameters of Control’ gives examples of the different symbolic-dramatic 
categories, or signs as forms of control, employed during the observed classes at the three 
schools. These categories can be analysed and grouped into three basic categories. A 
consideration of the data, guided by the ideas of control in educational transmission in 
Bernstein (1975), has led to the conclusion that there are three aspects of control: that 
achieved through the manipulation and patterning of space, time and image, referred to, 
respectively, as boundary, periodicity and symbolisation. Larger-scale versions of these 
categories will be referred to in the next section; what is being considered here is a practice of 
charismatic control through the medium of language and its effect on an audience. Boundary 
(to be more grammatically consistent it should be referred to as ‘bounding’ or ‘boundary 
creation’) is the act of dividing the semantic space of a listener by imposing a boundary 
between different qualities, for example dividing behaviour into ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or 
answers to questions into ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’. Such divisions have a profound effect on 
listener perception. Periodicity can be dividing up time linearly into successive periods, such 
as past, present and future, giving a sense of temporal depth to a discourse in the present, or 
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looped as it is in certain rhetorical devices such as the rule of three and repeated motifs. By 
symbolisation I am thinking primarily of things like analogy and metaphor, which can shape 
understanding or alter ways of thinking. Nevertheless, the linguistic is only one level of 
manifestation of these categories of control; even  in the classroom they will have extra-
linguistic applications, for example dividing the class into groups, imposing a deadline for 
work or using visuals to reinforce learning. The table on page 140 shows how the combined 
symbolic dramatic categories fit into the basic categories. 
Some forms of control do not fit into a single basic category. For example, tradition can be a 
way of looking to the past, but it can also function as a standard for present behaviour; ritual 
involves the periodic repetition of a set of actions, but also usually is heavy with symbolism. 
Some of the symbolic-dramatic categories did not fall into these categories of control, but 
into another aspect of authority, power distribution. Power distribution is less about the 
charisma of the teacher but derives from the role and the power that is the mark of office. Its 
categories are more straightforwardly informational but also indicate the shifting balance of 
power in the to and fro of interaction. 
Control is differentiated from, though related to, power in this theory of transmission. Control 
and power together constitute the authority of the teacher. The main distinction is that while 
control originates in the charismatic quality of the teacher to mitigate distraction and 
stimulate learning in the students, power is a conferred status that a teacher has by dint of the 
role they occupy and the qualification they have to stand in that role. The distinction runs 
deeper than that, however, particularly in regards the role of the teacher in value 
transmission. 
 
Fig 18 Symbolic dramatic categories as forms of control and power 
Symbolic-dramatic categories Basic categories of 
control 
Sorted forms of control 
Authority, shared experience, 
taboo, tradition, exemplar, 
instruction, rules, ritual, text, 
task, interpretation, teaching, 
custom, disclosure, warning 
(prediction), resistance and 
assertion of power, narrative, 
foretelling, image, recollection, 
Boundary taboo, tradition, rules, probing, 
disclosure distinction, custom 
Periodicity shared experience, tradition, 
warning (prediction), ritual, 
custom, foretelling, recollection, 
narrative 
Symbolisation exemplar, ritual, interpretation, 
image, example, indication, text 
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probing, announcement, 
explanation, encouragement, 
acceptance, summarising, 
example, discussion, advice, 
distinction, indication, 
recitation, elicitation, 
disputation, clarification, 
reassurance 
Power distribution Instruction, teaching, assertion of 
power/authority, advice, probing,  
announcement, explanation, 
encouragement, acceptance, 
summarising, discussion, 
recitation, elicitation, disputation, 
clarification, reassurance 
 
Control being charismatic, is unique to the individual; it can be natural or learned, but 
everyone has it to varying degrees along a spectrum; more importantly, it cannot be conferred 
or shared. Power is different. Power is derived and shared hierarchically and rests ultimately 
in the power of the state to determine who can teach. More importantly, the granting of power 
confers with it the right to distribute power (the extent of this will be considered in the next 
section), which as the consideration of empowerment and disempowerment in the classroom 
demonstrated, is vital to the process of acquisition. 
4.4   Summary 
Data from the case studies is compared under three sections. These sections are the same 
categories as those employed for categorising information in the case studies themselves, 
namely Institutional Character, Institutional Values and Institutional Transmission. Within 
each category analysed data from all relevant sources has been ordered according to sub-
categories, grouping concepts that have largely been developed during the course of the 
analysis (although some are in vivo concepts) and which have an affinity for each other. Data 
has been simplified and standardised by reducing written data to notational form or single 
terms and numerical data to percentages, to facilitate easier comparison between cases, and 
placed in tables and frames with the data arranged either vertically or horizontally. Some 
datasets, particularly for the surveys, have comments written alongside offering observations 
and interpretations of patterns that seem to be emerging. The main analytical discourse, 
though, is contained in each section following the cross-case comparison. Entitled 
‘Institutional Ontology’, it attempts from the data to make inferences from the patterns of 
similarity across the dataset about the nature of those schools as institutions in the 
transmission of values, as a preliminary stage in the development of a mechanism for 
institutional value transmission. 
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Important patterns began to emerge, first concerning the value infrastructure of the schools, 
such as having a depository of values and a discourse of values, a sense of community and 
communal markers and boundaries, and a value economy defined largely by the constituency 
served. Then, despite the disparate models of governance and sources of values that the 
schools exhibited, a broad convergence on the most significant values across the three 
schools could be seen, as well as important theoretical concepts such as moral autonomy, 
resistance to authority and spontaneous sociality. Finally, there was evidence in support of 
the initial concepts of invocation and evocation, and some refinement of their scope, as well 
as differentiation of the concept of authority into power and control, and differentiation of 
control into boundary, periodicity and symbolisation. This comparative cross-case analysis 
was developed alongside an iterative cross-case analysis, in which the dataset across an entire 
case was reanalysed and then emerging concepts ‘fed into’ another, as described in chapter 3.  
In summary, at this point in the theoretical development, some important aspects of 
institutional transmission of values are understood to be strategy (strategic thinking and 
planning), signs (of control), power (to empower and disempower) and participation (the 
experiential aspect of value). How these are linked to the ideas of invocation and evocation, 
as well as the other aspects of institutional ontology outlined here will be discussed in chapter 
6, after the structural aspects of the entire mechanism have been outlined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5   PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
 
 
In this chapter I present the overall conceptual framework of the model for institutional 
values transmission, as that has emerged through the process of iterative cross-case analysis, 
and then break it down into its constituent categories and concepts, providing definitions and 
examples of each (and, if applicable, sub-types), and a rationale for deciding on each concept 
or category. The chapter concludes with a demonstration of conceptual clustering in texts 
chosen from across the dataset.  
5.1   Overview and Outline of Model for Institutional Value Transmission 
On the basis of the analyses of data obtained at the three schools covered in the Case Studies 
and the synthesis of this analysed data in the Institutional Focus Value Analysis (IFVA) and 
Whole case Data Review (WCDR), an overview of the model for institutional value 
transmission in four stages can be outlined, shown in the table on the following page. Sub-
categories/concepts in bold are constitutive aspects of the principal categories/concepts in the 
left-hand column; non-bolded ones are typically examples of the sub-categories/concepts or 
‘scaffold’ terms that have been important at various stages in the construction of the model. 
This model can be thought of as a development of and an extension of the basic model of 
invocation and evocation derived from the analysis of value in the chapter 2. The terms 
‘invocation’ and ‘evocation’, however, do not appear in the model as it stands. The reasons 
are twofold: the lesser of these is that invocation and evocation are deductive principles 
which have guided the research process, whereas the model below is inductively based, 
containing categories and concepts which have emerged from the data during the course of 
the research; the more important is that the model below is a static representation of the 
components of the model.  In the next chapter, Discussion of Findings, the dynamics of the 
model will be explained more fully, and that is where invocation and evocation will be seen 
to play their part.  
 
Fig 19 Outline of model for institutional values transmission 
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CATEGORY/CONCEPT SUB-CATEGORIES/CONCEPTS EXPLANATION 
Permeation  Value/disvalue, strategy, semiotic  
marker, intentional state; official 
perspective (top down), classroom-
teacher perspective (sideways on), 
pupil perspective (bottom up) 
The linguistic, 
conceptual and symbolic 
diffusion and re-
appearance of values 
throughout all levels of 
the institution 
Authority Periodicity, boundary creation, 
symbolisation, power distribution; 
authority, boundary, structure, 
routine, operational value, 
transmission value, personal value, 
empowerment, disempowerment  
The extent and limitation 
of the powers by which 
control is exerted for 
maintenance and 
production at all levels of 
the institution 
Resistance Moral autonomy, intensity, target, 
negotiation; Rebellion, defiance, 
criticism, questioning 
The ways in which 
externally imposed and 
internally generated force 
(power) is countered at 
all levels of the 
institution 
Transformation Transformative experience, trigger, 
turning inward/reflectivity, 
replication; Intrinsic value, beyond 
controlling, taking responsibility, 
unspoken tradition, letting the mask 
slip, the spiritual core, catching the 
moment 
The ways in which 
resistance is bypassed, 
averted or overcome, 
throughout the institution 
 
5.2   Definition of Principal Categories and Sub-Categories 
This section will provide a definition of all the main categories and concepts in the model, the 
principals in the first column and those bolded in the second column of the table above. 
 
144 
 
5.2.1   Categories of Permeation 
Permeation is the state of conceptual saturation of the life-world of an institution, specifically 
by value concepts. This arises through the normal routes of institutional communication in 
schools: policies, meetings, notices, discourses, colleague dialogue, books and films, 
classroom pedagogy and more informal exchanges, peer conversations, and so on. As well as 
the specifically linguistic, it can also include extra-linguistic communication, such as 
pictures, symbolic acts and behavioural modelling. 
Value 
A value is any term, or a description of a state of affairs, that has the connotation of a good in 
a particular frame of reference, and can influence how individuals feel and behave in certain 
circumstances. Here, it includes specifically social, moral, spiritual, individual and 
achievement values. Using a variation of content analysis, values are designated by abstract 
nouns being assigned to sections of text that match the noun in meaning, either through being 
identical, transformed (e.g. syntactically) or synonymous. 
Disvalue 
Disvalues, as they are interpreted in this research, are negative states that reinforce a good or 
invoke a positive reaction, so are found in clusters either with or without values. 
Strategy 
A strategy is an action, intention to act or action plan with a pedagogical aim, specifically 
(though not exclusively) to facilitate the teaching of a particular value or set of values. 
Semiotic marker 
A semiotic marker is a word or phrase that designates an object or event, either real or 
imaginary, which has some pedagogical significance, particularly, though not exclusively, in 
the teaching of values. 
Intentional state 
The term is taken from the phenomenological literature, from the ‘intentionality of 
consciousness’, used first by Brentano (1973) and then by Husserl (1970), meaning that 
consciousness is not a pure abstraction but is always consciousness of something, that 
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something being either indiscriminately the perception of an object in the external world, the 
awareness of an emotional state, a belief, etc. In this research analysis ‘intentional state’ is 
used to denote particularly expressions of experiences in the context of a value or set of 
values. 
5.2.2   Categories of Authority 
Authority is understood to consist of power and control. Power is hierarchical and distributive 
and this distributive aspect is reproduced throughout all levels of the institution. Control, by 
contrast, is individual and charismatic, and limited only to a particular arena. Power and 
control are not themselves represented at the analytic level, but power by ‘power distribution’ 
and control by ‘periodicity’, ‘boundary’ and ‘symbolisation’. 
Power distribution 
Includes any references to the power structure, the giving (empowering) or the removal 
(disempowering) of power: within the class, within the school, or from outside with reference 
to the school. 
The following three categories denote techniques for exerting control within the school 
environment, that arise from individual or collective autonomy, initiative and creativity, 
outside of the hierarchy of power. They include physical manipulation of the environment, 
but more specifically the manipulation of language. At the administrative level this latter is 
more likely to be written; at the pedagogical level it is more often spoken.  
Periodicity 
Periodicity refers to the action of patterning language with respect to time. That could include 
placing things in a chronological order, or even creating a time reference for a single event. It 
also includes introducing cycles into language through various rhetorical devices, such as 
rhyme, rhythm, repetition, group of three, etc, and also grammatical regularities such as 
parallel clauses, linking and reference, and phonological  aspects such as intonation and 
stress. In all cases examples should be immanent in the text rather than a secondary reference. 
Boundary 
Boundary refers to the action of using language to pattern space, of dividing space – in the 
widest sense, including physical and all forms of imaginary space – up and thereby bounding 
146 
 
sections of it. Examples would be dividing the class into groups, prohibiting or promoting 
certain actions (dividing moral space, creating regions of ‘allowed’ and ‘not allowed’). The 
language tends to be imperative, but the bounding transcends the language and is ‘felt’ in the 
realm of meaning. 
Symbolisation 
Symbolisation can include the use of visual images, but refers specifically to the 
manipulation of language to create images in the mind of the reader or listener. Includes, 
metaphor, metonymy and simile, onomatopoeia and alliteration, etc, which are immanent in 
the language, but also various transcendent narrative and anecdotal devices. The use of visual 
images, particularly used pedagogically, would probably be classed under ‘semiotic marker’. 
5.2.3   Categories of Resistance 
The natural reaction to change, particularly when that change is perceived (rightly or 
wrongly) to impact negatively on the relative freedom, power, status, wellbeing or economic 
circumstances of an individual or of an individual to act on behalf of an institution. In the 
context of this research the definition is more narrowly focused on the struggle between the 
relatively empowered and disempowered over the question of the good. 
Moral autonomy 
The desire of each person to be able to decide the good for themselves, irrespective of 
whether that good might be fundamentally selfish, self-denying or public-minded. It is the 
encroachment of power into the area of moral autonomy that is the basis of resistance. 
Intensity 
Every reaction to the usurpation of moral autonomy is a form of resistance, but its 
manifestation can vary widely, particularly in regards to intensity. Stages of intensity of 
resistance identified from the least intense are questioning, criticism, distraction, defiance and 
rebellion. 
Target 
The target of resistance is that authority which is perceived as encroaching on moral 
authority. The identification of this source with the real situation depends entirely on the 
correctness of this perception.  
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Negotiation 
We all negotiate a compromise between various goods, for example between freedom and 
security or leisure time and income. Sometimes this is more subtle and more fundamental. 
The acceptance of a value requires the sacrifice of a degree of moral autonomy. Often this 
proceeds through an internal dialogue; sometimes the bargaining is in the open but the nature 
of the process is not acknowledged, as when a teacher convinces a pupil to work hard for an 
exam. The institutional transmission of values in a school requires a particular type of 
negotiation: the school must offer something in return for the pupils’ moral autonomy. That is 
a place in the moral community. That is clearly not an offer that every person feels obliged to 
take up. The ‘lads’ in Willis’ (1977) study were clearly not willing to sacrifice their moral 
autonomy to accommodate academic study, despite this condemning them to a life of 
industrial labour. Children who truant are rebelling against the authority of the school and 
placing themselves outside the moral community. These are the more extreme cases, but as a 
measure of negotiation takes place within all individuals, there must be something that both 
makes the moral community an attractive proposition and assists in the negotiation with 
moral autonomy. 
5.2.4   Categories of Transformation 
Transformative experience 
As the experience of a shared feeling constitutes the interiority of value, the acquisition of a 
value should logically be accompanied by a type of ‘experience’ that allows and enables the 
experiencing of that shared feeling. Though these two meanings of experience used here are 
distinct, they are connected at a very fundamental level, as I have argued in the theory 
chapter. 
Trigger 
The change from a state of non-acquisition of a value, particularly in the case of active 
resistance though not limited to this, to a state of acquisition requires an event in the 
individual’s personal or social environment that triggers the change. This can be something 
dramatic or something quite mundane, but it leads to a transformative experience. 
Turning inward/reflectivity 
148 
 
The exteriority of a value is its linguistic conceptualisation. Therefore, the acceptance of a 
value, particularly as this is explicitly recognised, should engender a more reflective attitude 
towards life. Though values are relative and underpin very different life-worlds or ‘forms of 
life’ (Pring, 1986), all values require something of an inward turn. 
Replication 
Values are intrinsically shared. Moreover, they are inherently transmissive, meaning they 
require being transmitted. On acquiring a value, at the expense of a degree of moral 
autonomy, there is a need not only to reinforce the decision through invocation of the value 
but also to extend the moral community of the value. 
5.3   Explanation of Evidential Basis for Categories 
 
This section deals with the evidential basis for the terms and audits the decision process in 
arriving at that particular concept from the raw data. This will be done using a limited range 
of data; the full data supporting the conceptual scheme can be found in the supplementary 
material. 
 
5.3.1   Categories of Permeation 
The concept of permeation lies implicitly in the literature of hegemonistic saturation (Apple, 
1979, p.22), though it is not used explicitly and certainly not in the sense used here, that of 
the institutional diffusion of values. Evidence for permeation itself was not sought directly in 
the raw data of the primary sources; it was considered an organising idea primarily. As 
explained elsewhere, it would require longitudinal studies of some sophistication to establish 
the extent to which permeation of values was a result of transmission flow alone.  However, 
indirect evidence arose with the discovery of ‘clustering’ of the categories of permeation in 
the data, and that will be dealt with in the final section. 
5.3.1.1   Values 
The concept of values proposed in this research, and explained in the theory chapter, means 
that values as linguistic structures are diffused through normal routes of communication and 
are therefore embedded in normal, pedagogical and reflective discourses. In Methodology, 
the process of isolating values embedded in texts was explained in full, but simply put is a 
variation on content analysis, whereby explicit or implicit values are extracted by reduction to 
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abstract noun forms. Four types of embedding can be distinguished: explicit, explicit (lexical 
variation), implicit (synonym/metaphor) and implicit (interpretation). Each of these will be 
demonstrated. 
i) explicit value 
What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school?  [pause] ‘Ahm, Care for 
each other, ahm, and a recognition that everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has 
intrinsic value’. [A/INT-29.00] (care) 
‘The core of chapel life [is] a celebration of the community that’s here…we have 667 students living 
at close quarters with each other and it becomes vital, I think, to promote empathy, ehm self-
understanding, ehm a sense of altruism towards others and those skills are manifested in adventures 
beyond the school, active charity events…’ [B/INT-6.55] (empathy, altruism) 
‘The ordered community is...I mean, this school is, has a very good community feel and I think 
everybody feels part of a team. I’ve been in lots of schools and taught in lots of schools and this is 
probably the only one where it feels that you’ve got that community spirit in the same way as we’ve 
got here [C/FN-2324]; I think you could ask any pupil in the school and they would say they feel part 
of a real community here and a valued part of this community’. [C/FN-2557] (community) 
ii) explicit (syntactic variation) value 
Becky: ‘Some teachers are more lenient, but sometimes I think people get away with stuff that they 
shouldn't like being disrespectful or not paying full attention’ [A/FG-2]; Gavin: ‘without respect 
nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don't respect your teacher 
they’re probably not going to respect you, and when no one’s respecting each other nothing works 
properly’. [A/FG-8] (respect) 
‘The School prides itself on the positive relationships between pupils and staff’. [B/P-BM, 2.1] 
(pride) 
To deliver a balanced and broad curriculum which is relevant and accessible to all pupils [C/Aims-2] 
(balance) 
iii) implicit (synonym/metaphor) value 
[Initially] ‘I didn’t see how we could generate that locality loyalty within a building on a site’. 
[A/INT-16.00] (belonging, cooperation) 
‘there’s a lot of village people who know our Bramtonians and talk to them and are a lookout post’ 
[B/INT-39.55] (welfare, safety, protection) 
‘Even if I don’t like a subject I always still try hard; I learn a lot if I put the effort in; When I’m off I 
realise how much I miss school, so I try to make the most of my education’. [C/SUR-8] 
(determination, commitment) 
iv) implicit (interpretation) value 
Amanda: ‘Overall I feel you get a good education at the end of the day. In year 11 it's the target year 
and they always make sure you do well’. [A/FG-3] (accomplishment, achievement, attainment) 
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‘If you were to go to [house name] and [Airey Pierce*] is the housemaster there, he would be one of 
the best exponents of this, because you can ask him about any boy in his house and he’ll tell you the 
parents, the parents’ names, where they’re from, he’ll even tell you what particular crisps they like: 
the detail, it amazes me the details the housemasters amass on their charges, and that to me is...there’s 
a lovely moment on a Friday night and a Saturday night and Airey is in the foyer of the house and the 
boys come, sometimes in their rugby kits or their sports kits and they’ve got late teas or been to the 
chippy or something and they sit around him and they just talk. And when I have a problem or when 
teachers have a problem in the academic environment, as there’s one particular issue going on at the 
moment with a girl, you talk to the matron and the matrons really do know their boys and their girls... 
They have the most intimate conversations with their students, I marvel at their nature’. [B/I-51.10] 
(care) 
Teacher: ‘What’s this poem all about, [the one] Benjamin Zephaniah’s written. Yes?’ Student: ‘It’s 
about all religions and where you’re from, they’re all equal. It doesn’t matter if you’re 
different’ .[C/OBS-34/3233] (diversity, multiculturalism) 
5.3.1.2   Disvalues 
The ontological status of disvalues was discussed in the theory chapter. They are transmitted 
like values and function to reinforce or provoke values, so even where they stand alone they 
imply values. They are much less common in the sources than values; however, this could be 
a result of a line of questioning rather than anything intrinsic. Although this has not been 
considered systematically, there seem to be several distinct types of disvalues: ideological 
competitors to certain values, negative emotional states, and abstract antonyms. Disvalues in 
the following examples are underlined and the implied value(s) are bolded. 
All will be expected to adhere to the school’s Equal Opportunities Policy. All forms of racism, sexism 
and discrimination of any kind will not be tolerated. Incidents of unacceptable behaviours will be 
recorded [A/BP-P, p2] (equality, diversity) 
Racism and sexism, are among an expanding number of identified behaviours that are 
characterised as discriminatory and trigger a strategy of non-tolerance across a broad range of 
public and, increasingly, private institutions. As non-tolerance of discriminatory behaviour is 
linked to the values of equality and diversity, such discrimination can be considered a 
disvalue. 
‘be magnanimous when the success happens or when the failure happens’. [B/INT-3211] 
(magnanimity) 
Failure is mentioned in the context of magnanimity, where it has a particular resonance, as 
learning to be a ‘good loser’ is a sign of emotional maturity; however, it could provoke other 
value experiences such as determination or humility. 
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‘we are pushed sometimes into doing things we wouldn’t ideally want to do: either perhaps running a 
particular course which students can pass and get some points and push us up the league tables, which 
might not be the best course that we actually want them to do, but we can’t risk results dropping. And 
so it’s very cautious in that way [than] perhaps introducing new things that might be better. There are 
new course available that students could do that might be better GCSEs. The science course we do at 
the moment might educationally be better, might be more interesting, more motivating for the pupils, 
but we would be very wary of changing when we’ve got an established course which students are 
doing very well on’. [C/INT-2940] (stability, achievement) 
Caution and wariness underlie an innate conservativeness in the school (Chelmswood), which 
promotes stability in an institution which already has an excellent academic reputation and 
feels no need to take risks to improve matters. 
5.3.1.3   Strategy 
Strategy refers predominantly to pedagogical strategy but can also refer to learning strategy. 
From the research perspective strategies fall into two types: reported strategies, which, as the 
term implies, are when people – even unconsciously – refer to the strategies they employ to 
teach (or to learn), and live strategies which are immanent in the description of a teaching 
event or in the transcription of the teacher’s (pupil’s) verbal delivery. The former are 
recovered from the transcriptions through line by line analysis; the latter are postulated on the 
basis of a morphological analysis of the entire observed lesson, a variety of structural 
phenomenology. Examples are taken from across sources and cases. Where a specific part of 
the extract is of particular significance, it is underlined. Stated or implied values, where 
appropriate, that are being promoted are given in brackets and bolded after the reference. 
i) Reported strategies 
‘We operate distributed leadership and project management here, which means that a lot of the power 
resides in a broad number of people who don’t have to run back to me to check things. Because we 
use project management it means the most junior member of staff can have an idea, can be allowed to 
run with it, develop it and produce an outcome, which their peers then say “Yeah, that sounds good, 
we’ll do it”’. [A/INT-1600] (responsibility, freedom) 
The intention behind two interlinked concepts, ‘distributed leadership’ and ‘project 
management’ is indicated by the link ‘which means…’ which in this case does not introduce 
a definition but a purpose and an intention to empower members of staff. 
‘We make a feature of pluralism... I think the very plurality and the very fact that it’s very clear to all 
pupils here that they do live in a society where there are people from many different faith 
backgrounds and cultural backgrounds, I think that’s very important to people here’. [C/INT-1912] 
(pluralism, diversity) 
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The intention is evident in the words ‘We make a feature…’ and the fact that this has been 
linked to an identified desire of the target group, which in this case is the student body. 
ii) Implied strategies through morphological analysis 
From Case Study School B 
Though superficially straightforward, the structure is not really a linear one, but rather cyclical. 
Though complex in detail and not uniform in execution the basic cycle can be represented thus: 
Fig 20 Implied strategy in observed class, school B 
 
Disclosure____ _________________ 
Warning Consequence 
____________  Evidence_________ 
Education Question/Comment 
  Response________ 
 
First the teacher reveals something that the pupils may not have known, such as the ease with which it 
is possible to gain access to someone’s site. Then she gives a warning to the students about the 
appropriateness of their behaviour online, the possible consequences, such as losing or failure to 
secure employment and provides evidence for this through publicised examples. The cycle is 
complete when the teacher responds to questions or comments from the pupils, developing and 
deepening the point, before moving to the next disclosure. 
 [Case Study B/Critical analysis of observed class-I] 
The teacher has a clear strategy in this analysis: to change behaviour through a double shock, 
that of unmasking illicit behaviour and then pointing out the potential long-term 
consequences of that behaviour. 
5.3.1.4   Semiotic Marker 
A semiotic marker is anything in the texts that indicates a sign (ignoring in this instance the 
notion that words themselves are signs). Signs could be categorised in a number of ways, for 
example by whether they are immanent or reported, or by type, such as message, act, object 
or event; but, for the purposes of this exposition these distinctions do not seem as relevant as 
showing that there are a multiplicity of media that sign, and that this process is instrumental 
in transmitting values. The only stipulation is – and this may seem obvious – only real, 
tangible things count (even if they have imaginary content, such as stories). In the following 
examples the semiotic markers are underlined and any values implied are bolded.  
Rules will be prominently displayed throughout the school so that they can be referred to regularly 
and applied consistently [A/BP-CC, p4] (appropriateness, safety) 
153 
 
In this case the rules are printed onto a sign or poster through which the message is broadcast. 
To teach the rules adults will model appropriate behaviour at all times [A/BP-CC, p5] 
(appropriateness) 
Actions consistent with messages delivered verbally send a strong message in themselves. 
The Chapel is regularly used to focus the thoughts of the community at times of crisis, collective grief 
or rejoicing [B/P-WRE-2.7] 
‘The Chapel’ is really an example of metonomy, in which the building itself stands in for a 
whole edifice of belief, ritual, guidance and pastoral care, which extends throughout the 
school, but which finds its centre in the building itself. 
‘Pupils are polite and respectful and teachers respect the pupils. I’ve never been in a school where 
you walk down the corridors and pupils always, always say “hello miss, how are you, did you have a 
good weekend?” and the teachers the same to the children: “Ah, morning Steven, how are you?” You 
come in and they’re opening doors for you, “can I help you with that, miss?”’ [C/FN-2324] 
Here, ritual greetings and actions are used to convey feelings of respect and friendliness. 
5.3.1.5   Intentional State 
An intentional state is simply a state of consciousness of something, but I have used it in a 
more restricted sense of an awareness of a particular disposition: a feeling, an opinion, a 
cherished belief, a judgement, which is being articulated. Intentional states are experiential, 
but in the cases quoted here are experiences, however tangentially, of values or, in some 
cases, disvalues. Values or implied values are bolded; disvalues are, additionally, italicised. 
Amanda: Well me, I lend money. I don't expect it back but they say they'll pay me back anyway so I 
take it when they give it back. Becky: It's about trust I suppose. I have this weird thing about money, 
especially, I don't know why, it might be because of the way I was brought up, I don't know, but I 
don't like giving money away. I'd rather give my food away than trust somebody to give me back 
something. I don't know why. Gavin: I think if you give some money they may start taking advantage 
and expect you to give money more often so people would rather just give them their food. And plus 
if you got lunch it's likely that your parents have given it to you and you've not actually paid for it 
yourself so you're more willing to give it away than give your own money away. [A/FG-17] 
(generosity) 
The discussion was in response to a question regarding generosity, but the conversation 
seems to focus on trust as much as on generosity, or not trusting people, and ranges over self-
analysis, reminiscence and prediction. 
Becky: A lot of the time you can get into more trouble for not having your uniform done properly than 
that people might do for disrupting everyone’s learning in the class. [A/FG-2] 
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Becky expresses her resentment at what she perceives as an injustice or unfairness based on 
the value she attaches to learning. 
‘... everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has intrinsic value; so no matter how 
naughty, no matter how deprived, no matter how socially excluded you may be or, on the other hand, 
no matter how wealthy or fortunate you may be, that within each person is, there’s going to be 
something of real value that needs to be nurtured and grown and developed.’ [A/INT-29.00] 
The teacher uses his belief in intrinsic value as a great equaliser in terms of class, advantage, 
status and behaviour. The poor, who are disproportionately likely to display inappropriate 
behaviour, nonetheless have potential. Those from more advantaged backgrounds, while 
enjoying many privileges, may implicitly lack certain qualities which they need to discover. 
‘I would see it as a very successful day at school when I haven't had to lay down the law but have 
managed to improve pupils’ behaviour in other ways’. [C/INT-1225]   
The Head reveals that he find happiness in being able to bring about change through 
education and persuasion rather than by the threat of sanctions. 
5.3.2   Categories of Authority 
The relationship between prior and later categories 
From the Whole Case Data Review of School A, ten categories were derived from the data, 
which were authority, boundary, structure, routine, operational value, transmission value, 
personal value, empowerment, disempowerment and resistance, which were built into an 
initial model. From the WCDRs of schools B and C, and the concepts and categories 
emerging out those analyses, that theoretical framework developed considerably. Eight of 
those ten prior categories were then integrated into four higher-order categories: periodicity, 
boundary creation, symbolisation and power distribution; and one, authority was promoted to 
an overarching category. This left one, resistance, which had not been subsumed into the new 
ordering. This process of integration was not been done arbitrarily, nor was it a case of the 
new superseding the old; the prior had been integrated into the later because of a 
developmental shift in theoretical perspective which allowed the reorientation and the 
emergence of a higher-order and more complete theoretical model. These relationships are 
shown in the table on the following page. 
 
Fig 21 Analysis of authority: administrative & classroom levels 
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CAUSAL-ACTIVE-MANAGERIAL CONSEQUENTIAL 
WHOLE SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATION 
CLASSROOM 
PEDAGOGY 
Authority Control Periodicity Routines Rhetoric 
Boundary 
creation 
Structures, rules, 
boundaries 
Divisions, limits 
Symbolisation Signage, symbolic 
structures 
Images, 
metaphors 
Power distribution Empowerment, 
disempowerment 
Empowerment 
and 
disempowerment 
 
Based on the WCDR of School A, a model was built up of an individual’s ‘spiritual journey’ 
as they entered the orbit of the school. This model was able to delineate the large-scale value-
oriented features of the institution. Most of the essential features of that model have now been 
incorporated into the table above, which is focused instead on the causal, active and 
managerial attributes of actors within the institution. 
5.3.2.1   Power Distribution 
Power distribution concerns issues of empowerment and disempowerment, who is 
empowered or disempowered, and the circumstances under which this balance changes.  
 ‘Here I can [give advice based on Catholic principles]. So, that’s not so much a clash, I think that’s 
actually empowering.’ [A/INT-3405-3534] 
Working formerly in a non-Catholic school, this teacher felt disempowered by the rules 
which prevented him offering advice to a pupil who was asking for some, to their mutual 
frustration. At St Augustine he was free to do so, and experienced no clash between the 
values of his Catholic faith and the values of his profession. 
‘The sixth form are leading the discussion. I’m there with another member of staff just facilitating 
discussion and making notes, but they’re leading it’. [A/FN(2)-34.28] 
A situation of role reversal (sort of) where pupils determine the agenda and teachers take a 
backseat. It should be noted that the framework has been created by and is maintained by the 
school, so this is a case of the pupils being empowered by the school rather than spontaneous 
empowerment. 
‘they have the freedom to challenge and that they’ll have the expectation that that’ll create an 
academic discourse over the topic we’re looking at’. [B/INT-1220] 
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This concerns lessons in ethics. Pupils are encouraged and expected to have their own ideas 
and to argue for their perspectives and not simply to accept the ideas put to them. 
‘we have a creeping mandate from, a creeping influence from the state, not – indoctrinate is too strong 
a word, but to politicise people in a certain way. And I do worry about political involvement that 
dictates, you know, some of the values that might be beneficial to politicians to be inculcated in 
schools’. [B/INT-2425] 
This expresses a concern widely felt in all schools, of whatever type, of a sense of 
disempowerment, or a threat of disempowerment, in regards to their autonomy in deciding 
how to conduct the values education of pupils and what values to educate them in. 
Broughampton is an independent school but seems not to be immune to this threat. 
all staff have a part in the decision making processes [C/AE-7] 
The senior management group sees the advantage of empowering the general staff, creating a 
sense of collective responsibility and reducing the likelihood of resentment and the 
development of an ‘us and them’ mentality. 
Bullying involves the illegitimate use of power [C/ABP-Definition] 
Bullies seize power over others and maintain it through force, intimidation and other coercive 
means, thus disempowering their victims in perpetuity. Two things in particular distinguish 
this from legitimate forms of power. First, legitimate power is distributed within an 
established order in which power is conferred according to merit and the sanction for this 
power lies ultimately with the State which itself, constitutionally, represents the will of the 
people. Secondly, the bully asserts power and disempowers others only to suit his/her own 
desires. Legitimate power, such as that exercised within schools, comes with responsibility to 
both empower and disempower according to desert and for the good of the individual and the 
common good. Bullying is, therefore, a threat not only to the self-esteem of the victim but to 
the moral order of the institution in which it occurs. 
 
5.3.2.2   Periodicity 
Periodicity concerns the shaping of time as an aspect of control. Time can be divided into two 
types, circular or repeating time and linear time. Similarly there are two types of periodicity, 
that which aims to control through repetition and that which does so through creating a 
historical context. 
157 
 
‘Listen to the text I’m going to read to you. It’s about a situation that I want you to talk about. This 
concerns a character called Matt. I want you to listen to this story’. [A/OBS-1125-1215] 
A good example of rhetorical control of a class through repeated and motifs and linear 
progression, contained in four short, simple sentences. Note the repetition of ‘Listen…listen’ 
and ‘want…want’, and the progressions in task ‘listen…read…talk’ and  semiotic structures 
‘text…situation…character …story’. 
‘Yeah, I suppose it does give that, coming to school, kind of like that family feeling, your friends, but 
I don't really feel that school is number one. Outside of school is outside of school. I don't take school 
with me when I go home. It's not always there; when I'm here, yeah, I do belong here; it is the place to 
be’. [A/FG-3] 
This student, Gavin*, had a natural rhetorical flair which made his contributions some of the 
most interesting. When the content is analysed it reduces to a set of truisms or tautologies and 
a paradox. Nevertheless, its rhythmic pulse makes for arresting reading. 
‘the Christian ethos and the Christian core of the school...we’re built on the site of a Benedictine 
monastery’. [B/INT-1520] 
Within this sentence are encapsulated both types of periodicity, the rhetorical repetition of 
‘Christian’ and the historical contextualisation of the site and the tradition. 
‘[We] were the young bucks who were going to change the world who went round systematically 
[taking issue] with the old farts who wanted no change [and saying] we’ll never get to that table but 
now I feel the irresistible draw of that table’. [B/INT-1817] 
Again both forms of periodicity are on display: the repetition of ‘change’ and ‘table’ and the 
collision between reminiscence and reality in the progression from ‘young buck’ to ‘old fart’ 
and ‘change’ to ‘no change’. 
‘we’ve managed to build on the big improvements that were made say twenty years ago, fifteen years 
ago there was a step change, there was much more effective focus on academic achievement and on 
pupil behaviour and values’. [C/INT-3503] 
Here the present achievements are contextualised in terms of historic decisions and the 
changes that flowed from them. 
5.3.2.3   Boundary 
 ‘And there are a whole range of value related things where we have a stands, position … there’s a 
benchmark, and so it gives, um, it gives some sort of baseline, a benchmark valid to the discussion 
around a particular topic.’ [A/INT-3439-3612] 
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‘Stand’, ‘position’, ‘benchmark’, ‘baseline’: all terms, despite the inconsistency of the 
metaphors, that indicate the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible. 
‘[Mobile phones] are a distraction, but sixth formers are allowed to carry them’. [A/FG-1] 
Indicates the existence of a double boundary – between acceptability and non-acceptability, 
and between sixth formers and the lower years – to which the pupils I interviewed, none of 
whom was a sixth former, evinced an ambiguous response: part accepting and part accusatory 
in the face of an implicit hypocrisy.  
‘We’re not aiming to be a Winchester; we’re not aiming to be an academic hothouse’. [B/INT-0354] 
Setting out a clear demarcation between independents that focus on academic excellence and 
those such as Broughampton that have a broader concern with ‘character’ in general. 
‘far better to have them drink under a supervised, safe environment rather than not drinking where it 
becomes a craving and therefore something they’ll try to get to by jumping in a taxi late at night’. 
[B/INT-4425] 
Boarding schools frequently have to make compromises. At Broughampton sixth formers are 
allowed to drink on site under strict conditions. This is tolerated behaviour rather than 
encouraged. The alternative of going off-site is not tolerated, is in fact prohibited. 
‘They respect we’re always going to be there, but we respect that it’s their village…’ [B/FG-9.1e] 
This illustrates the idea that clear boundaries make for better cooperation, based on 
recognising and respecting the territory and rights of the other. 
‘I think the state’s got as role in setting the boundaries’. [C/INT-2338] 
The idea of the State as a guardian of minimum standards, setting the boundary between the 
acceptable and the unacceptable but otherwise keeping its distance. 
‘so the groups are as we want them, rather than being friendship groups’. [C/INT-5812] 
The boundary here is not as immediately clear as it superficially appears, as two incongruous 
– rather than contrasting – perceptions are juxtaposed: a notion of acceptability with an 
objective sociological label. What is actually being contrasted are a formally constituted 
group for pedagogical purposes and an informal friendship group in which learning is 
secondary to interpersonal relationships. 
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5.3.2.4   Symbolisation 
Symbolisation, the ability to create and use symbols, overlaps strongly with the category 
‘semiotic marker’; they can be thought of as cause and effect. Three types of symbolisation 
have been considered: institutional, pedagogical and linguistic. In this research most 
institutional and pedagogical symbolisation is categorised under ‘semiotic marker’. However, 
there is a paradox at work. What is mostly known about these forms of symbolism is itself 
conveyed through linguistic symbolism; so I decided to divide up the examples of linguistic 
symbolism into those three types. Institutional symbolisation is that which is pertinent to a 
structural aspect of the schools; pedagogical symbolisation to an aspect of the classroom; and 
linguistic symbolisation, which is by far the majority of the examples, generally figures of 
speech that give shape and interest to language.  
i) Institutional Symbolisation (structural) 
‘This school is a microcosm of real life in all its diversities’. [A/FN(2)-45.58] 
The teacher seems to be referring to the diversity of the student body in terms of gender, 
ethnicity (race, religion and language), socio-economic background, ability. He could also be 
referring to the intergenerational nature of the school. However, in many respects a school is 
a highly artificial social environment. 
‘…seeing beyond the school walls and not to build up school walls that isolate us from others’. 
[B/INT-5758] 
The choice of ‘walls’ is not a mere figure of speech in this case, although its function is more 
symbolic than literal. The Chaplain is concerned that pupils at Broughampton are interested 
in and feel compassion for those in the wider society who are less privileged. For a more 
detailed analysis of the symbolism of the walls, see the critical summary of the interview with 
the Chaplain in Case Study B. 
ii) Pedagogical Symbolisation (overlaps with semiotic marker) 
‘Face your partner, please. Say good morning and use their name ...there are people who are 
embarrassed, but try not to show it. Even if it’s a false grin’. [A/OBS-11.25] 
The speaker here is operating on the assumption that what is sometimes referred to as ‘going 
through the motions’ actually has an effect on perceptions, emotions and behaviour. 
‘By speaking to me in a, not polite but, like your mum would speak to you like…if I’m being bad then 
don’t patronise me; you know, firm but fair’. [A/FG-8] 
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For this pupil the mother is a symbol of an acceptable authority figure. 
iii) Linguistic Symbolisation (metaphor and other figures of speech) 
‘They just see it as ways to learning, as a toolbox really’. [A/INT-1422] 
This refers to ‘thinking skills’ which are taught at St Augustine. A toolbox contains a number 
of tools for different purposes. In a like manner the different skills can be applied as 
appropriate to a particular problem. 
‘…getting my hands dirty’. [C/INT-5812] 
The Head spent several years in administrative roles at former schools which didn’t bring him 
into contact with pupils much. He now sees it as one of his main responsibilities to be out and 
about as much as possible, talking to pupils, dealing with behavioural issues and generally 
setting an example for the staff of the importance of being a visible presence, with the 
implication that this is what real Head teaching is. 
5.3.3   Categories of Resistance 
The concept of resistance was first encountered in the literature (Apple, 1979), and appeared 
in the interview data from school B and in the WCDR of school A. At first it was treated as a 
homogeneous term, then level of intensity became apparent, and then other constitutive 
aspects. The aspects are moral autonomy, intensity, target and negotiation. Whenever a threat 
to autonomy or an obstacle to the exercise of power is encountered, whether personal, 
departmental or institutional, the phenomenon of ‘resistance’ occurs. It varies in intensity, 
from questioning, criticism, non-compliance, defiance to outright rebellion. This is often seen 
as negative, and it can have destructive consequences. Resistance here, though, is seen as 
something essential to the process of change and development, allowing the possibility for 
spiritual, moral or ideological change. As I will discuss in the examples, resistance includes 
the idea of negotiation; otherwise, change could only happen through the escalation of 
resistance to violent reaction against threats to autonomy. 
5.3.3.1   Moral autonomy 
‘…“I worked hard, I was happy with my results and I wanted a life” ’. [A/INT-30.15] 
The Head of St Augustine related the story of how he had been trying to convince a group of 
students to aim for the highest GCSE grades. In the end some of them got good but not 
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excellent grades. This was the response of one student when asked why she hadn’t tried for 
the highest. He was sympathetic to the reasoning as he has himself declared that there is more 
to life than academic achievement. 
‘As soon as you instruct people to do something or you’re imparting something to them there is a 
natural resistance to it’. [B/INT-1220] 
A very good summary of the dilemma at the heart of moral education and many attempts to 
transmit values. People would much rather arrive at an understanding of the right and good 
through their own reasoning and experience than be told what they should think. 
‘I think we’ve been quite resistant to externally imposed change’. [C/INT-3503] 
Institutions as well as individuals can exert moral autonomy, at least those who represent 
institutions can do so on behalf of the institution. 
5.3.3.2   Intensity 
S: ‘Focus on me. Put anything that’s going to distract you down out of the way, make sure it doesn’t 
distract you…OK. Can you make sure what is distracting you is put away...make sure what is 
distracting you is put away…Thank you for putting your stuff away. That’s excellent behaviour, well 
done…Listen up please. Focus on me.’ [A/OBS-9/06.02] 
Being distracted, inattentive, engaging in private pursuits or displaying boredom is often a 
low-level form of resistance to authority. The teacher in this observation repeatedly 
undermined the self-empowerment of the group interaction by bringing to attention poor 
focus and the causes of it as well as praising compliance. 
‘…I don't see why, they're in lessons like we are in lessons. I mean, if I want check my phone for 
something why can't I?’ [A/FG-1] 
The sense of injustice over sixth-formers being allowed mobile phones underlies the tone of 
grievance, although the reasoning has almost no merit in a pedagogical context. This 
reinforces the fact that although all forms of resistance originate out of sense of moral 
autonomy, the reasons for asserting this in many cases are not legitimate; moreover, the 
intensity of feeling has no bearing on the legitimacy of the grievance. 
 ‘I know we’re not allowed to go into Facebook, but we don’t expect teachers to [unclear]. Then again 
we shouldn’t get into trouble through Facebook [unclear] writing [it’s private] shouldn’t be able to 
see, you know’ [B/OBS-15/1133] (teacher’s comment during post-observational discussion: ‘Sophie* 
was mad, she was cross, she was cross with me because we found out some stuff on Facebook pasted 
on somebody else’s wall that I happened to be...’) 
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In this case the student probably does have a limited case for their grievance, similar to the 
case that could be made if the teacher had read their private diary. Two points should be 
made in mitigation. First, Facebook, although restricted, is not private as the information is 
freely shared. Secondly, as the teacher’s concern was with the well-being of the students in 
their care, there is some justification (plus, there had been an outbreak of cyber-bullying 
which it was in the interests of the whole community to curtail). 
5.3.3.3   Target 
‘…there’s the stuff in relation to citizenship...although I’m very suspicious...and the PSHE 
stuff...again I’m suspicious; putting things in boxes like that, I’m really not sure that it’s the right way 
forward and it becomes, it gets looked at as a subject instead of being something that’s part of...’ 
[A/INT-25.34] 
The target of suspicion is the government’s approach to education of values. 
‘I think they've got some of their priorities wrong because they're more bothered about uniform 
sometimes than how people behave’ [A/FG-2] 
In this case it is the teachers’ hierarchy of values that seems amiss. 
‘I don’t carry around a ruler or anything. It’s so annoying. When you go to uni or anything you’re 
going to have relationships so I don’t see the point of it’. [B/FG-13.1b] 
The target here is a rule that seeks to prevent the development of romantic liaisons by 
prohibiting boys and girls from being closer than six inches to each other.  
‘I wouldn’t say that it’s always been exercised in a good way, the State’s role in this’. [C/INT-2338] 
The government again. 
5.3.3.4   Negotiation 
 ‘…it was some younger members of staff and a couple of assistant head teachers got drawn into this 
project group. They said could they go with it. They knew I was not in fa.... I was very open about it; I 
said why I wasn’t in favour.’ [A/INT-16.00] 
Having empowered his staff to work on projects, the Head found himself in the paradoxical 
position of being the one resistant to change initiated by those he has authority over. 
Obviously, he was convinced to give the project an opportunity and is now proud of the 
outcome and those who initiated it and saw it through.  
Gavin: ‘without respect nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don't 
respect your teacher they’re probably not going to respect you, and when no one’s respecting each 
other nothing works properly’ [A/FG-8] 
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Gavin has given an insight into a fairly subtle internal negotiation whereby he justifies his 
adherence to the norms of the school culture while not seeming to compromise his moral 
autonomy. 
‘There was an issue in recent years, the city council in order to reduce teenage pregnancy has been 
promoting the idea we would give out condoms, make condoms available through the school nurse, 
and we’ve always resisted doing that; not because, obviously it’s very important to avoid teenage 
pregnancy but we feel that would cause a breakdown in trust between the school and the parents on 
which we very much rely, and the idea that the children would have access to the contraceptive 
services without any reference to the parents would worry a lot of our parents, particularly those with 
a religious background, but not only. So we avoided the clash by saying ‘no actually we’ll do things 
our way and we’ll educate them about contraception, where they can go outside the school to access 
these services if necessary independently of their parents’. But we wouldn’t actually do that ourselves 
within school because of a potential clash with parents which might damage our other relationships 
with them’. [C/INT-2758] 
It is unclear whether the negotiation took place in the real world or whether it was simply a 
response to an initiative; the language suggests that the policy did not have statutory force. 
5.3.4   Categories of Transformation 
5.3.4.1   Transformative experience 
‘I’ll never forget, [at] a school in P____ a child asked me for advice; if I was asked here I could have 
given it because we’re a Catholic school, we’re based on Catholic principles, I could have given an 
answer within that context and made it very clear that was how I was answering, and then it was, it 
would be for the child to take that or not. The school I was in, I was asked this question by one of the 
girls and I said “I’m so sorry, I can’t answer it”. She asked why, and I tried to explain, and she 
absolutely lost it; she said “that’s the trouble with you adults these days; it’s all political correctness. I 
don’t want political correctness, I want somebody to say something to me, so I can either kick against 
it and say ‘that’s rubbish, you’re talking out of your hat”’ – she didn’t use the word ‘hat’ – “or I can 
say ‘that’s really interesting, I’ll think about that’. That’s what I want.” And I had to say “I’m really 
sorry; I may well agree with those sentiments but I’m still not allowed to...to talk to you about it”. 
Here I can. So, that’s not so much a clash, I think that’s actually empowering.’ [A/INT-3405] 
The experience of the clash between the disempowerment of his moral autonomy in the 
secular school and the sense of empowerment at St Augustine has undoubtedly strengthened 
the Head’s conviction in the rightness of the principles and values of his faith. 
Things you learn at school: 
How to get along with people you don’t like and how to be in a community. 
Making the right decisions, supporting others and being able to make good friends, real friends. 
Without hard work you won’t get anywhere. 
How to communicate well with people. 
[C/SUR-8] 
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These comments at the end of the survey, in response to the question ‘What do you learn at 
school apart from the subjects you study in class?’ are not reports of transformative 
experiences in themselves, but they exhibit a level of cognitive and moral development that 
indicates that some form of transformative experience must have taken place. 
5.3.4.2   ‘Trigger’ events 
i. Taking a risk 
‘I send my deputy to meetings, I don’t go to certain meetings because if they’re the best person why 
do I go and have to come back and say “Right, this is what I learned at the meeting”, go through it all 
and say “what do you think?”. Why don’t they go, make the decision? That makes my head teacher 
colleagues very uncomfortable, very uncomfortable, and they’ve had to learn to come to terms with it. 
And when I did my presentation they understood it a lot better. They asked lots and lots of questions. 
And then one of the Heads said “I think you’re very brave. I’m not sure” - how did he phrase that – 
“I’m not sure I would have the courage to do that”. Because it needs trust which comes back to values 
again. I have to, I have to demonstrate absolute trust in my colleagues and sometimes they’ll get it 
wrong, as we all do.’ [A/INT-1939] 
St Augustine seems to have a number of innovative approaches to how it organises itself and 
its teaching schedules. The ability to take risks, to allow the development and implementation 
of new measures opens the possibility of new experiences and new possibilities for 
transmitting values, as the House system seems to have done. 
‘I mean sometimes the most rewarding lessons are completely off syllabus, off specification, and I 
don’t think that I’m unusual in that a lot of kids speak quite frankly, quite openly, and they will ask 
quite personal questions. So sometimes one is put on the spot in the classroom: “Have you heard 
about so-and-so; what’s your view? Have you ever taken drugs?” you know, those types of questions. 
So one deals with those as best as one can and I always try to be completely honest. Unfortunately, 
sometimes the questions become too embarrassing, too probing, but also sometimes the subject will 
lend itself to moral questions, moral speculations’. [B/FN-1838] 
The risk for a teacher involved in one opening oneself up to interrogation and potential 
embarrassment is also the possibility of addressing genuine moral issues that might arise for 
pupils. 
ii. Letting the mask slip 
‘the number of times I go into Chapel and there’s somebody sat on their own in there; and I think in a 
busy, highly competitive, sometimes go-getting culture that public schools can be, I think the Chapel 
offers that space and that oasis and I think that is recognised, particularly at peak times like exam 
times where they go; and then finally, however rich you are, however secular you are, you don’t 
escape those existential moments: a family member dying or a family member being ill or Dad’s 
business going under’. [B/INT-3615] 
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If we wear a mask to the world, life can cause the mask to slip and, in the right place and at 
the right time, openness to an understanding and values beyond what we normally aspire to 
can be the trigger for a transformative experience. 
‘if you were to go to _____ House and Airey Pierce* is the housemaster there, he would be one of the 
best exponents of this, because you can ask him about any boy in his house and he’ll tell you the 
parents, the parents’ names, where they’re from, he’ll even tell you what particular crisps they like: 
the detail, it amazes me the details the housemasters amass on their charges, and that to me is...there’s 
a lovely moment on a Friday night and a Saturday night and Airey is in the foyer of the house and the 
boys come, sometimes in their rugby kits or their sports kits and they’ve got late teas or been to the 
chippy or something and they sit around him and they just talk. And when I have a problem or when 
teachers have a problem in the academic environment, as there’s one particular issue going on at the 
moment with a girl, you talk to the matron and the matrons really do know their boys and their girls, 
because they’re the one the student might say: “you know I might be pregnant” or, you know, “I think 
I’ve dabbled in this; do I need to see a doctor”? They have the most intimate conversations with their 
students; I marvel at their nature.’ [B/INT-5110] 
The type of ‘deep knowledge’ displayed in this anecdote is the foundation of ‘care’, which as 
Heidegger (1962, p243) reminds us is ‘that to which human [Being] belongs “for its 
lifetime”’. It counters the image of Broughampton as hierarchical and authoritarian. The 
experience of care is foundational to the acquisition of some of the most fundamental social 
values, such as trust and respect, dissolving resistance within institutional structures and 
facilitating the transmission of values. 
Clarice: I remember in year 7 spending an entire break with [the former Head] sharing a bag of crisps 
and talking about TV and stuff. 
Justin: He had a snowball fight when it snowed once as well. 
[C/FG-2458-2506] 
 
Teachers and particularly Head teachers must wear the mask of authority, which is expected, 
in both senses: that of exhibiting leadership skills and of maintaining a certain distance. But 
sometimes the display of the human side, the adult enjoying a moment with young people or 
displaying their ordinariness, can be deeply affecting, because of its unexpected nature and its 
dissonance with the official role. 
iii. Catching the moment 
‘In terms of [teaching] Broughampton’s values, I think that isn’t explicitly alluded to unless they ask a 
question about something that’s going on in the school, or unless I’d become aware of a problem’ 
[B/FN-1838] 
Unless the mind is in some ways prepared, and is caught at that moment of openness, the 
instruction of values is likely to be met by resistance, as the Chaplain stated, above. 
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‘Our first chaplain was very much a John the Baptist character who...who challenged everything that 
we did and she drove us spare, she really did, and there were some aspects of her that we...we 
couldn’t cope with [I hope she didn’t end up with her head on the plate] – well not so far off 
sometimes, I tell you – but she was, she was uncompromising in her challenge and she’d make you 
really uncomfortable, because there was no hiding place; and it was great, it was just what we needed 
at the time’. [A/INT-4435] 
The denouement of this passage is totally unexpected, as was perhaps the outcome of the 
difficult relationship, which was formative of the identity of the school as it is today.  
5.343   Turning inward 
i. Intrinsic value 
What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school?  [pause] ‘Ahm, Care for 
each other, ahm, and a recognition that everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has 
intrinsic value’ [A/INT-29.00]  
We believe that all individuals are of value and worthy of respect [B/ABS, p1] 
These two passages from different schools illustrate the idea of there being an intrinsic worth 
to human life, whoever and wherever. Such an idea cannot be readily grasped if we think of 
human life in terms of physical attributes, skills and accomplishments, status or economic 
value. It requires a more reflective, inward turn. 
ii. Spirituality 
‘The core of the chapel life...[is] a celebration of the community that’s here’. [B/INT-0655] 
The core of the school is the chapel, and the core of the chapel is the community at worship. 
There is something almost paradoxical, until it is realised that it is another reality, 
supervening on the mundane, that is being spoken of. 
iii. Tradition 
There’s always scope for the failure of a document like [a mission statement] to fully embrace what it 
is that we do [B/INT-1520] 
‘There’s some things that go unsaid and don’t need to be said’. [B/INT-1817] 
These two passages relate to the tradition of the school. Its essence cannot be really 
encapsulated in words; it is something felt in the stones of the place, a genius loci. 
iv. Taking responsibility 
‘You have this education…and with that comes a responsibility to be a voice for the voiceless’ 
[B/INT-0850] 
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The life of the typical Bramtonian is one of privilege. The Chaplain’s exhortation is that for 
that life to be meaningful it must be lived for more than the propagation of that privilege, but 
be of benefit, in some way, to the less fortunate. 
Becky: in my form we will talk to different years. We all get on; I think it’s good because you get to 
talk to people of all different ages. You get different opinions. Because I'm a prefect in form, if any of 
the younger students have any problems they can all was come and talk to me because I'm an anti-
bullying councillor as well. So then it’s just good they can come and talk [A/FG-6] 
In taking on various responsibilities, Becky has become a mediating figure in the school 
community, binding the communities of the tutor group and the House more closely together. 
5.3.4.4   Replication 
Out of 41 respondents to a question in the survey measuring ‘inclusion’ through a situational 
response, 28 were judged at i=5, 5 each at i=4 and 3 and 3 at i=2. There were none at i=1. This 
strongly suggests that the value of inclusion has become self-reinforcing and self-replicating in the 
student body [C/ASR-6] 
5.4   Conceptual Clustering 
It is one thing to derive the above-detailed concepts and categories from disparate parts of the 
data; it is another to demonstrate that these concepts and categories belong together in a way 
that reflects events in the real-world. A first step to doing this is to demonstrate that 
‘conceptual clustering’ is occurring, that is, that these concepts and categories are found in 
meaningful patterns in proximity to one another, in particular clustering around values. In the 
following, examples from texts across the dataset are examined for conceptual clustering in a 
four stage process: 1) analysis of the text by the key categories; 2) interpretation and/or 
explanation of the choices made in the analysis; 3) synthesis of the categories into a coherent 
narrative demonstrating causal or other links; 4) evaluation of the narrative in terms of 
demonstrating conceptual clustering. 
 
5.4.1   Key to analyses 
 
1 Value 
2 Disvalue 
3 Strategy 
4 Semiotic marker 
5 Intentional state 
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6 Power distribution 
7 Periodicity 
8 Boundary 
9 Symbolisation 
10 Resistance 
 
 
5.4.2   Examples of Conceptual Clustering across the Data field 
 
5.4.2.1   St Augustine, Interview 
 
1)  Analysis 
I’ve had opportunities to move on. But I do consider it to be my school. I’m a Catholic and I 
went through Catholic schooling myself as a young person and I do feel that it’s my school. 
And as I said earlier I do feel it’s more real life than some schools. So, yeah, I’m intensely 
loyal
1
 to it and want to see it be successful
1. And I think we are successful, but we’re caught 
up in this need ever to drive up standards. I said to the youngsters, I said to my year 11, ‘I 
expect you to get the best results ever at GCSE; the last year got the best results ever, the year 
before did’7. We’re flogging this9; the interventions we put in place3; we’ve got to compete in 
some way. The league tables do say something
4
, but the accountability I think – and I know 
much public funding does go on education – but the accountability has gone way over the 
top
10, 8
. Instead of just letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion that our professional 
status as teachers is going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a 
profession in the future, it might be considered a career
6
, is shocking
10, 2
. We are the experts; 
at times I wish people would just let us get on with doing what is right
10
 and I think we do a 
good job as teachers generally, not just in this school. So I’m immensely loyal here and I 
know it’s a good school and I know we’ve got a lot of good children and good staff5.  
[A/FN-2038] 
 
2)  Interpretation 
1. Two values are embedded in the text, loyalty and success, of which success is the more 
prominent for this analysis. 
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2. Anger, as a disvalue, is expressed in the extract ‘the accountability…is shocking’. This 
anger arises from a perceived injustice, from a sense of being slighted professionally, and 
from a feeling of disempowerment. It is not fundamentally negative, though, as the 
overwhelming desire is to ‘just… get on with doing what is right’, which the current system 
is preventing. 
3. Strategy is marked by ‘the interventions we put in place’ to achieve success. 
4. There is a concession that ‘the league tables do say something’, that is, they have some 
significance for educational performance, and are interpreted as such by teachers and parents, 
as well as politicians. 
5. The whole passage is an expression of overlapping intentional states: reminiscence, 
affirmation, determination, resentment and re-affirmation. 
6. There is reference to disempowerment by the arbitrary power of the State: ‘Instead of just 
letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion [is] that our professional status as teachers is 
going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a profession in the future, it 
might be considered a career’. 
7. There is a double sense of periodicity in the extract, ‘I expect you to get the best results 
ever at GCSE; the last year got the best results ever, the year before did’: both rhetorical 
effect through repetition and also establishing a temporal perspective. 
8. ‘The league tables do say something, but the accountability I think – and I know much 
public funding does go on education – but the accountability has gone way over the top’. A 
boundary is drawn by differentiating the rights and wrongs of government measures. 
9. ‘We’re flogging this’. Colloquial metaphor/cliché, a form of symbolism. 
10. Mild resistance, in the form of criticism, is expressed throughout the second half of the 
extract, directed clearly against the government: ‘the accountability has gone way over the 
top. Instead of just letting us get on and do our job, the suggestion that our professional status 
as teachers is going to be taken away and teaching might not be considered a profession in 
the future, it might be considered a career, is shocking. We are the experts; at times I wish 
people would just let us get on with doing what is right’ 
3)  Synthesis 
170 
 
There are two values embedded in this extract, success and loyalty; success is the primary 
value focus here. A strategy for success, ‘the interventions we put in place’, is referred to. 
The primary driver seems to be the league tables, which have a semiotic function in ‘say[ing] 
something’, that is, providing an incentive to work for success. Additionally, there is indirect 
reference to teacher classroom control through recalled periodicity in the delivery of student 
encouragement: ‘‘I expect you to get the best results ever at GCSE; the last year got the best 
results ever, the year before did’ ‘. However teachers’ autonomy – ‘get[ting] on with doing 
what is right’ - is not being respected in this process, and the sense of disempowerment 
shown by government not ‘letting us get on and do our job’ is giving rise to the disvalue of 
anger/resentment. This underlies an element of resistance, clearly limited to criticism. The 
whole is framed and made cohesive by the intentional world of overlapping dispositional 
states and structured by the formulation of a boundary between the positive and negative 
aspects of State policy. 
4)  Evaluation 
In this extract there is evidence of quite strong clustering around the value of success, not 
only for the categories of permeation, but also for the categories of authority. Even resistance, 
which has no necessary connection to value, is quite strongly aligned with the issue of 
success in this case. Unusually, all the analytic categories were deployed, although the value 
‘loyalty’ and symbolisation were not found to be relevant to the core cluster.  
5.4.2.2   Broughampton, Interview 
 
1)  Analysis 
Well, the core of the chapel life, and I love to see chapel service not as the hard sell ‘God 
Slot’ but as a celebration of the community1 that’s here4, really, a celebration of the 
community that’s here; so I would describe this place as intrinsically linked with those of the 
community
5
. By that I mean we have 667 students living at close quarters with each other and 
it becomes vital, I think, to promote empathy
1
, em self-understanding
1
, ehm a sense of 
altruism
1
 towards others
5
 and those skills are manifested in adventures beyond the school, 
active charity events; and we’ve just made a link with an urban priority area in N____. So we 
take busloads of Bramtonians* to an area of S____ that is quite deprived: high crime, high 
instances of social problems
3
 and this is another world for them
8. And we’ve tried to do it 
delicately, that one doesn’t feel patronised2 by the other set of people, but that mutual 
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interaction
8
, seeing people with a whole set of different agendas to those in a cosy little 
village school like Broughampton is, I think, try to translate the values we inculcate in the 
boarding houses
6
 to extend over the school wall
9
 to people outside
3
. [B/INT-0655] 
 
2)  Interpretation 
1. Four values are embedded in the text: community, empathy, self-understanding and 
altruism. 
2. A ‘patronising’ attitude can be considered a disvalue to the extent that awareness of the 
possibility is likely to make someone more sensitive to the social consequences of their 
actions. 
3. Organising charity activities in order to promote the development of empathy and altruism, 
and also to promote the school’s values beyond the school. 
4. ‘The school walls’ is an example of institutional semiosis; they act as a metaphor for the 
limits and bounds of the school’s writ, and in this case the school community. 
5. Strong sense that the Chapel acts as the spiritual centre of the school community. Belief 
that spiritual values must be cultivated in order to preserve the communal sensibility 
6. ‘Inculcation’ bespeaks a culture of staff empowerment and pupil disempowerment 
7. No data on periodicity 
8. The boundary between two worlds, that of privilege and the underprivileged, becomes a 
creative interface for the exchange of life experiences and mutual growth 
9. The Chaplain makes reference to the symbolic function of the chapel service. 
10. No indication of resistance 
3)  Synthesis 
There are two sets of connected values here, connected at least in the mind of the chaplain, 
which are ‘community’ on one hand and ‘empathy’, ‘self-understanding’ and ‘altruism’ on 
the other; so the strategy to enhance these, latter, spiritual qualities is also a strategy to 
maintain the community. That strategy is to involve the pupils in some form of charitable 
exercise with the inhabitants of a deprived area in a nearby town, though the chaplain is 
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aware of the dangers of the inhabitants feeling patronised by the presence of such privileged 
young people. These things for the chaplain – charity (as an inner compulsion to love and 
give), charitable acts and community – are all intimately connected with the chapel as the 
core of the school life and the services are the ‘celebration of [that] community’, where all 
those things are ‘intrinsically linked’ and made manifest. There is a secondary layer of 
interpretation of the motivation for these activities, however, although it is less obvious. 
There is implied an almost evangelical sense in which the values of Broughampton are first 
‘inculcated’ into the pupils and then taken out into the broader society. The ‘school walls’, 
while they actually exist, are not the sort of ramparts with which many schools surround 
themselves today; the use of the term here is more a metaphor of the community which 
protects its values from the destructive forces outside and then feels a calling to export those 
values. Perhaps the chaplain is also sensitive to the perception of this way of thinking as 
implying moral superiority, for he also expresses the idea of the schools walls as a boundary 
between two worlds which facilitates ‘interaction’, to mutual benefit. 
4)   Evaluation 
There is reasonably strong clustering around a group of closely linked values, among which 
‘community’ is the most prominent. There was no information on two of the analytical 
categories, periodicity and resistance. The other eight categories were employed, although 
they were integrated through the use of parallel narratives of the ‘core’ and ‘boundary’ rather 
than a single narrative. 
5.5   Summary 
The structural aspects of the mechanism for institutional values transmission, as that has 
emerged from the iterative process of cross-case development, comparison and improvement 
of provisional models, are set out.  First, definitions of the major components of the model 
and the constitutive aspects of those components are given. Next, in the longest section of the 
chapter, a range of the evidence supporting the conceptualisation of the various components 
and aspects of the model is adduced, creating an audit trail for the findings. The range is 
selected to represent as fairly as possible the distribution of views across the cases, but also to 
explore the cohesiveness and variability across each concept, i.e. whether further sub-
categories were involved. Finally, a limited testing of the model, termed ‘conceptual 
clustering’, is carried out. Two selected texts taken from interviews from different cases are 
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subject to analysis for evidence that the categories and sub-categories of the model are found 
in proximity to values.  
The model of institutional value transmission has four major components: permeation, 
authority, resistance and transformation, each of which has a number of aspects. It brings 
together two models, a permeation-authority model of inculcation and a resistance-
transformation model of acquisition. The model has strong evidential support from the data 
collected from the schools, and has reasonably strong interpretive power when applied to 
selected texts. 
This chapter has explained the detailed structure of the model. Chapter 6 will explain the 
genesis of the model and its internal dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 6    DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, several partial theories will be 
considered. Four of these are simple models (though of increasing complexity) derived from 
the concepts contained in the ‘institutional ontology’ section that follows each part of the 
cross case analysis in chapter 4. They illustrate aspects of modelling values transmission, 
which, though they are limited, I would argue, sometimes become the basis for widely 
accepted ideas about the role of values education in society. Also included are two attempts 
to create integrated theories that emerged during the analysis. They have been included 
because they demonstrate important insights en route, even if in retrospect they appear 
flawed. Despite the limitations of these partial theories, they contain perspectives that should 
be integrated into the completed model and derivable from it as limited cases. The second 
section discusses in detail the model of institutional values transmission outlined in Chapter 
5. Whereas the outline explained the components of the model and traced their emergence 
from the raw data, here the dynamics of the model are considered; also considered is how the 
simple model of invocation and evocation, first developed in chapter 2, has been incorporated 
into an institutional model of transmission. Throughout, the findings will be discussed in 
relation to relevant theories and perspectives encountered in the literature review, and the 
chapter will conclude with a section comparing this model with other models or perspectives 
on values education and values transmission.  
6.1    Partial Models 
Building a model of institutional values transmission entails many levels of complexity, with 
both central concepts and those which are more peripheral. The approach will be to start with 
four relatively simple models, with concepts derived from the cross-case analysis, and 
gradually build more complexity into each. 
6.1.1   Input-output model 
The simplest model of institutional value transmission that can be posited is a basic input-
output model. Pupils enter into the school in year 7 (assuming it is a secondary school, as 
investigated in the research sample) and emerge 5-7 years later – the window of opportunity 
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for transmission (Schoenpflug, 2001b, p.132) – and, if having acquired values a, b and c, we 
can say, in the characterisation of Haydon (1999, p.28), that values transmission has taken 
place. In this model the school functions essentially as a ‘black box’, something that has a 
boundary, demarking it as an entity, and functionality, but the inner mechanism of which is 
impenetrable. Two problems with this model immediately spring to mind. No relationship of 
causality has been established. Students may have entered the school with the values a, b and 
c, or they may have acquired them outside the school. Additionally, the mechanism by which 
they acquired them, even if they acquired them at school, has not been established. This 
simple model, then, illustrates the two main problems in assessing pupils’ values education in 
formal contexts, which renders problematic the question of whether it could be improved. It 
is probably such a simplistic model that critics of any attempts at the assessment of values or 
values education have in their sights. The Chaplain at Broughampton [B/INT-3022] held that 
while development in this area can be assessed qualitatively to some extent, any attempt to 
make it ‘targetable’ would be disastrous. Much the same complaint, though with perhaps 
greater urgency, has been levelled by Foster (2001) at the assessment of values education 
outcomes in schools in New South Wales, which he finds problematic, undemocratic and 
inconsistent; he asserts the inseparability of values from cognitive and behavioural 
development and favours a formative, whole-school approach where assessment feeds back 
to inform general pedagogy. In this context, the view of Hechter (1993), that one of the 
problematic issues with values for the cognitive sciences are their resistance to meaningful 
measurement, is worth noting. 
6.1.2   The value-economy model 
The first piece of, admittedly circumstantial, evidence that pupils acquire some of their values 
at school is the existence of a constituency for each of the schools, meaning not only those 
families that send their children to the school, but those who actively seek to send their 
children there, not only because of, and even not necessarily because of, the academic 
standards of the school, but because they find the ethos, tradition or moral standards 
congenial, and this gives rise to a value economy, a simple model of supply and demand, 
which is no different essentially than the economy in goods and services, that is, one based on 
a subjective appreciation of the properties of the object (in this case a values-based 
educational structure) being offered (Rand, 1967). For example, St Augustine draws its intake 
predominantly from Catholic families who want to see their children educated in the Catholic 
religious and moral tradition, whereas Broughampton’s constituency is predominantly among 
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the wealthy who appreciate the all-round educational philosophy of the school, and 
Chelmswood is oversubscribed because of its reputation for academic and behavioural 
excellence. 
This value economy would not have sprung into existence instantaneously, but a symbiosis 
would have developed over time where the parents’ expectation of a particular values regime 
(be that humanistic, liberal, or religious) would be matched, at least to a sufficient degree, by 
the values programme that the school offered and, conversely, what the school offered would 
be to tailored to some extent by the expectations of the constituency. The match is never 
going to be perfect, as it often is not in the real economy also; however, over time, in a 
society which offers a range of options concerning schooling, such a relationship is going to 
emerge. In such a scenario both parents and the school believe that the school ethos embodies 
values that they wish the children to acquire, and may have some evidence, probably of an 
anecdotal nature, that such values are acquired in the school.  
6.1.3   Critical mass model 
The second argument supporting the acquisition of values in school is based on an idea, that 
of a ‘critical mass’, highlighted by the Head teacher of Chelmswood [C/INT-5023]. In any 
organisation individuals spontaneously associate and form social groupings, which in a 
school can be linked to at least one aspect of the hidden curriculum (Carr and Landon, 1999). 
However, a tension can arise between the spontaneous sociality of pupils and the requirement 
of the school to impose an ordered community so that effective learning can take place, and if 
a group within that school has goals which are antithetical to academic and value-based goals 
of the school and it reaches a ‘critical mass’ the school is in trouble. The ‘sense of 
community’ [A/INT-1022] only emerges when the spontaneous sociality of the individuals 
within an organisation coincides with an integrated community, i.e. the critical mass 
represents an integrated community. What frequently happens when organisations are 
composed of individuals who are very culturally diverse, is the emergence of several ‘sub-
culture’ critical masses, which may not be in-themselves antithetical to the goals of the 
organisation, but naturally prevent the emergence of an integrated community, and therefore 
the sense of belonging to a community, rather than just being in a place to socialise. In the 
cross-case analysis, it was striking that for the pupils at Broughampton, the sense of 
community was cited as a positive feature to a significantly higher degree than at the other 
schools.  Because the integrated community can only exist where such values as trust, 
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respect, cooperation and compassion are experienced by the whole body, then this requires a 
continuous value input. Hashimzade and Della Giusta (2011) discuss this phenomenon in 
relation to potential clashes between the transmitted values of immigrant communities in the 
UK and the values of the school they attend, and conclude based on mathematical modelling 
that in a society of heterogeneous communities, better social outcomes are created when 
schools focus on inclusivity. Halstead (2007), essentially concurs with this view, and believes 
that schools need to foster an ethos which supports individual faith identity within a 
commitment to the British cultural values of tolerance, cross-cultural understanding and 
respect. 
6.1.4   Transmission flow (inculcation) model 
Turning now to the mechanism by which values are transmitted, the simplest model is a 
variation and development of the input-output model, emerging from the cross-case analysis, 
which I call the transmission flow model. In this development the black box of the simple 
model begins to take on some definition. In its simplest form the institutional structure can be 
depicted as one of three levels, as it was for the analyses: the official, in which the Head is 
the key figure; the classroom, in which the teacher is the key figure; and the intake, in which 
the individual pupil is the key figure. Between these three levels there are two relationships: 
between the Head and the teacher, and between the teacher and the pupil. The Head drawing 
on the documentary resources, parental expectations and traditions of the school, sets the 
values agenda for the school which is then through the general ethos communicated through 
meetings, guidelines and memos communicated to the teaching staff. In the classroom, 
through the moral content and tone of the syllabus delivered in the class, and by the 
demeanour of the teacher in front of the class, those values are transmitted to the pupils. 
Therefore, as well as an input-output axis, this model also contains within it a flow axis, 
which runs hierarchically from higher potential to lower potential. This flow occurs not only 
in the school, but its source lies higher, for example in government policy or, for some, in 
something like religious doctrine, and there is, correspondingly, something like a trickle 
down into the general population. In this model there is a distinction between two types of 
values, operational and transmissible. Operational values are those whose function is 
principally to aid the cohesion and efficiency of the institutional structure and processes, and 
transmissible values are those, clearly, which the school wants to be transmitted to the pupils. 
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I want to discuss this model in relation to Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1977) theory of cultural 
reproduction through the education system, to which there a number of similarities. For 
Bourdieu ideological commitment to the principle of the state perpetuating the inequalities of 
privilege in society through ‘pedagogic action’ (ibid, p6) in schools, whatever the virtue of 
his critique, means he is wedded to a form of social determinism. Secondly, there is in the 
idea of transmission flow an implication that the greater the distance from the source, the 
more dilute the effect will be, based on the assumption that the source is pristine or absolute. 
This seems to be based on an analogy with power flow which does diminish down the 
hierarchy, each level down being relatively disempowered relative to the one above; so for 
Bourdieu and Passeron (ibid) the school can only coerce through ‘symbolic violence’ 
whereas the state has the legitimate monopoly on physical violence. In different terminology 
Bourdieu also expresses the idea operational and transmissible values, in the notion of ‘self-
reproduction’ in order to fulfil the function of ‘inculcation’ (ibid, p.54). 
Although there is a tendency to a more deterministic structural approach to value 
transmission by some of the theorists than I think is warranted, almost all impose some 
structural conditions on the relationship between transmitter and recipient, such as numerical 
ratio and age difference (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981) and age (Schönpflug, 2001a; 
Barni et al., 2011), sex (Whitbeck and Gecas, 1988) and educational level (Schönpflug, 
2001a) of the recipient. There is an obvious rebuttal to the idea that values become 
increasingly diluted with distance down the chain. Values are coherent in their conception 
and personal in their intensity; by that I mean that, on the one hand, linguistically, as abstract 
nouns, values cannot be quantified, and on the other, in terms of their personal intensity, there 
is absolutely nothing to suggest that this is other than arbitrarily distributed throughout the 
population, those in positions of authority no more or less likely to be trustworthy, 
compassionate, helpful, and so on. In Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s viral diffusion model of 
transmission there is no vertical hierarchy; each recipient becomes a new potential 
transmitter. 
Despite these weaknesses, it is something like this model of transmission that people most 
readily reach for when, for example, they heap expectation on schools to deal with social 
problems. It was the underlying assumption of much of the literature on values education in 
the late 1990s during an outbreak of ‘moral panic’ following the murder of a head teacher 
outside his school (SCAA, 1996). It is equally such a view that MacIntyre (1987) disparages 
when he dismisses the prospect for a moral community in society. 
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6.1.5   Spiritual journey (acquisition) model 
A ‘spiritual journey’ was the term used at Broughampton for a pupil’s passage through the 
school [B/INT-3348], although the model was developed based on the analysis of data 
gathered at St Augustine. In the spiritual journey model the emphasis is on the recipient as 
the acquirer of values rather than the school as the transmitter of values; it sees the structured 
school environment as the opportunity for values acquisition rather than a necessary outcome. 
It was the first time that the concept of ‘resistance’ was incorporated into the value-
acquisition process, though no mechanism was suggested by which resistance could be 
overcome. The following is an extract from the research journal. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Based upon the categories outlined in the section above a tentative model for the transmission of 
values in school A can be attempted. The model is shown in the figure below, which is then 
explained in detail. 
 
Fig 22 The ‘spiritual journey’ model of the transmission of values 
 
Figure 1 represents a model of an institution (school A) in which the route by which an individual 
(pupil) acquires a target value (TV) is mapped out. The categories indicated by the capitalised 
abbreviations are derived from the analysis of data collected in school A through school policy 
documents, interview, observation and focus group discussion. 
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An institution only exists through the authority (AUT) by which it is constituted. In the case of a 
school that would be with the support of the Local Authority under the powers granted by central 
government. Its standing as an educational institution is also established on the basis of the 
qualification and experience of its staff. Schools like school A have an additional requirement in 
being faith schools that they are empowered and recognised by the Archdiocese for the region. 
Considered from the perspective of a system for the transmission of values, an institution becomes 
the embodiment of two distinct types of values: operational values (OV), which are the values that 
govern the running of the institution, and target values (TV), which are the values that the 
institution hopes to instil in its members, or in this case its students. 
An institution has three main elements: it has an internal structure (STR) which determines the 
nature of the relationships that exist within the institution and the types of activities which are 
carried out; the routines (RTN) which carry the structures forward in time and make it a living 
entity rather than just an idea and enable it to serve the social milieu in which it exists; and a 
boundary (BDY) which delineates the region in which the writ of the school run and that where it 
does not. 
In the figure, which is a simplified theoretical model, structure, routine and boundary are all 
incorporated into the central square that represents the institution. Boundary should run all the 
way round, but to avoid cluttering the diagram the dimension of structure running vertically and 
the dimension of routine running horizontally double as the continuation of the boundary. This 
leaves the central space for the representation of the process of values transmission within the 
institution. Time dependent events run from left to right in the diagram. 
Within this setting the pupil, who has their own personal values (PV) acquired through 
experiences and in institutions other than school, is disempowered (DIS) by the structures and 
routines of the school. This is, in fact, the reason for the existence of school as an institution: it 
does not exist fundamentally to reinforce the values of the wider society, but to inculcate a 
specific set of values which serve the higher order requirements of the economy and the social 
good. To do so it must first break the unconscious attachment pupils have to their own worldviews 
(however imperfectly formed) and values, at least while the pupil remains on the school premises. 
Schools do this in various ways: by routines that accustom the pupils to ways of behaviour in 
which disciplines and values are implicit – punctuality, preparedness, effort, and so on – by 
rewards and by punishments. 
What happens at this point is still unclear. According to the analysis of the class observation 
carried out in school A, the students are empowered (EMP) by being given the freedom to engage 
in moral speculation within a controlled environment in which they are resolving their own moral 
dilemma by having to relate to an unfamiliar person correctly. This is reported as having had a 
marked and lasting effect on the social environment of schools in which this programme has been 
carried out, thus presumably resulting in the internalisation of target values (TV) such as respect. 
The question remains, though, how the boundary conditions that were the source of 
disempowerment now become a critical factor in empowerment. 
The situation is complicated further by the fact that the experience of disempowerment can result 
in a reaction. Coming into contact with the boundary induces a resistance (RES). The individual 
pushes against the boundary and tries to flee the institution, or like-minded individuals band 
together to form a cabal within the institution with their own set of values, very much as described 
by Willis (1977). Resistance does not have to manifest itself as such open defiance. At school A 
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there were several examples of resistance on display, such as pupil disagreement with some of the 
rules, staff developing their own versions of the mission statement, and the Head railing against 
some of the edicts of the state. A second question remains to be answered: is there a route from 
resistance to empowerment? 
The critical area for the theoretical model, then, is that indicated in figure 1 by the triangle formed 
by the line marked RES between DIS and BDY, the dotted line from DIS to EMP, and the dotted 
line from the point of RES to EMP. It concerns two possible routes from disempowerment to 
empowerment. As yet no explanation exists as to what takes place on these routes or even whether 
both routes are viable, although there is some speculation in the memos that follow this section. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The importance of this tentative model was that it raised the critical issue of the ‘gap’, not 
made explicit in other transmission models, between awareness and acceptance. It also raises 
the possibility of three outcomes: immediate acceptance; terminal resistance, and acceptance 
after a stage of resistance. 
6.1.6   The magic square (invocation-evocation) model 
Values cannot be acquired by private contemplation, but only in a ‘community of practice’ 
(Wenger, 1998). The integrated community requires authority plus a value discourse 
(continuous narrative of invocation and control) and the evocation of the moral community 
(the communal context in which values are lived). These ideas emerged in a clearer form in 
an attempt to build an integrated model of the concepts that were emerging, but influenced by 
the experience of undertaking research at Broughampton (School B). The following account 
is taken from a memo included in the research journal. It proposes a model for self-
propagating values transmission that in hindsight seems too optimistic. However, it 
represented a critical stage in the research and in the development of theory. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
I am now in a position to propose some of the initial theoretical findings of this research. The 
figure below demonstrates the interrelationship among the various concepts in the nature of 
values. I sometimes refer to this as ‘the magic square’ for reasons that should be apparent. 
 
There are some unresolved issues and some aspects that I am not entirely happy with. For 
example, it is not clear at the moment whether passive interpretation and active interpretation can 
be categorised together, and the same could be said for active invocation and passive invocation 
(decoding), or does one lead on to the other through a ‘virtuous circle’ mechanism. In addition, 
the terms ‘interpretation’, ‘invocation’, ‘evocation’ and ‘assimilation’ have not yet been formally 
defined or their  limits explored (to express it in terms of grounded theory, they are not yet 
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‘saturated’). However, there are some very positive points. The first is that, although arrived at 
through the route of analysis of empirical data, the ‘magic square’ still bears a strong resemblance 
to the original theory of the nature of value, and in fact can be seen as a development of the ideas 
contained in it. What is new is the idea of the strategic dimension of values. This has transformed 
it from a purely philosophical idea into social theory by embedding it within social institutions. 
 
Fig 23      The ‘magic square’ model of the transmission of values 
 
Secondly, it collapses the distinction between values, value transmission and the core nature of 
institutions, by suggesting that values inherently exhibit transmissibility, that values and 
institutions coexist and must be defined in terms of each other and that the principle function of an 
institution is to transmit its values.  
 
There are two contextual points to make. The first is that each of the components of the ‘magic 
square’ is an entire field in itself, and institutions, whether schools or any other type, can be 
viewed from different perspectives according to very practical objectives which have seemingly 
very little to do with values. However, we are concerned with where these aspects overlap, which 
is the place where their core values exist and where their fundamental identity is found. The 
second point concerns the role of power. The concepts of power and authority do not appear in the 
final expression of the theory, even though they played a significant part on the road. This 
exclusion can be justified in the following way. Power and authority are the basis of institutions, 
the thing that at a certain level holds them together. However, they are not the reason why 
institutions exist; that is for the transmission of values. Therefore, they are an important part of 
institutions in their establishment and running, but they are not the purpose. If an institution 
neglects its core values it cannot be held together by power and authority and will start to wither. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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While the magic square brought together many of the elements involved in this research, 
sifting the data showed that at the detailed level it began to exhibit some flaws. It pointed to 
the intimate relationship among the various categories that it had drawn together, but had not 
supplied a completely logical causal mechanism. Also, vitally, it downplayed something that 
became more apparent as the research progressed: any value in order to be transmitted 
requires the power structure of the institution. The model outlined below attempts to address 
the limitations and defects of the models discussed in this section; at the same time, as partial 
models their insights need to be integrated, even in a modified form, in the final theory. In 
other words, the central insights of the partial models should all be capable of being derived 
from the final model.  
6.2   An Integrated Theory of Value Transmission 
The integrated theory of value transmission brings together several components and several 
partly-synthesised theoretical ideas. In any consideration of values transmission in schools 
the central relationship has to be between teacher and pupil, which is the institutional nexus 
between the generations in terms of behavioural modelling, socialisation and enculturation, as 
well as the more mundane and well-understood conduit of information transmission (Parsons, 
1961). (The two aspects are not different at one level, as values are, as explained previously 
and recapitulated briefly below, in some respects just another form of information). As this 
theory deals with institutional transmission, rather just interpersonal transmission, though, on 
one side it must deal with the power relationships within the school, and even beyond the 
school in the influence of national policy-making and local authority implementation, 
whereby the values agenda – if, indeed, there is such a coherent entity – is set, and on the 
other the moral agency and developing moral cognition of the individual pupil subject to any 
attempts at values education. Several theoretical ideas will be used to explain, to the extent 
that the concepts, hypotheses and data discussed in this research allow, the process that takes 
place when values are institutionally transmitted centred on this central nexus of teacher and 
pupil: the nature of values from a philosophical perspective; the permeation of values through 
the institution; the concepts of ‘invocation’ and ‘evocation’; the institutional power structure 
and the power-control dichotomy; resistance and the transformative experience. 
6.2.1   Recapitulation of the basic theory of value 
The beginning of this research lies in questions outside the actual concern of this actual 
research. Such questions include: ‘In a world of such rapid social transformation, what 
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remains unchanging that enables individual lives and societies to find and maintain a core of 
stability?’ and this one: ‘In a society in which there are so many competing and conflicting 
demands on our credibility and interest – even embodying different epistemologies – is there 
a common conceptual language in which we can speak of them equally meaningfully?’ The 
answer, for me at least, is human values, because all values are human, whether the value 
discourse concerns divinity, technology or society.  
In the theory chapter a philosophical analysis of the concept of value from first principles was 
undertaken, in light of perceived problems both within axiology and the everyday usage of 
the term. The analysis included the conclusion that, contrary to the mainstream of academic 
philosophy, values were real and their nature and properties describable. The most significant 
finding was that values were semiotically related to symbols in having a dual nature and 
phenomenologically related to treasured personal items. Outwardly, values are linguistic 
signs denoting abstract concepts, while inwardly they are experienced as deep emotional 
attachment. As part of normal language, value concepts pepper our everyday discourse and 
communication, either in their primary nominalised form or in lexical variations (verbs, 
adjectives, etc) and are able to pass throughout society along the normal linguistic pathways 
of communication. Experientially, however, like symbols, values are only truly meaningful 
within a (theoretically) closed social groups for whom the value attains utmost significance, 
for example faith within a religious group, justice for a campaigning group, safety for a 
military reconnaissance unit or accuracy for a scientific project team. This idea has resonance 
with, but is not derived from, Tajfel’s (1974) concept of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’ as 
categories of identity through inclusion and exclusion. From either aspect values are 
inherently social, and this lead to one of the most surprising conclusions: that there are no 
private values. Values are just words on one level, but at the experiential level they are social 
and communal, that is they denote a shared experience, not a private experience. I can create 
a word for an intensely personal experience, but it could only become a value by being shared 
and finding an appropriate social context in which it can function. The idea of values as 
shared experience is not the same as, it is the exact opposite of, the idea of intersubjectivity, 
as that was conceived of by Habermas (1984). For Habermas individual subjectivity emerged 
from a collective recognition of signs; shared experience presupposes individual subjectivity 
as the basis for empathetic recognition of others’ interior worlds. 
The next consideration, then, is the function of values. This was not specifically addressed in 
the original theory, which focused on the ontological question of the nature of values; 
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however, the main line of an answer is fairly clear. If values acquire their significance in a 
communal setting, then a primary focus is to bind social groups together. The primary 
institution for human lives is the family and though the family must be considered the cradle 
for our basic values, it is also an institution which is bound together by common values. 
Society is a multiplicity of social groupings – familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, professional, 
vocational, economic, political, leisure and interest, etc – and all of them can be understood 
as defined by shared values. It is this aspect of values which in some respect renders them 
problematic. Values not only define the core of the group, they also define the boundary of 
the group, where the group becomes the non-group because of non-adherence to the 
particular values of the group (Tajfel, 1974). Values, therefore, are not only a cohesive force 
in society; many, possibly all, conflicts in society can be understood in terms of competing 
values. In complex modern societies the quest for common values, embodied in social 
institutions, is paramount. A second function of values is to embody the essential attributes 
and goals of the group. Values are not the same as attributes or goals, but they are clearly 
related. For example, values underlie goals; goals are more specific to a particular event or 
situation, but values transcend the particular event or situation to give continuity to the group 
beyond the immediate attainment of goals (Rokeach, 1973). A third function of values is to 
structure and give purpose to individual lives (Mandler, 1993; Barth, 1993). In modern 
societies in particular it is common to be multi-valued as a result of multiple belonging, the 
overlapping of different interests, commitments and loyalties. It is paradoxically both a 
condition and an outcome of open societies that such multiple belonging occurs; it is one of 
the guarantees that society does not fracture along narrow monocultural lines, defined by 
religion or ethnicity (Huntington, 1993, 1996). 
The third aspect of values is their transmission. This is based on the ideas of invocation and 
evocation as a way of understanding the mode of existence of values in a closed community 
and of the propagation of the community. Invocation, based on the idea of value as a 
symbolic type of entity, is the ritualistic utterance of the value sacred to the group, with the 
purpose of reinforcing their commitment to both. While this may seem too overtly couched in 
religious terminology, the contention is that values actually take on aspects of the sacred 
(Eliade, 1957), which is most explicitly demonstrated in religion, but is actually part of all 
aspects of human life and accessible to everyone. Evocation can be thought of as the effect 
that invocation has on the listener, that of opening up a realm of experience associated with 
the value, referred to as the moral universe of the value, but that moral universe most readily 
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conflated with the immanent community and its obligations; for this reason ‘evocation of the 
moral universe of the value’ and ‘evocation of the moral community’ are essentially identical. 
Participation in the moral universe of the value is a grounded existential certainty and sense 
of belonging that Eliade (1957, p.21) refers to as the experience of the sacred, as ‘a fixed 
point, a centre…equivalent to the creation of the world’. 
The theory outlined here is a deductive argument derived from a consideration of the 
meaning of value as that has been analysed in terms of phenomenological and semiotic 
categories. It originates in an attempt to understand the nature of values which goes beyond 
the limitations of the epistemological impasse in Descartes’ characterisation of subject and 
object, and portray a philosophically coherent view of values which is commensurate with 
their usage in the social sciences. Its extension into a consideration of the function of values, 
and particularly the transmission of values, is only partly developed. In particular, its 
understanding of social institutions is extremely minimal. The understanding throughout has 
been that this deductive theory will not be perfectly mirrored in events of the real social 
world, but that if it contains genuine insights these should re-emerge through the theoretical 
insights derived inductively through data processing and analysis of data from the field, and 
these will provide the basis for a fuller theory of value transmission in social institutions. 
6.2.2   The institutional permeation of values 
Permeation as the name implies is the extent to which a particular value has been identified 
within the three main levels of the school: the official, the pedagogical and the learner as 
represented by data from documents and interview (Head), classroom observation and field 
notes (teacher report/feedback sessions), and pupil survey and focus group, respectively. 
Permeation, it is important to be aware, is not the same as transmission. First, it would be 
impossible to establish causality of any sort without a longitudinal study far beyond the scope 
of this research. Secondly, institutions like schools are highly permeable to multiple 
influences and the presence of a value does not indicate that its acquisition has been achieved 
within its confines. What the analysis has attempted to discover is the degree of commonality 
of experience within the lived world of the institution, the recognition of common semiotic 
structures which carry the value meanings, and the link between these semiotic structures and 
the strategies for values education (Downey and Kelly, 1978; Plunkett, 1990) that exist at the 
official level, however informally those are formulated. Through the cross-case analysis, a 
core of values that seem to permeate the institutions investigated has been established. This is 
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only indicative of a snapshot view of the schools, though it has been verified in principle in 
the report/feedback sessions. The point is not to argue for absolute veracity of detail, but for 
theoretical plausibility on the basis of methodological reliability. 
Permeation can then be thought of as a conceptual field in which, however tenuously, there is 
common awareness of the preferred values of the school transmitted either directly through 
verbal indication or indirectly though suggestion. As outlined in the theory section this 
communication of value concepts is not the transmission of values in the sense of acquisition 
but only the possibility for  conceptual grasp, that is, the ‘awareness stage’ of Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman (1981) and Schönpflug’s (2001b) two-stage process of ‘awareness’ and 
‘acceptance’. 
In a consideration of the hegemony of ideology in society and schooling in particular, Apple 
(1979, p.22) makes use of the term ‘permeate’ (in a somewhat pleonastic manner) to describe 
a state of ‘saturation’. The concept of permeation has been taken up to describe the extent of 
transmission flow though the institute, the extent to which values are transmitted through the 
institutional structure and acquired by the recipients of values education. That such a flow 
occurs seems to be taken for granted by the schools: ‘In our mission statement we talk about 
everyone being treated with dignity and respect...that everyone should be treated as of equal 
worth...Saying it and doing it at times is difficult...But I think it does permeate through’ 
[A/FN2-3032]. In this theory permeation is an aspect of transmission, but, as mentioned 
above, is not its equivalent. Therefore the sense in which the teacher used the term in the 
extract quoted above, where he meant acceptance, is, strictly speaking, not the same as it is 
being used here. The data collated from the schools into the Institutional Focus Value 
Analyses (IFVA) gives a snapshot of the state of permeation; as mentioned earlier, it would 
take a longitudinal study of each institution in order to quantify the extent of permeation to 
any degree – even if it was possible in principle. The IFVA does establish that common 
values are found at all levels of the schools. Moreover the surveys establish that there are 
significant levels of pupil awareness of the schools’ attempts to teach certain values and 
attitudes. 
In this context, it is necessary to evaluate the two-stage process of ‘awareness’ and 
‘acceptance’. First, these have to be considered stages in transmission and not a mechanism 
for transmission, certainly not in the sense that I would understand ‘mechanism’, to mean a 
causal explanation. Secondly, Schoenpflug’s two stages are of limited utility; they are 
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appropriate in interpersonal transmission, but within an institution even if acceptance of a 
certain value can be shown, unless it can also be shown that inculcation, awareness and 
acceptance form a causal line within the institution, to speak of institutional transmission is 
not permissible. Establishing permeation is easier: indications of student awareness of being 
taught and of staff awareness of the ethos, both of which are evidenced in all schools 
[A/B/C/SUR-4], are enough. Permeation means simply that there is a value discourse 
occurring in every sector of the institute, in this case at every one of the three levels of the 
schools. But while there might be institutional awareness, it requires something more to 
create the conditions for acceptance, or ‘acquisition’, the preferred term here. 
6.2.3   Transmission and the institutional structure of authority  
 Permeation, as just noted, takes place as easily as people communicate, either informally 
through casual interaction, or formally as in the teacher – pupil interaction or in official 
documents and publications circulated through the school. Values are embedded in such 
modes of communication either consciously or unconsciously and therefore reach to every 
part of the school. However, to move to the stage of acquisition requires a very different 
process (taking a cue from the viral analogy of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), the 
relationship between permeation and transmission can be likened to that between diffusion 
and infection). This process involves the authority structure of the school. 
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to go back to the basic theory outlined above, in 
which value has a dual structure. One is its external aspect of simply being a conceptual 
word, easily communicated and assimilated. However, this is not the whole or the essential 
nature of a value, which lies in its internal aspect of being a shared experience of the moral 
force of the value. For this aspect of the value to be acquired three things must happen: a 
communal context must exist; the value explained or modelled in some way; and the intended 
recipient as a moral agent in their own right move to acceptance. Each of these will be dealt 
with separately; this section will deal with the first two. 
6.2.3.1   Invocation and evocation 
According to the theory outlined here, as shared experience values have a communal aspect. 
Elsewhere this has been referred to by the concept ‘evocation of the moral community’ and 
two types of evocation were distinguished, intrinsic and extrinsic; they could be called simply 
the moral community here and now and the moral community somewhere else. Both types of 
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evocation were witnessed in the class observations. Intrinsic evocation identifies the moral 
community with the community defined by the class itself [A/OBS]; they become, as it were, 
the experimental laboratory for the practice of the value. Extrinsic evocation is more an 
exercise in remote empathy, where the class experience vicariously, communally the 
circumstances of others [B/OBS]. Logically, evocation must follow invocation, but the 
precursor for both within an institution is that the actual physical group must exist in which 
inculcation of the value can occur. For that the authority of the school over the moral 
autonomy of the individual must be brought into play. It is, of course, entirely possible for 
someone to accept a value outside a communal setting, for example by being convinced by an 
argument read in a book and this point will be looked at when considering the generalisability 
of the theory. 
On the path from a general understanding of the meaning of a concept to acceptance of the 
concept as a value, there needs to be a qualitative change in the recipient’s relationship with 
the value-term. Within the classroom that is going to be supplied by the teacher’s use of a 
value-term in a meaningful context (Hawkes, 2010), perhaps supplying examples, in this 
way, more than just by definitional precision or extension, deepening the understanding of 
the term, and hopefully by being an example of that value and modelling that value in the 
behaviour they demonstrate to the pupils in the class and others. This is in accordance with 
the theoretical concept of invocation. According to the definition of that concept given above, 
invocation is the ritualistic utterance of the value sacred to the group, with the purpose of 
reinforcing their commitment to both. Where there is clearly some gap between the theory 
and the reality, both evocation and invocation can be thought of as principles for action, or 
activation principles, rather than as straightforward descriptions of what happens; I will 
return to this idea when talking about the strategic dimension of transmission. Evocation 
requires the group to be transformed into the moral community, but it is not yet the moral 
community. In a similar manner, invocation requires the as-if modelling of invocation, even 
though the value has not yet been acquired by the group. The relationship is actually closer 
still: by supplying a meaningful context and by deepening the students’ understanding of a 
value, I would argue that something mysterious and even sacred is happening [Eliade, 1957]. 
Like evocation, invocation is also challenging the moral autonomy of the individual student 
and placing a demand upon his or her attention and interest, which requires the authoritative 
presence of the teacher in the class. 
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In both the cases of evocation and invocation the issue of authority arises: the authority of the 
school to organise young people into classes for the purpose of learning and specifically for 
the transmission of values; and the authority of the teacher to stand in front of a class of 
morally autonomous individuals and hold the attention of the class and undertake pedagogy 
in order that they can acquire a particular value or values. What links these two instances of 
authority and what differentiates them needs to be considered. In order to do that the concept 
of institutional authority needs to be thoroughly examined. In this theory a distinction is made 
between the concepts of authority, power and control, authority being defined as a 
combination of power and control, as illustrated in the diagram on page 155. The concepts of 
power and control will be explained in turn. 
6.2.3.2   Power and control 
The importance of power and control in educational transmission was something I began to 
appreciate through reading Bernstein (1975). While the definitions that I have arrived at 
through analysing the data from the schools differ ultimately from those Bernstein employed, 
his use of ‘classification’ for a spatial boundary between curriculum subjects and 
‘framework’ for the temporal rhythm of the syllabus, shaped my thinking on this. Power has 
a number of manifestations, but in this model of value transmission, only two functions 
which are of importance: one is to create roles that function to distribute power; the other is 
to licence control. It is in the first of these functions of the role that power reveals its capacity 
to give rise to a self-replicating hierarchy, though one of vertically diminishing power, as 
discussed in the partial ‘transmission flow’ model . All power is symbolic and the 
appointment of someone to a role is a secular anointing accompanied by the symbolic 
trappings, the certificate, the office, the desk, for example. In developed economies 
appointments to important or professional posts – such as a teacher – are made on the basis of 
having met certain formal requirements that demonstrate sufficient skill to carry out the role. 
Once conferred, a role then gives the appointee the right in turn to confer power. A role, 
though, does more than just confer power; it also limits it through regulation (legal and 
ethical). Power takes two forms, that of empowerment and disempowerment. The role both 
empowers and disempowers (although, it can be seen in context that the role only 
disempowers by empowering in the first place, therefore empowerment and disempowerment 
are relative) and by empowerment confers the power to empower and disempower in turn, 
though the nature of the conferred empowerment and disempowerment may be curtailed by 
the limitations of the role. Whether and to what extent limited, however, the power to employ 
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empowering and disempowering methods, known collectively as ‘power distribution’, to alter 
the dynamics of a system such as a classroom, is fundamental to a role and one of the four 
areas of control conceded to a role, in particular (though not limited to) the role of a teacher. 
It seems that this power – the power to distribute power – is reproduced throughout the 
hierarchy, and is not a form of control which is a feature of personal charisma. Power 
distribution is not a creative shaping force as control is; it is essentially a reproduction of the 
forms of power being transmitted through the hierarchy, embodied in the assigned role. As 
discussed above, the role empowers through a certain space for action – a space in which 
charismatic control can be exercised – but also disempowers by placing limits on that space 
and curtailing the freedom to act by imposing mandatory requirements and responsibilities, 
prohibitions and taboos. Although the exercise of power distribution may appear to be 
undertaken spontaneously at each level, in reality the freedoms and limits, say, employed by 
a teacher in a classroom, are determined higher up the hierarchy and manifest in the legal and 
bureaucratic burdens that accompany the role. 
The exact relationship between power and control is complex, because control also involves 
the use of coercive force, if not physical force in these times at least some form of ‘symbolic 
violence’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Foucault, 1979). Happily, such considerations lie 
outside the scope of this theory; in regards to the transmission of values, coercive force would 
be entirely unproductive. The forms of control that are of interest lie in a form of authority 
that transcends the role, which could be referred to as ‘character’, ‘personal magnetism’ or 
‘charisma’, and for which the role is either unnecessary or necessary but not sufficient. The 
latter seems intrinsically more realistic; even if an individual has personal magnetism, unless 
they have the authority to stand in a role they cannot exercise this control in a formal setting. 
Power creates the context in which control can be exercised and, in that sense, unleashes it, 
but it is not the origin. Unlike power, which is conferred and hierarchical, control is either 
innate or learned and is unique to the individual.  
6.2.3.3   The institutional expression of authority structures 
At the whole school level there is an axis of authority (the authority for the school to exist, 
authorisation to administer education and recruit teachers, and mandatory requirement for the 
running of a modern school including the contents of education and pedagogies) which acts 
as the basis for three areas of local control relevant to values transmission: the internal 
structuring of the school, both in terms of its architecture and its management structures, and 
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the limits of the school’s writ, which collectively are referred to as the bounding of space; the 
organisation of the syllabus into a timetabled curriculum, and the other aspects of school life 
into a set of routines, called collectively the periodisation of time; and overseeing a system 
for the permeation of values throughout the school, including strategic planning, signing, 
signposting and signage (semiotic marking), broadcasting and the cultivation of the school 
ethos, collectively known as the symbolisation of value concepts.  
At the classroom level the axis of authority is manifested in the role of the teacher, which 
reproduces the mandated power distribution of the higher authority. So, for example, the 
teacher has the authority to empower and disempower students but only within the 
parameters mandated by the school board (or increasingly by the government). The role is the 
basis of the teacher’s control that they are able to exercise in the class, but only in the sense 
that it legitimises their position; it does not constitute it, however. Control is a manifestation 
of the personal charisma of the teacher, which can be either innate or learned. While this 
charisma (as the name suggests) may in some sense be an ineffable quality, it has tangible 
dimensions through which control is exerted: as the shaping and structuring of space 
(physical, social and behavioural) through creating boundaries; as the rhythmic structuring of 
time (through rhetorical devices, lesson planning and the continuity of contact with the 
student body) referred to as periodicity; and as the shaping and manipulation of images 
through the spoken and written word and through performative acts, known as symbolisation. 
The relationships between these concepts are summarised in the table on page 155. 
At the level of abstraction given above, the structural similarities between the two levels 
(whole school and classroom) and their point for point correspondence become clear. 
Evidence was gathered in the case studies that these attributes of power and control are 
ubiquitous throughout the institutional hierarchy; power distribution, though, is reproduced 
directly and hierarchically, whereas the other aspects of control - boundary, periodicity and 
symbolism - are spontaneously emergent. The nexus between the two levels of transmission 
occurs (potentially) at several points: a direct link, as mentioned, in terms of authoritative 
axis and role, although this plays no decisive part in transmission but rather ensures the 
stability and continuity of the institutional structure; the critical nexus occurs in the symbolic 
cycles, as teachers participate in and build on the institutional strategy for their own 
classroom strategy, appropriate the institutional semiosis, suitably adapted for their own 
classroom pedagogy, and both draw upon and contribute to the school ethos.  
193 
 
6.2.3.4   The value cycle 
So far permeation and control have been discussed in isolation, as if these processes or states 
were unrelated to each other. On the route to value acquisition, though, they are intimately 
related. As discussed above, control manifests itself through the persuasive manipulation of 
language, patterning time (periodicity), space (boundary) and image (symbolisation), in effect 
to create a state of altered consciousness in which individuals can be empowered or 
disempowered. In the cross-case analysis of observational data a causal relationship was 
identified that was simplified to four categories: strategy, sign, power and participation. This 
represents the interface between the structure of institutional permeation and the structure of 
institutional authority. Teacher classroom strategy in the transmission of values, as 
previously mentioned, draws upon the institutional repository of the ethos and other sources 
of values and projects the message in a semiotic display in the classroom combining signs for 
control and embedded signs for a value, this pathway from strategy to sign being the process 
of invocation. The signs now permeate the consciousness of the pupils empowered and tasked 
to participate in the moral universe of the value. This pathway from sign to participation is 
the process of evocation. Participation in the moral universe of the value is also, for reasons 
already discussed at length, participation in the moral community, where the ‘sense of 
community’ is experienced. This leads naturally to an intensification of participation through 
value-based strategic action and semiosis at every level of the institution. The completion of 
the cycle from participation back to strategy equates to acquisition. At each stage of this 
cycle charismatic control is exercised; through the distribution of power pupils can exercise a 
measure of control over themselves and one another in maintaining a stable, value centred 
community. This process is shown in the following figure, where P = power, R = role, CC = 
charismatic control, St = strategy, in = invocation, Si = sign, ev = evocation, Pa = 
participation and ac = acquisition.  
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Fig 24 The value cycle 
6.2.4   Resistance, moral autonomy and transformation 
There is in all this up to now, though, something outstanding. The explanation outlined offers 
a hegemonistic and deterministic view of value transmission, in terms of permeation and 
authority. It describes the mechanism of value transmission from the perspective of the 
institution and the teacher, but has not considered the recipient, the pupils, as autonomous 
moral agents (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994; Barni et al., 2011). To the extent that it has 
considered them, they have been viewed as blank canvases and as output, albeit the output 
from a rather more sophisticated process than that considered in the partial theories. What has 
not been explained is the trigger to value acquisition; for inculcation, or the attempt to 
inculcate, is often met by resistance [B/INT-1220] and for those cases something must 
ameliorate that resistance. This final part of the outline of a model of institutional values 
transmission will look at the nature of resistance and the transformation that needs to take 
place for values to be acquired within an institutional setting. 
Resistance takes on different forms varying in intensity, from questioning to outright 
rebellion. Cases of the latter were only encountered in the literature (e.g. Willis, 1977); the 
cases from the research field were limited to a range between questioning [A/FG-1] and 
robust criticism [B/OBS-15/1133]. It would be wrong to think, though, that resistance is 
either limited to students or necessarily an expression of antisocial tendencies. The data 
exhibits examples of resistance across the institutional structure and towards varying targets: 
criticism of government policies by head teachers [C/INT-2338], criticism of teachers [A/FG-
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2] and head teachers [C/FG-2524-2555] by pupils, some criticism of teachers by other 
teachers [A/FN2-3032], implied conflicts over policies, criticism of local authorities [C/INT-
2758], other schools and other  [A/INT-6503]by head teachers, and criticisms of sixth 
formers.  
In the partial model ‘A Spiritual Journey’, described in the previous section, it was suggested 
metaphorically that when the individual collides with the boundary of the institution, 
resistance occurs. Translated into a realistic context, when individuals encounter the 
boundaries established by rules and regulations and limitations on their freedom they usually 
resist to some degree, either actively or passively (Brehm, 1966). In this state of resistance it 
is impossible to acquire the values promulgated by the institution, which raises a dilemma for 
the institution: it cannot relinquish the principles that bound the form of life (Pring, 1986) that 
the institution embodies, for in this case the institution would lose its identity and its raison 
d’être; neither can it simply reaffirm its principles, nor affirm them more vociferously, for 
this is only likely to strengthen the resistance. In order to seek the resolution of this dilemma 
it is first necessary to understand the nature of resistance in greater depth. 
What is common to the examples of resistance given above is the reaction of moral agency to 
the perception that authority is encroaching on the space in which it exercises moral 
autonomy [B/INT-1220]. What can overcome that resistance is the calculation that a benefit 
is to be had by trading a degree of moral autonomy for something that authority has to offer; 
that is the moral community [A/FG-8], discussed under section 6.2.3.1 ‘invocation and 
evocation’. Therefore, resistance should not be viewed as something pathological, but as an 
intrinsic psychic mechanism for the protection of moral integrity, which is, nevertheless, at 
the same time, negotiable. From the perspective of authority the process of transmitter 
inculcation/recipient acquisition can only be completed through overcoming this resistance 
[C/INT-5023]; from the individual acquirer’s perspective resistance is an asset which creates 
the possibility of testing the integrity of the moral community before acquiescing to the 
merging of their moral identity with the collective. In our complex and relatively open social 
world individuals rarely become identified with a single form of life, but enjoy multiple 
identification and belonging. But for each belonging there is a concession of moral 
autonomy. Objectively, from a neutral perspective, we can speak of the necessity for a 
transformative experience. Many things can trigger that transformative experience, but to be 
meaningful to the idea of institutional transmission they should be institutionally 
contextualised, i.e. things that occur or are witnessed within the school. 
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In the theory chapter the nature of value was analysed and exposed as a conceptualised 
shared experience. It seems logical, therefore, that a transformative experience within an 
institutional context must underlie the transformation from resistance to the acquisition of a 
value or values. The evidence from schools and the data collected in this research is 
circumstantial but suggestive (for example, [A/INT-3405] and [C/SUR-8]). The acquisition 
of values is also accompanied by a turning inward. The conceptual aspect of values again 
logically requires that acquisition should be accompanied by a more reflective attitude. To 
return to the partial model ‘A Spiritual Journey’, the analogy of collision with the boundary 
suggests that one way of ameliorating the implacability of the boundary is to turn away and 
move away, moving inward. I have already discussed above that this inward turn is 
accomplished through a process of negotiation between moral autonomy and belonging to the 
moral community. It is ultimately to find in the community something sufficiently 
compelling and attractive that the boundary, the encroachment of authority on moral 
autonomy, becomes invisible or irrelevant. It could be something explicitly inward, such as 
spirituality [A/INT-29.00; B/INT-0655], but also a pride in the school [C/INT-1912] or the 
tradition of the school [B/INT-1817], or learning to take responsibility for others [A/FG-6; 
B/INT-0850]. 
These things describe the nature of transformation, but not ultimately why it occurs, what 
triggers the transformation that allows the acquisition of values within an institution such as a 
school. The reasons may ultimately be ineffable and idiosyncratic, yet a common 
phenomenon appears in the anecdotes of two of the schools in the field. It is difficult to name 
it exactly, but I have referred to it as ‘the slipping of the mask’. The pupils in my focus group 
at Chelmswood told me, almost in hushed tones, of their admiration for the former Head, who 
had spent an entire break time with one of them, ‘sharing a bag of crisps and talking about 
TV and stuff’ and on another occasion had participated in a snowball fight [C/FG-2458-
2506]. What is not significant here are the actions themselves, which are mundane, but the 
dissonance between the mask of authority and the humanity beneath. A similar dissonance, 
on an institutional as well as a personal level, occurred between the hierarchical, tradition-
bound structures of Broughampton and the glimpses of warm communal life that could 
coexist. In a part of the interview quoted at length in the case study, the Chaplain related his 
amazement at the care shown by a housemaster to his charges, deeply grounded in intimate 
and detailed knowledge of their likes, dislikes and background [B/INT-5110], something that 
will probably have as lasting an impression on those pupils as it obviously has had on the 
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Chaplain. As Heidegger (1962, p.243), quoting an ancient Roman fable, reminds us, ‘Care’ is 
‘that to which human [Being] belongs ‘for its lifetime’’. 
There is one final aspect of transformation that needs to be explored, which is replication. 
The essence of values is in a shared experience. Therefore, to acquire a value is to acquire the 
desire to share the value, both as a way to reinforce the negotiated decision involved in 
transformation and to extend the moral community. The basis of this concept is deductive 
reasoning from the nature of value and the symmetry of the model of permeation-authority, 
outlined in the previous section and illustrated in the diagram on page 193, which requires a 
new cycle of strategy, sign and participation. However, evidence from Chelmswood, in which 
pupils spontaneously affirmed values of inclusion [C/ASR-6; C/FG-2314] permeating 
through the institution structure from the official levels to classroom pedagogy, supports this 
contention. Replication links the phenomena of resistance and transformation to those of 
permeation and authority, by completing the link between participation and strategy. 
Participation is not itself part of the model for transmission. Participation is the end result of 
the process of transmission; therefore, logically, it cannot be part of the process. However, it 
can stand at the head of a new transmission event. 
6.3   Further thoughts  
6.3.1   Comparison with models of values education and models of value transmission 
Because the model I have presented takes a holistic and integrative view of values 
transmission, it bears similarities to other holistic views in the literature. For example, 
Downey and Kelly (1978) and Plunkett (1990, pp.128-9) put forward similar ideas of values 
education being approached from one of four possible avenues: through a specialised 
curriculum, through a broadening of the existing curriculum, through pastoral care or through 
the school community. Hawkes (2010) has effectively taken all those approaches and 
combined them in pedagogy of values education. Hawkes, even more explicitly recommends 
the creation of a vocabulary of value terms to structure pedagogy, an approach essentially 
undertaken on a national level in Australia which has a list of desired values (Toomey, 2010), 
around which participating schools can design their curricular and pedagogic approaches. 
Seeing values education less from a curricular and more from a psychological perspective, 
Darom (2000) discerns four distinct aspects of education, the cognitive, affective, values and 
behaviour, which he believes should be integrated for education to have ‘a chance of truly 
touching young people’ (ibid, p.20). The model of values transmission touches on all those 
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points but explores their theoretical connections, not only as interconnected parts of 
institutional structure but as aspects of a coherent mechanism.  
That mechanism, which I have presented here, I would argue, builds upon, incorporates and 
goes beyond the mechanism put forward by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and 
Schoenpflug (2001a), a two-stage process of awareness and acceptance. Looking at 
transmission from an institutional perspective, it has had to take into account issues of 
authority and control which are constitutive of the deontology of institutions, aspects not 
made explicit in their theories even if assumed, which make formal education possible and, as 
I have described, have a central role to play at the stage of awareness. Between awareness 
and acceptance there is also a hiatus, which they have not clearly addressed, that of resistance 
and transformation. This theory has provided a theoretical framework that bridges that gap. In 
some sense the theory of transmission explained here could also be said to extend Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman’s viral transmission model by incorporating the idea of the dual 
conceptual and symbolic functions of values, allowing them to switch from ‘diffusion’ mode 
to ‘infection’ mode. 
6.3.2   The centrality of the human relationship to transmission 
If there is any consensus over the frequently disputed area of values and values education it is 
the centrality of the human relationship and the quality of that relationship in the transmission 
of values. As Schönpflug reminds us (2001b, p.132), the contents of transmission are 
‘particularly sensitive to the channel’ of transmission, which I interpret to mean that for the 
recipient of any form of information, and particularly with the case of values, which also 
need to be activated in the recipient, who the transmitter is, in terms of the perception of the 
transmitter by the recipient, is vitally important. From a negative perspective, in cases from 
the schools studied where teachers were not held in high regard, this had a negative impact on 
academic performance (A/FG-8; C/FG-1100, 1215, 1247); and in all these cases the cause of 
the complaint was not their competence as teachers, which in all but a small minority would 
be taken as given, but their lack of warmth, remoteness or unpredictability. Research 
invariably backs this observation up. There is a broad area of agreement with various 
psychological and philosophical views that the quality of relationships is central to the idea of 
transmission. For Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) the relationship between the teacher 
(transmitter) and the taught (recipient) is a key condition of transmission. Although the focus 
of studies on values transmission has been on the parent child relationship, shifted into an 
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institutional context, all of that which has been predicated of relationships in 
intergenerational transmission is equally true of the teacher-pupil relationship. For 
Schönpflug it is (2001a) that is ‘an empathetic style’; for Euler et al. (2001) it is ‘emotional 
closeness between the generations’; for Barni et al. (2011) it is the ‘relationship’ among the 
parents and the ‘consistency’ of the value message that is received, as well as the ‘closeness’ 
of the relationship. These all fit into a pattern of successful parenting, which most now agree 
is authoritative (Steinberg, et al., 1989), rather than authoritarian or permissive. This also 
seems a fitting description of the relationship that ought to exist between teachers and their 
pupils in the context of education in general, but specifically in the context of transmitting 
values. An ‘authoritative style’ seems a fitting description of the combination of authority and 
humanity of key figures that I discovered in the data from the schools and characterised as 
‘the slipping of the mask’, which I concluded was fundamental to a contextual transformative 
experience en route to the acceptance of institutional values. 
6.3.3   An evaluation and interpretation of the model 
Through this research the aetiology of value transmission has been traced, from the nature of 
values having a dual role as concept-like and symbol-like, through the institutional 
permeation of value concepts throughout the institution, to their invocation through the 
medium of pedagogical control of the value concepts and their re-symbolisation for the 
student audience. In doing so this theoretical perspective has developed an understanding of 
the school as an institutional structure for value transmission, incorporating and offering a 
reinterpretation of its power hierarchies, and its administrative and pedagogical functions. 
Moreover, it has demonstrated that the definitionally problematic notion of ethos has a 
tangible meaning in the context of value transmission. The abstract notion of value has been 
shown not only to be real but implicated into and – importantly – co-defined with its 
institutional context, incorporating aspects of space, time, authority, strategy and dramatic 
play. In short values, value transmission and institutions are co-existent and inter-related 
conceptually (Rokeach, 1975). 
It has also considered what many theorists of values education and values transmission have 
not, that of the role of resistance to values inculcation and its incorporation into a more 
inclusive theoretical model of transmission that embraces both inculcation and acquisition 
perspectives, through the negotiation of moral autonomy for belonging under acceptable 
conditions. Parsons (1961) did recognise the phenomenon of resistance to schooling, but saw 
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that as a structural reaction to raising levels of achievement. Values education is much more 
than a one-dimensional race towards academic or vocational achievement, although research 
on longer term programmes of values education (Lovat et al., 2010; Toomey, 2010; Hawkes, 
2010) suggest that it can impact considerably on those outcomes; it is about humanising the 
curriculum (Aspin and Chapman, 2000) and creating the opportunity for education to touch 
the lives of young people (Darom, 2000) based on ‘the kind of persons that [as a society we 
wish them] to grow up into’ (Pring, 1986, p.181). For this to happen, values education, as all 
good education, requires a transformative experience in the life of the recipient, one which 
can mitigate or even prevent resistance to transmission. 
The emerging picture of transmission of values within an institution is both simple and 
complex. It can be understood at the level of an individual journey through the institution, a 
negotiation with and reconciliation to the demands placed by institutional belonging. But it 
can also be understood at the institutional level, as the workings of a complex system of 
interlocking hierarchies, in the cases considered here the relationship between the teacher in 
the classroom, the administration, management and ethos of the school, and the influence of 
outside forces, notably religions, local communities or constituency, and local and national 
governments. But at its core it is about a very small space, the classroom, in which the 
relationship between the teacher and the pupil flourishes or withers. A school is an intricate 
web of control, dependence and autonomy (Morris, 1964) at every level and a consideration 
of the transmission of values highlights this very clearly.  
6.4    Summary 
This chapter effectively concludes the analytical process by integrating the findings of the 
cross-case comparison (chapter 4) with the product of the cross-case iteration (chapter 5), the 
mechanism for institutional values transmission. It also functions as a revue of the stages in 
the development of the model, including partial, limited and flawed models which, 
nonetheless, contributed to the final outcome. In doing so it draws comparisons with other 
models of values and transmission considered in the literature review and argues for the 
superiority of the present model. 
The core of the chapter is the two sections ‘the value cycle’ and ‘resistance, moral autonomy 
and transformation’. In the first the inner dynamics of the inculcation pole of transmission is 
worked out, which involves detailing the interrelationship between the semiotic permeation 
of the institution by value information with the pedagogic authority of the teacher in a 
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classroom leading to the incipient ‘moral community’ of the student body. The second 
section explores the acquisition pole of transmission, drawing on examples from the case 
studies to give a more narrative account of the psychology of the individual that leads from a 
natural resistance to authority and testing of the moral integrity of the institutional 
collectivity, to acceptance of its values and the ‘sense of community’. 
The final chapter attempts to evaluate the entire research process and to place its findings, 
including the model of institutional value transmission described here, within the context of 
existing knowledge, including an assessment of its contribution to the pedagogy of values. 
 CHAPTER 7   EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
This final chapter does two things. In the first part there is an evaluation of the two-tier 
research process as a whole, including a brief summary of issues relating to validity and 
reliability in the core research and a lengthier review of the derivative hypotheses. I conclude 
with a reflection upon some broad themes arising out of this research, such as placing the 
research within the academic tradition, considering the broader application of the findings 
and their original contribution to knowledge, and any implications or recommendations that 
arise as a result of these findings. I also consider the limitations of this research and suggest 
avenues for further research. Finally, I will share some personal reflections on the research 
process.  
7.1   Evaluation of the Research  
7.1.1   Validity and Reliability in the Core Research  
This is a review of points that were covered in detail in the methodology chapter. Yin (2009) 
analysed validity in case study research to three types – construct, internal and external – and 
recommended a series of tactics to ensure that the requirements of each were met. For 
construct validity there should be the use of multiple sources, a chain of evidence and the use 
of respondent validation. Internal validation requires a means of matching emergent patterns 
with that predicted by theory and also the use of cross-case analysis. External validity means 
the findings are capable of being generalised across a broader range of cases. Reliability 
means the repeatability of the research process; for this the creation of a research protocol 
and research database are recommended. All of these requirements have been met. The 
concepts of invocation and evocation derived from the fundamental theory of values 
predicted that in value transmission verbal and symbolic forms of communication of value 
concepts and the creation of communal structures would be evident, which was found to be 
the case and the evidence for that is outlined in the case studies. 
7.1.2   Review of Derivative Hypotheses 
Of the ten hypotheses, the first five concerned the nature of values, the next three concerned 
the nature of values education and the final two features of values educational institutions. 
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Evidence for (both positive and negative) and evidence against was amassed during the 
process of analysing the data from the three schools chosen for the field research. In each 
case transcripts were examined for statements and positions or policies that might either 
strengthen or weaken the case for a particular hypothesis. The stance taken here was that the 
fundamental theory, derived deductively from basic axioms, must be considered testable 
against data arrived at more empirically. While not applying strict criteria of falsifiability, 
theory must be sufficiently supported and not indisputably disproven by the data available 
and, at the same time, capable of development and improvement.  
1. Values do not precede social or moral behaviours 
This hypothesis is stating something that arises from the fundamental approach to the nature 
of values, namely that we do not assimilate a value culturally and then start behaving in a 
manner which is governed by that value, but that we are taught the appropriate behaviour 
usually in the context of value-laden instruction and that we gradually assimilate the meaning 
to the acquisition of the appropriate skills. A clear distinction is being made between the 
conceptual knowledge of a value term, which may precede the associated social or moral 
behaviour, and the acquisition of a value, which the hypothesis states cannot. 
Positive support for this hypothesis is provided from St Augustine. The school, in fact each 
house, carries out charity projects, to which the children generously devote time and money 
[A/FN2-2342]. The purpose, though, is not merely to help others in greater need but in order 
to ‘educate them as human beings to have a certain humility to other human beings [and to 
challenge] the philosophy of looking after number one’ [A/FN2-2342]. Implicit in this view 
is the belief that left to their own devices humans have a tendency to pursue selfish and 
small-minded concerns. To manifest generosity, humility and concern for others these values 
must be acquired through a process of ‘conceptualised activity’, in this case charitable giving. 
At Chelmswood High the Head conceives of values education as taking place most 
importantly in ‘the daily interactions we have within school’ [C/INT-0700], by which he 
means the interaction between the staff and pupils, particularly in: 
having to deal with people who have transgressed the rules and where things have gone 
wrong, [and] people have not behaved as they should have. I suppose in every single 
interaction to do with these issues it's the values underlying it: how do we want people 
to be in the school, taking account of the needs of others in this school community 
[C/INT-0700]. 
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One pupil also notes, ‘Behaviour depends on who you hang around with’ [C/SUR-8]. Both 
these scenarios assume, though not explicitly, that the acquisition of values follows 
behavioural patterns. A more transient and less structured example comes from Chelmswood 
High. In this exchange one student is describing to the teacher how, following a lesson on 
diversity and inclusion, he corrected his brother who was using a derogatory term: Teacher: 
‘And what did you say to him?’ ‘I said he shouldn’t say it’. ‘And did you explain why?’ 
‘Mm, yeah’. ‘And what did he say?’ ‘He said ‘Oh, alright’’ [C/OBS-0343/4 (3)]. A simple as 
this exchange sounds, it embodies the principle that values are acquired by a directed activity 
(in this case an instruction to change linguistic behaviour) with a conceptualised reason (in 
this case unclear, but probably some version of what the pupil learned in the lesson). 
The view that social and moral behaviours precede value acquisition could be charged with 
promoting a traditional view of social and moral behaviour that passes unchanged from 
generation to generation, as it does in the orthodox religious families, or that Bourdieu (1977) 
claims is accomplished through the reproduction of the institutions of privilege in capitalist 
schooling. While there are examples of cultural transmission that remain intact, it is not the 
position taken here either that this is to be lauded or assumed to be normative. Societies and 
moral codes evolve over time, and while there may be natural limits to what is acceptable in 
human society (which will be discussed below) the social and moral norms referred to here 
are what is acceptable either to society in general or to particular parts of society or groups 
within society at any time, without distinction, and the research is concerned with the 
mechanism of value transmission rather than which values are transmitted or whether these 
are the ‘right’ ones. 
A more serious challenge to this view is contained in the belief, promoted in St Augustine, 
but also found to a lesser degree at Broughampton [B/ABS-1.1] and Chelmswood [C/INT-
0829], that there is an ‘intrinsic value’ to human beings. In discussion the principal contact 
stated: 
everybody, no matter who you are or where you’re from, has intrinsic value [pause], so 
no matter how naughty, no matter how deprived, no matter how socially excluded you 
may be or, on the other hand, no matter how wealthy or fortunate you may be, that 
within each person is, there’s going to be something of real value that needs to be 
nurtured and grown and developed [A/INT-2900] 
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The concept of intrinsic value is inherent in Catholic theology derived from Aristotelian 
philosophy, but is deeply embedded in Western thought generally, even finding expression in 
the Marxist labour theory of value. In the theory chapter a version of this idea was 
considered, the idea that value constitutes a tertiary property of things. In the subsequent 
discussion the existence of this idea of value was discounted as a reification of the process of 
valuing, for which an alternative explanation was offered. The concept of intrinsic value 
remains one of the triumphs of the philosophical and moral imagination, which would 
undoubtedly benefit society if more widely promoted, but it is a belief (rather than a fact) 
whose transmission conforms to the principles being sought, and the hypothesis under 
discussion. The sense of the intrinsic value of human life cannot be acquired apart from the 
concept and some confirmatory experience, preferably the modelling of behaviour based on 
that belief. Presumably based on this concept, at St Augustine difficult pupils ‘will be given 
unconditional positive acceptance, making clear to them that it is their behaviour that is 
unacceptable, not their person’ [A/BM-P]. 
2. Values justify various behaviours, moral codes and worldviews 
Though, according to hypothesis 1, values (value acquisition) do not precede social or moral 
behaviours, once acquired values justify particularly ways of behaving, particular rules that 
are followed and particular views that one might hold about all sorts of things within the 
social world. Values act as a shorthand or code for a larger bundle of views and the actions 
that flow from them. This means that values then become the basis for action, not only in 
daily life but also by extension into larger areas of sociality, such as work and vocation. In 
the schools that formed the field for this research this hypothesis is of particular relevance to 
the mission statements or documents that embed the fundamental values of the institution. 
The Head at St Augustine stated, regarding the values of the Ethos document, that ‘we have 
our position and then it’s applying that position to everyday life’ [A/INT-5400], attempting to 
work out the implications of idealistic principles in the hard and messy reality of a large 
school. At Broughampton, where there is less dependence on, indeed a suspicion of, written 
documents [B/INT-1520], ‘there is a strong emphasis on general moral development and the 
individual’s journey of faith, and the School promotes the values of personal integrity, 
tolerance and respect for others, and a sense of responsibility for the more vulnerable within 
their community’ [B/EO-3]. At Chelmswood High, ‘while things go along reasonably plain 
sailing we tend to…you are protected to a certain sense by just going by your established 
procedures: ‘how would we normally deal with this?’’ [C/INT-1516]. However, ‘in some 
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adverse circumstances where things became more difficult we would be…we would fall back 
more onto written policies and statements and things, where you would have to check ‘is 
what we are doing appropriate, is this right?’’ [C/INT-1516]. A student at St Augustine also 
gives an example of how things can go wrong if values are not integral to interaction: 
‘Without respect nothing works in school and out of school; especially in a lesson if you don't 
respect your teacher their probably not going to respect you, and when no one’s respecting 
each other nothing works properly’ [A/FG-8]. 
3. There is no a priori hierarchy of values 
This hypothesis follows as a logical implication of the theory of values described in the 
theory chapter, which states that values name a shared experience or, to put that in more 
philosophical terms, a value is a conceptual linguistic marker, derived from discourse within 
a bounded social group, that encapsulates a common feeling or experience within that group. 
On this definition all values are ontologically equivalent. This does not preclude that some 
values, a posteriori, might be found to be more fitting to human society; this would converge 
with the general evolutionary outlook which this research has declared in the introduction. 
However, it takes issue with the platonic view that a realm of values exists independently of 
human endeavour and that these values can be ordered into the greater and the lesser. 
Nevertheless, the evidence from the field, scant as it is, does not generally support this 
hypothesis, but rather the contrary view, that there is a hierarchy of values. Even when 
proclaiming openness, there is often an underlying supposition of certainty. As the principal 
contact at St Augustine, in giving his view on the Catholic perspective at the school, noted, 
‘We do feel duty bound to say, ‘but other views are this, this and this’ and try and lead 
youngsters to some sort of reasoned conclusions themselves about where their views stand’ 
[A/FN2-1055]. Implicit in this view is the assumption that with the application of reason the 
correct view will emerge. Some of the pupils there are more forthright: ‘I think if you aspire 
to be famous or wealthy I think you're lucky if you do get that in your life, but I don't think 
it's that important. I think as long as you're happy and you’ve got everything you need in life, 
like have a family or whatever, I think you'll be fine, you don't need anything’ [A/FG-10]; ‘I 
think overall if we’re talking about morals and would I change if I was famous or if I was 
wealthy then no, I think being famous should never overshadow morals or what you truly 
believe. Nothing should really change because you’ve got a lot of money’ [A/FG-10]. For 
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these young people moral values and fundamental values like family and happiness trump 
evanescent values like fame and wealth. 
These views, though popular opinion would probably be largely in accordance, are just 
opinion. There is evidence of a more empirical sort to be had in the data from the field. 
Across the three schools the same values appear, both as choices for important personal 
values in the surveys and as values permeating all aspects of the institutions: these include 
social values like cooperation, respect, fairness and trust; moral values like honesty and 
appropriateness; and spiritual values like care, compassion and generosity [A/B/C/SUR-2], 
[A/B/C/IFVA]. Even though these institutions are all schools with a common mission to 
educate the young, and all are expected to educate the spiritual moral and social components 
of knowledge, such a convergence is still surprising and suggests that values are 
differentiated in terms of their importance. 
The data assembled against the hypothesis, though circumstantial, is formidable; and it 
should not be underestimated how damaging a successful challenge to this single hypothesis 
could be for the entire theoretical edifice. One strategy would be to sidestep the issue by 
taking refuge in claiming that a posteriori ranking is not the same as a priori ranking. 
However, I think the issue needs to be considered and addressed more seriously than such a 
gambit would permit. There is, in fact, evidence that there is a natural ordering of values, that 
is to say, there is a natural basis for some of the most fundamental values. Take trust, for 
example. Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust lies at the basis of our ideas of social capital. I 
would add that wherever social institutions are analysed reductively the trust between 
individuals is the only thing that is socially irreducible. Trust is probably the most tangible 
social force. At basis, it is the sense that the other intends no harm and no harm will result 
from dealings with the other; the absence of this sense would make human association, and 
hence human society, impossible, and its presence is, therefore, requisite. In a critique of 
Fukuyama’s thesis, Hoogvelt (1998) argues that while trust was an important component of 
early stage capitalism, it has become less so with each technological advance and modern 
internet connectivity virtually obviates the need for bonds of trust in commerce. If this is so, 
then biological rootedness does not imply logical priority. I would say that a distinction needs 
to be made between the biological roots of values, on the basis of which a case for natural 
ordering can be made, and the functioning of values in the complex cultures which we inhabit 
today, in which all values have to be considered intrinsically plausible. 
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4. Knowledge of a value, or discussion about values, is different to their acquisition 
This is the corollary of the point made in hypothesis 1, that values do not precede social or 
moral behaviours. To be said to have acquired a value is to have consolidated a pattern of 
behaviour or practice and to have conceptualised that behaviour or practice. The Head of 
Chelmswood High came very close to this definition when he stated,  
I would understand [values education] as being to do with, I suppose, partly to do with 
[the] study of ethical standards and moral values that guide our conduct but also partly, 
I suppose, people internalising those and actually behaving in a proper way in school 
and beyond, as a guide to one's own actions [C/INT-0525]. 
Merely grasping the meaning of a value term and the ability to use the term in meaningful 
discourse are insufficient. Acquiring a value is about confirmatory experience, to some extent 
proclamation, but more importantly actualising some potentialities while closing off others. 
In the theory chapter the acquisition of a value was characterised as occurring within a closed 
group due to its essential collectivity. However, real-world groupings are hardly ever closed, 
and those that are are typically pathological. Some degree of awareness of in-group and out-
group is necessary, though, for identity maintenance and such groupings are necessary for the 
development of collective experience which is at the root of value formation. Schools are a 
typical case. All schools are semi-closed institutions in which social bonds between staff 
members, pupils and teachers and between classmates develop largely out of the public eye. 
Visitors are permitted only on special occasions or with special permission. Moreover, good 
schools typically foster exclusivity as a strategy to bind the in-group more tightly. 
The problematic issue for schools, to the extent that they are aware of it as an issue, is that 
they can provide the necessary information or guidance, but they have no influence over 
acquisition, or often knowledge of what the conditions and triggers of acquisition are. As the 
Assistant Head of St Augustine observed, ‘Ultimately all we can do is give the Catholic 
Church’s view and then it’s youngsters [who] make their decision’ [A/FN2-1055]. In a 
similar vein the Drugs Policy document at Broughampton states that it recognises that it has a 
duty to deliver education concerning drugs to its pupils throughout their time at the school ‘in 
the hopes that they will be able to make informed decisions when faced with the temptation 
to experiment with drugs’ [DSM-1.2].  
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5. All values theoretically exist in a state of tension, as they underlie fundamentally 
incompatible worldviews, or groups and institution with competing or conflicting 
interests 
It is not only politicians who intone the word ‘values’ as if it were a balm to heal all manner 
of social ills; philosophers also sometimes succumb to the surfeit of positivity associated with 
the contemplation of a field which manages to be simultaneously highly abstract theoretically 
but with implications for every facet of human life. In reality, values are paradoxically the 
source of social cohesion, where they are shared, and the source of social conflict, where they 
are not shared. The theory chapter explains clearly the cause of this paradox. First, our values 
are very close to an essential definition of who we are as individuals, rooted as they are in 
experience, and as such something to which we have an emotional attachment and in which 
we have an emotional investment. Secondly, the nature of values as shared experience means 
that values are not only acquired within a communal setting but are also a source of self-
definition for the group. These two ideas taken together explain why, when groups with 
differing values that underlie different worldviews and agendas are competing for social 
space or economic resources, passions can run high and lead to open conflict. 
This hypothesis is the one which is most clearly attested by the data. There are numerous 
examples of conflicts of values, between individuals, between groups, between teachers and 
pupils and between outside agencies and the school. Interestingly, most of them are not 
personal conflicts, but between differing ‘cultures’ and expectations. For schools, one of the 
perennial sources of conflict is the imposition of targets by central government. The Assistant 
Head of St Augustine strongly disagrees ‘that exam tables are the only measure of an 
effective school. They’re very narrow to be perfectly honest, and what we pride ourselves on 
in a Catholic school – and I’m sure many non-faith schools do as well – is that school should 
be about educating the whole person’ [A/FN2-1553]. According to the Head the school also 
‘take[s] a very inclusive attitude to students; which means we don’t do very well in league 
tables [A/INT-0724]...the whole targets culture creates a clash’ [A/INT-3015]. From a very 
different vantage point, that of a successfully performing school, the Head of Chelmswood 
High explains how the target culture results in both unnecessary conservatism and 
unnecessary innovation [C/INT-3210, 3327]. He cites the example of another, 
underperforming school that replaced Science GCSEs with an alternative, easier qualification 
that would boost the school’s standing in the league tables, but at the cost of closing off the 
pupils’ prospects of a career in the sciences [C/INT-3327] and notes drily that ‘the problem is 
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not so much the measurement of performance but the very high stakes of the outcome which 
are then publicised’ [C/INT-2940]. 
There are culture clashes within the school. According to the Head of Chelmswood, ‘in all 
large organisations with many different people there are bound to be times when people's 
needs and rights and interests conflict’ [C/INT-1006]. At least one of the (female) students in 
each focus group complained about what they considered to be petty rules concerning 
jewellery, nail varnish, etc. A more serious complaint was in regards to the inconsistency in 
the punishments for different infractions: ‘A lot of the time you can get into more trouble for 
not having your uniform done properly than that people might do for disrupting everyone’s 
learning in the class’ [A/FG-2]. From the teacher’s perspective, though, ‘quite often ... 
younger people focus on rights and not on responsibilities’ [A/FN1-0335]. 
6. Values are likely to be a chronologically late mental acquisition 
As this is a hypothesis about something which is potentially measurable, and is properly the 
brief of a field like developmental psychology, the sort of data provided by the research 
methods employed here are likely to be, at best, circumstantial. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate 
projection from the theory, by way of hypotheses 1 and 4, and could be a decisive, make or 
break prediction. The reasoning is straightforward. If value acquisition is dependent upon a 
level of cognitive development sufficient to entertain abstract thinking and a life in which 
sufficient experience has been amassed, then it is likely to emerge in late childhood or early 
adolescence. In this respect the comment of the Assistant Head at St Augustine is telling: ‘It’s 
interesting as you see them develop; I’ve seen many come through the school from year 7 to 
6
th
 form and they grow up and then they get to 6
th
 form and they’re adults, they’re mini-adults 
and you can see that they’re starting to take on the values that we’ve tried to instil in them’ 
[A/FN2-3428]. Looking at the results from the surveys it is clear that given the right prompt 
pupils grasped the contextual nature of values, though limiting their choice of personal values 
to those used in the questionnaire suggests that conceptualisation is limited, which inhibits 
exploration of wider examples [A/QQ-3/RAN-6]. The median age of the surveyed groups 
was 15, range 1 (15-16) [A/QQ-1] but could occasionally exhibit sophistication in their 
perceptions, indicative of a high level of cognitive development, e.g.: ‘I think that being 
famous and being successful is totally different because you could be famous because you 
killed someone or you could be famous because you saved someone’ [A/QQ-1/FG-10]. 
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7. Values education in its most general sense is only the application of the standards of 
good teaching across the curriculum, and does not entail a specific requirement that 
knowledge of values be taught 
Some years ago there was a spate of interest in an approach to teaching values known as 
‘values clarification’, the assumption being that all children were bearers of their own values 
in potential and it was the teachers job merely to assist them in realising them in actuality; 
moreover, it was not the job, and wrong in principle, for the teacher to impose their own 
values or to inculcate the values of the society or institution. This approach has largely fallen 
into disfavour, at least in the UK, since the 1990s and the common assumption now is that 
there are common values shared across a wide swath of the population (DfES/QCA, 1999, 
2004) the teaching of which should form part of the curriculum, although there is no statutory 
requirement as long as there is provision for the ‘spiritual and moral’ education of pupils. The 
hypothesis as it stands needs some clarification and perhaps amendment. Where it states that 
there is no requirement that knowledge of values be taught, it had in mind the type of 
approach typified by values clarification or that of advocates of values education as a 
timetabled subject; it did not mean that there should be no discourse of values, but assumed 
that this discourse is naturally a part of good teaching in every subject. As the Head of 
Chelmswood says, in explaining that there is no specific general approach, ‘[values 
education] is more intrinsic in what we do anyway’ [C/INT-0829] 
Since these views were stated, I have changed my position on this slightly, partly as a result 
of the data coming from the schools, but partly because I believe that the hypothesis as stated 
does not follow from the theory of values discussed previously in hypotheses 1-5. The theory 
of the invocation of values within the closed community clearly implies a discourse of values, 
through which the experience of the members of the community is conceptually shaped. 
Ideally, that discourse should be a part of what good teaching is, but that is not necessarily 
what is understood to be good teaching in even the best schools. A comparison of the culture 
at the three schools investigated in this research reveals some interesting differences. 
Superficially all three schools claim to pursue good academic standards and a focus on 
individual students. However, the detail shows that these are understood and prioritised 
differently. At St Augustine the focus is on ‘educating the whole child and assisting them 
with skills and values that will help them with life, just outside the world of work and 
academic achievement’ [A/FN2-1553], in other words the priority is on a broad-based 
education in which (specifically, but not exclusively, Christian) values are central, even to the 
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detriment, to some extent, of academic performance [A/INT-3015]. At Broughampton, 
although there is a similar commitment to a broad-based education, creating the ‘all-rounder’ 
[B/INT-0315] is more a case of nurturing individual talents within a fairly pressurised and 
competitive environment. At Chelmswood High the focus is on ‘academic excellence and the 
response to individual needs’ [C/INT-0317], yet behavioural expectations are not seen so 
much as an end in themselves but as a prerequisite for creating a good learning environment 
[C/INT-5434] 
8. With regard to values education in the more specific sense of moral education, what is 
needed above all is the assertion of standards of behaviour to which students should be 
required to conform; the function of standards is always socialisation leading to the 
acquisition of values; the normative content of moral education must be to lead the 
individual away from a preoccupation with the self to others and the wider community. 
If we examine the function of values, particularly moral values, by which I mean specifically 
those values the acquisition of which generally requires a code of conduct or a set of rules 
(although this is a definition that I have adopted to distinguish the moral realm from say the 
spiritual that may not be agreeable to everyone), we see that their role in social groupings is 
to direct the individual to greater participation in the community and away from self-centred 
concerns and activities. This arises from values being generated or acquired in a communal 
setting. This principal can be taken to the next level in which individual groups can be 
viewed as isolated self-interested entities and underlies the search for common values in 
society, without which societies become enclaves of misunderstanding and potential conflict. 
A core of common values allows groups to compete in the shared social space productively. 
Recognising that we are caught in the dilemma of being – in Kant’s phrase – in a state of 
‘asocial sociality’ (Kant, 1784), moving from a self-centred to a community-centred 
perspective is about both ‘pull’ and ‘push’. According to the principal contact at St 
Augustine, ‘Catholic Schools are about community, they’re about people helping each other, 
working together; it’s not just about being narrow-minded and individualistic, look after 
number one, that philosophy. Looking after number one is not a particularly healthy 
philosophy really’ [A/FN2-1553]. Different things bring a sense of community. For the Head 
of Chelmswood High it is ‘pride that they do go to this school... that helps to bind people 
together’ [C/INT-1912], while at Broughampton ‘The Chapel is regularly used to focus the 
thoughts of the community at times of crisis, collective grief or rejoicing’ [WRE-2.5] 
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However, the sense of belonging, does not always come naturally or easily initially; much of 
community-building has to do with enforcing rules that benefit the community while 
challenging individuals to confront their selfish tendencies. As one teacher observes, values 
education is ‘the expectations, the high expectations, we try to get the children to follow’ 
[A/FN1-0335]; it is about things like ‘getting a class ready to come into a classroom, meeting 
and greeting them, ensuring that their uniform is correct – because there’s a big thing about 
uniform; we say you need to be smart, it’s a sort of precondition that you’re organised and 
you’re ready to work – and then inviting them into the classroom’ [A/FN1-1010]. It can also 
be about things like learning how to think about the needs of others [C/INT-0700] or ‘how to 
get along with people you don’t like’ [C/SUR-8] that make it possible to exist as a 
community.  
9. For values to be transmitted they must permeate the institution at all levels 
This is, as should be apparent from the previous chapter, one of the main theoretical ideas 
that has emerged during the course of the research. At one level this can be considered a 
tautology, for in some sense we cannot speak of transmission without permeation. It would be 
possible to acquire values without permeation, but they would not, therefore, be transmitted 
values. The point is that in order to be transmitted a value must suffuse the ethos of a school 
to an extent that it becomes infectious (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). Evidence has 
been presented through the case studies that in each school there were values that had 
permeated the entire institutional structure, represented by the three levels of official, 
classroom and pupil perspectives, and that, moreover, through the cross-case analysis, some 
of these values were common and likely to be universal across at least educational 
establishments and probably beyond. 
Direct evidence from the raw data is circumstantial. At St Augustine the school makes 
considerable effort to create an ambience in which the spiritual forms an integral part of the 
pupils’ experience of life at the school, on both a daily basis, but also cycling through the 
religious year, with prayer, Masses, RE and religious retreats and other activities [A/FN1-
1410]. While the evidence points to some indifference towards the outward manifestation of 
this religiosity, there seems no doubt that the values of Catholicism are recognised and 
accepted by and large. At Chelmswood there was a commitment to diversity and inclusion, 
and a non-tolerance of stereotyping, which was manifest at the official level, within the 
classroom environment and in the responses of children themselves, which gave a strong 
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indication that these values had been successfully transmitted through institutional 
permeation. 
10. For values to be acquired they must be exemplified by those in authority 
This can be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition for value acquisition to 
occur in an institutional setting. To demonstrate this, the counterfactual need only be 
considered. We often admire those who manifest certain virtues without necessarily feeling 
the need to acquire them personally. Nonetheless, in the absence of good examples of 
behaviour, the practice of values, it is very difficult for young people in particular to acquire 
them. From the data from the schools it is apparent that this principle is held to by those 
setting out the policies [A/BM-P; B/BM-1.2] as well as all teachers. Teachers see their 
responsibilities as including being a role model [A/FN2-3032], of setting an example in 
attitudes towards pupils but expecting reciprocation [A/FN2-3428] and by setting an example 
preparing the young for adulthood [A/H]. But the responsibility to be a role model extends 
upwards, to the senior management of schools, who see their role as not just setting an 
example to pupils but also to the staff under them [C/INT-1516, 3730; A/INT-1939]. 
The data from the pupils’ perspective was not so forthcoming on this issue until I asked the 
question directly to the focus group at Chelmswood: ‘Do you look at your teacher as a role 
model?’ [YES][Yeah] [C/FG-1413]; [the teacher is] ‘like an adult role model’ [C/FG-1530]. 
The things pupils seem to admire in their teachers is friendliness and approachability, and 
they also appreciate senior staff who are a visible presence around the school, someone ‘you 
can go to if you’re in trouble’ [C/FG-2530]. There was no evidence of value acquisition by 
this route, but as Schönpflug (2001a, p.176) indicated in his theory of transmission belts, 
transmission is more likely to occur where there is a ‘a harmonious and constructive 
relationship’ and according to Euler et al. (2001, p.147) where a close bond between the 
generations exists, which though predicated of the parent child relationship are no less likely 
to be true of any inter-generational relationship in which authority plays a part. 
7.1.3   Assessment 
The plausibility of this theory of institutional values transmission has been tested at each 
stage, through philosophical argument, through the development of an appropriate 
methodology and course of field research, through the development of methods for the 
analysis and synthesis of data, and through attempting to anchor conclusions firmly in the 
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data. Furthermore, within the limits of the research and methodology, a claim for both 
forensic and predictive capacities of the theory can be made; the strengthening of this claim 
could be accomplished only through the use of more quantitative methods and longitudinal 
studies. Clearly, plausibility, not proof, is being claimed here. The snapshot view of the 
schools in the study meant that connections had to be inferred on the basis of the available 
data and institutional causality could not always be established.  
After reviewing the hypotheses individually, discussing their implications in light of the 
research that has been carried out since they were first formulated and considering the 
evidence for and against each one, the overwhelming sense is that they have been tested and 
have proved to be robust. Hypothesis 3, which asserts that there is no a priori hierarchy of 
values, was the most exposed and the objections to it were stated in their strongest form, but 
found to be inconclusive. Hypothesis 6 which claims that value acquisition is likely to occur 
late chronologically in individual development, has strayed from pure theory into empirical 
territory and could only be backed up anecdotally and observationally, but remains plausible 
considering the alternatives. Most found ready confirmation in the data coming from the 
schools. There was very little in the way of counter-evidence and that was mostly ambiguous. 
7.2   The location of the research within the academic tradition 
This research was carried out broadly within the fields of the philosophy and sociology of 
education, but skirts the borders of philosophy, evolutionary psychology and sociology. But 
if its exact location is hard to define, its subject was very clearly focused: that was to 
understand how values are transmitted in the context of formal education through developing 
a model of institutional value transmission. Values education is a relatively new field, though 
it has precursors that stretch back decades and even hundreds of years if religious instruction 
is included; and ultimately the education of values is something that happens and has 
happened in all cultures at all times. But the twin characteristics of the ubiquity and 
invisibility of the process mean that its study has been sporadic, frequently arcane and usually 
characterised by vagueness. The model proposed here clarifies the understanding of what 
values are. It accepts the functional objectivity, and even relativity, of values at one level, but 
has demonstrated that the interiority of values functions precisely in binding social groups 
through their linguistic and symbolic functions of conceptualising shared experience as a 
localised absolute. Through the idea of permeation, the model of institutional value 
transmission has essentially taken a model of cultural transmission, such as Cavalli-Sforza 
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and Feldman’s analogy of viral diffusion and applied it to a broader, institutional context, 
particularly their category of ‘oblique’ transmission, that is, non-genetic intergenerational 
transmission. Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission was influential in 
conceptualising the relationship of power and control to the educative context, although 
ultimately the understanding of power and control developed was significantly different. 
Again Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction was initially helpful in navigating the relationship 
between power and institutional structure, though ultimately I would repudiate his underlying 
determinism. Findings in transmission studies repeatedly emphasise the importance of moral 
autonomy in the acquisition of values. The other finding, which again reinforces those of 
studies in intergenerational transmission and in the psychology and phenomenology of value, 
is of the importance of an intimate and warm human bond. The data strongly suggested that 
leavening (but not replacing) the authoritative role with openness, friendliness and care was a 
key to removing resistance and drawing pupils into the moral community of the school. I 
have a keen sympathy for the Parsonian model of socialisation through inculcation. I think 
society and schools have a duty to teach those values which are understood to correlate with 
better social and personal outcomes and are broadly shared but which are frequently 
neglected in the upbringing of the young. Yet, the route of inculcation is specifically 
associated with increased alienation (something also recognised in Bernstein’s view of 
‘collective codes’, i.e. closed ‘esoteric’ bodies of knowledge); indeed for Bourdieu and Apple 
the social and educational systems are ‘locked into’ class modalities of inculcation and 
resistance. The model emerging through this research, however, suggests that this is one 
possible outcome, but certainly not the only one possible. Values, in a sense, can only be 
acquired, but they cannot be acquired in the absence of a determination to transmit them. 
Nevertheless, the interiority of values as shared experience means that values cannot actually 
be acquired outside a collective context, and that entails forging collective bonds of personal 
closeness and warmth. To educate values thus requires pedagogical authority, personal 
integrity, a degree of innate or acquired charisma and an ability to be at least strategically 
open and friendly.  
7.3   Generalisability of the Theory 
Within the determination of the integrated model in the final part of the Findings chapter, the 
scalability of the model was alluded to, in that what occurred at the classroom level was also 
applicable at the whole school level, the aspect of the ‘value cycle’ essentially being a 
hierarchically reproducible mechanism. This strongly suggests that the model as a whole can 
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be applied more widely outside the context of formal education. Potentially, it could be 
applied to a wide range of institutional settings. The caveat would be that schools are social 
institutions that are specifically set up for the purpose of educational transmission, including 
the transmission of values. Other organisations, such as businesses, policy units and local 
governments are not. Even universities, which clearly have an educative function, do not 
normally consider themselves responsible to engage in the education of values. Perhaps, 
though, this is too narrow a view of the matter. Values are at the heart of every social 
grouping; they are determinative of the purpose for which the group exists in the first place. 
Therefore, the transmission of values must be part of what happens in order to induct new 
members and to reinforce continuing allegiance among the existing membership. In all 
organisations issues of resistance to authority arise, which if not managed can be destructive, 
firstly of the harmony and morale of the group, and then progressively of the cohesion, 
efficiency and functionality of the group. The analysis of the dilemma of resistance, as a trade 
off of moral autonomy for collective belonging on one side, and of the responsibility of those 
with authority for generating the desire for belonging on the other, would seem to be 
universally applicable. I am quite happy for others to read into this a system for good 
management. My purpose here is rather to establish the point that values are constitutive of 
all social organisations, and partly determinative of institutional structure. Values are also 
inherently strategic and transmissive, but their acquisition within a social context can only be 
assured by the cultivation of greater reflectivity. 
7.4   Original contributions to knowledge 
There are four areas in which this research has made original contributions: in axiology or the 
philosophy of value, educational and social theory, methodology and pedagogy. 
7.4.1   Contribution to axiology 
The theory chapter propounds a view of value based on the unification of a 
phenomenological view of the interiority of the value experience with a semiotic view of the 
exteriority of value, and identifies this exteriority with its linguistic marker. This linguistic 
aspect endows values with two features that work symbiotically: conceptual flow through 
normal communication routes and symbolic profundity. It argues that while values are 
individually held, they are communally generated and sustained and that the essence of any 
value is a shared experience.  Within the closed confines of the lived-world of a particular 
value the value has a binding effect and a regulating effect on action. This defines the 
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interiority of value. On the other hand, through its exteriority a value becomes a part of 
normal discourse within open social structures. This duality allows the individual to inhabit a 
plurality of value-worlds with overlapping and differing degrees of commitment. Values then 
can be spoken of as participatory, transmissive and strategic. 
Since the birth of modern philosophy with Descartes’ epistemological turn, a dilemma of 
subjectivity and its relation to the phenomenal world has only become more acute. Debates 
within value theory have also been conducted within this Cartesian framework of subjectivity 
and objectivity. A view of value which is communicative but also communal, which is 
implicit in social structures, and in which ‘experience’ rather than ‘subjectivity’ is 
constitutive, essentially sidesteps this whole issue.  
7.4.2   Contribution to educational and social theory 
The theory of institutional value transmission put forward makes a number of contributions to 
social and educational theory. It provides a clear mechanism for the transmission of values 
within institutional settings, which, though it may be intuitively grasped by those who work 
in the field of values education, is never made explicit. It also builds theoretically on the work 
of evolutionary psychologists, such as Cavalli-Sforza, who offered a theoretical framework 
for inter-generational transmission, by generalising the problem to the level of transmission 
within formal education (schooling) between teacher and pupils. Moreover, building on the 
foundations of Bernstein’s theory of educational transmission, particularly the relationship of 
open and bounded forms of knowledge to power and authority, the model took the issue of 
values transmission to the level of the whole school perspective, implicitly even 
incorporating those forces external to the school with power over the curriculum, such as 
local and national government. 
Through the development of this theory of institutional value transmission a number of 
subsidiary points were illuminated. The first was the importance of values to institutional 
structure or, more properly, the coexistent interrelationship between values and institutional 
structure, to the extent that they can be considered partly inter-definable.  Secondly, through 
the model terms such as ‘ethos’ and ‘community’ were reinterpreted and conceptualised and 
their educational significance within schools given a clearer theoretical foundation. These 
points open up the possibility that the model can be applied more widely to a range of 
institutions and organisations beyond schools. 
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7.4.3   Contribution to research methodology  
Though I would not claim to have any significant contribution in this area, the nature of the 
research itself has raised questions about the appropriate methodology and forced me to make 
certain adaptations. Hopefully, future researchers in this field will work to develop and 
improve on these methodological procedures. 
Based on the philosophical approaches to understanding the nature of values that was utilised 
in chapter 2, that of phenomenology and semiotics, a joint phenomenological-semiotic 
approach to the field and the analysis of data was developed. In order to build up a picture of 
each school, from both the aspect of the interior states of a sample of representative 
participants, as well as the institutional structures and pedagogy and the messages conveyed 
through them, I chose a suite of six data capture methods, and applied several analytical and 
synthetic methods to each data source to allow the fundamental categories to emerge that 
would go into making up the final theoretical model of values transmission. 
Working from a philosophical theory to the field and a methodology based on the structure of 
the philosophical theory, then the development of theory combining the deductive 
philosophical approach and the empirical data of the field, I was concerned that the final 
model, despite the triangulation built into the methodological mix, might be no more than an 
artefact of the research process. Therefore, a second route to check the outcomes of the 
analytic process was incorporated into the research process. This involved the development 
of ten hypotheses directly from the philosophical theory, which in the final stages of the 
analytical part of the research were subject to an evaluation process drawing on evidence 
from the raw data from the field. I believe this dual route method has strengthened the 
plausibility of the final model. 
7.4.4   Contribution to pedagogy  
The model of values transmission should prove useful for teachers, managers and 
administrators within schools concerned with the pedagogy of values. Derived independently 
from purely theoretical concerns with a more or less theoretical purpose, its conclusions 
converge significantly with the empirically-based views and conclusions of educators who 
take a more proactive approach to values education and add a theoretical underpinning to 
their programmes and curricula. As detailed in 6.2 it remains, though, a highly conceptual 
and abstract model, so I will attempt to draw out its relevance to pedagogical practice. 
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The model of institutional values transmission addresses a number of issues that have been 
discussed in the academic literature on values education and also issues that are recognised 
by teachers generally, such as the role of ethos and school culture, implicit and explicit forms 
of values education, pupil resistance to authority, issues of student empowerment, the school 
as a community  as well as part of the community, school discipline, rules and regulations, 
friendship groups, gangs and bullying, ethnic or class tensions, and the risk of increasing 
alienation through raised standards, although its primary contribution is in promoting values 
as fundamental to all educational development and a balanced view of values education as 
being a process of both inculcation and acquisition. 
The diagram on page 220 shows a pupil ‘journey’ through the institute towards the 
acquisition of its values. According to this model, simply stated, the necessary stages on this 
journey are the transition from self-empowerment (i.e. self-directed freedom and desire) to 
disempowerment under the authority of the institution, where they are inducted in the values, 
culture and structures of the institute, to empowerment (or re-empowerment) under the 
authority of the institution, where they have the opportunity to rationalise the choice of these 
values as their own. The necessary steps in this process are indicated in the diagram by solid 
arrows, but it should be noted that these are additional steps and not transformations; the 
acceptance of institutional values does not negate moral autonomy (or responsibility) or the 
capacity for self-empowerment, but rather fashions them in the particular institutional 
context. 
One conclusion of this research, based on an understanding of the nature of values, is that 
values can only be acquired, and only acquired in any meaningful sense by an experience of 
the moral demand that they place upon us (‘moral’ being understood in a broad sense of 
‘requiring commitment to a set of behaviours’), but that they are rarely, if ever, acquired in 
the absence of an intention to teach them.  
None of the schools I studied had a specific values education policy or programme, although 
all of them considered values to be an important concern of the school and the education of 
values in general to be a part of what they did. The schools were different in the degree to 
which they were able to identify specific values which they considered important, though my 
research indicated that all of them had policy statements in which values were prominent, 
though perhaps subsidiary to the overall purpose of the texts. Again, I observed examples of 
PSHE classes in all the schools, and of good practice in each, but, except in one case, the
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education of values was not an explicit aim of the class. The implicit education of values has 
an important function, in reinforcing a particular message or desired behaviour, but evidence 
from the research on values education indicates that an institutional discourse of values in 
which specific and explicit values are a pedagogical focus is more effective in terms of 
behavioural outcomes – and academic performance as a result. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
as conceptual clarity with effective practice is invariably a potent combination. 
Another conclusion of this research, based on an understanding of the nature of values, is that 
the acquisition of a value is never merely a private experience, but through acquiescence to a 
shared meaning and a shared commitment to its moral demand, is bound up with belonging in 
a moral community (one that shares that commitment) and a shared experience. This means 
that schools in order to transmit values not only have to acquaint students with the meaning 
of value terms, make clear the expectations in terms of attitudes and behaviours, and ensure 
that their staff are setting an appropriate example, but also create the communal structures 
that both reflect and elicit that sense of belonging. 
Schools face two challenges to accomplishing this. The first of these is what I have come to 
call ‘spontaneous sociality’. By that I mean simply the natural tendency of humans to form 
social groupings, not necessarily those deemed by authority to be in the interests of the 
common good. My research indicated that where the student body is highly heterogeneous in 
terms of cultural background student perception of the school as a ‘community’ is lower than 
where it is more homogeneous, despite this being an important focus of the official policy, 
and that the primary commitment of pupils is to the community of their cultural background, 
class, ethnicity or friendship group. While all pupils enjoy the opportunity to socialise that 
schools provide, they do so largely with people of the same background. This is not 
necessarily a problem as such – although it can lead to factionalism and be the precursor of 
bullying – but it tends to weaken that sense of belonging to the school community that 
schools clearly wish to foster, and hence commitment to its institutional values, and replace it 
with a sort of co-presence. This may have implications for the definition of what we mean by 
‘inclusion’. 
The second challenge is resistance to institutional authority. ‘Resistance’ is a broad category 
that ranges from boredom and disengagement, though criticism and disobedience to outright 
rebellion and non-attendance, including truanting. Although resistance creates problems for 
teachers and schools, it should not, except in its most extreme forms, be taken to be 
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something essentially negative, but as an expression of moral autonomy and, as such, a 
precondition for the acquisition of values. Also, resistance is by no means limited to pupils. 
In my research I came across instances of resistance to institutional authority from Heads, 
teachers and pupils, though the targets were variable and appropriate to their standing. 
Resistance is in some sense always legitimate, as it is a testing of the moral integrity of the 
institutional authority to which the individual is subject. Institutional values can only be 
acquired, though, when resistance is mitigated through a negotiated compromise and the 
surrender of a degree of moral autonomy in exchange for belonging, which in turn requires 
some form of personal ‘transformation’. As the diagram illustrates, this transformation is not 
solely something internal to the individual; the institutional culture and structure play a 
vitally important role in creating the context in which this can happen. 
7.5   Implications and recommendations 
7.5.1   Implications for values education 
Data from the literature (Hawkes, 2010) and from the field both indicate that expectations of 
appropriate and good behaviour, and the organisation of the structures within the school to 
promote that, and to minimise poor behaviour, while a worthy end in themselves in 
promoting young people who aspire to play a positive role in society, are also fundamental to 
creating the atmosphere, ethos and culture in which academic attainment can be optimised. A 
school culture in which there are strict boundaries and clear sanctions for transgression, but 
one in which the inward pull of community is strong, a strong institutional pride and identity 
is fostered, but also one in which a balance between authority and humanity is maintained, is 
clearly fundamental to this effort. At the same time, the concept of invocation, which has 
largely been vindicated through this research, implies that the explicit voicing, explication 
and modelling of values is more important than is generally practiced within schools, and this 
view is strongly backed by evidence from programmes of explicit values education (Lovat, 
2010). Evidence from the field in all the schools studied shows, though, that even implicit or 
‘intrinsic’ approaches bear fruit in the permeation of fundamental and strongly-held values, 
whether those are moral, individual attainment or socio-political, into the student body.  
The model of institutional values transmission described in 7.4.4 has a number of 
implications for pedagogical practice and organisation in schools. 
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1. Schools should develop an integrated and specific set of values which reflect the character 
of the school, reinforce the community of the school, further their commitment to creating 
educated persons in the broadest possible sense, and develop their place in and service of the 
local and wider communities of which they are a part. 
2. These values should be taught explicitly and integrated into all aspects of the school 
culture, particularly attitudinal and behavioural expectations. They should also be taught 
implicitly, by the example set by the management and staff of the school. The model does not 
specify that these values should be integrated into the curriculum as such, but that 
knowledge/skills and values should be ‘twin pillars’ of the institution, though some subjects 
may be naturally appropriate vehicles for the broader educational contextualisation and 
discussion of values. 
3. The specific values, or their origin, are less important than that these are assented to by the 
entire staff and reinforced on a continual basis. The expectation is that there would be a 
convergence on a core of common and widely shared values, though variation at the 
institutional level is probably socially beneficial.  
4. Although the excesses of resistance to authority, as described above, should be controlled, 
critical evaluation of authority and institutional values should be accepted as a natural 
phenomenon of cognitive development and the assertion of moral autonomy, and pupils 
should be encouraged to exercise their moral imagination in different scenarios, at an age-
appropriate level. The inner nature of values as shared experience entails that any form of 
coercion is counter-productive; explanation and dialogue are the required methods to achieve 
acquiescence to the institutional values and their behavioural requirements. 
5. Schools should be structured in such a way as to maximise opportunities for belonging 
under the auspices of the school that ‘cut across’ and thus mitigate spontaneous sociality 
based on class, ethnicity or friendship group and primary commitments to those values 
(which weaken the communal integrity of the school). Evidence seems to suggest that a 
culture of belonging to such sub- and micro- school communities (diffused belonging) 
actually reinforces a sense of belonging within the greater school community. Two of the 
schools I studied employed a house system to good effect, but there are numerous ways to 
achieve this diffusion: clubs, boards, groups, teams, and projects, both internal and external. 
225 
 
6. The acquisition of institutional values requires some element of personal transformation 
that occurs within the specific institutional context. Although in the research the 
manifestation of that transformation was found to be different, such as a growing academic 
interest, a spiritual crisis and its resolution or the assumption of greater communal 
responsibility, the institutional trigger was invariably the relationship between a member of 
staff and a pupil. Pupils look to their teachers and senior staff as role models and appreciate 
those who are open, friendly and helpful and who make themselves present and available, 
while maintaining their authority and setting clear boundaries, and clearly these are qualities 
that need to be sought, emphasised, nurtured and developed. Indeed, a striking finding was 
that it is the dissonance between the ‘mask of authority’ and the underlying humanity that 
plays a key role in triggering transformation. 
7.5.2   Implications for schooling in general 
Schools already provide, and are required to provide, a measure of education in values for 
their pupils, whether it is explicit or, more usually, implicit. As discussed above, I believe, 
and the evidence tends to support this viewpoint, that the more explicit the education the 
more pronounced are the outcomes. There is one thing to add: fundamental to values and to 
values education is the development of reflectivity, a higher-order and late-developmental 
cognitive skill, which as a technology-driven and highly pressurised culture we do not 
provide sufficient context for young people to develop. While I make no specific 
recommendations in this regard, I believe that we do our young people a disservice if we 
model our schools on too narrow a view of success as the success of the marketplace, and 
bias learning and means of knowledge acquisition too strongly towards the technocratic at the 
expense of the traditional, creative and reflective. 
7.5.3   Recommendations for educational policy 
1. There should be national standards for developing and overseeing values education 
programmes. At the moment Ofsted oversee the provision of moral and spiritual education in 
English and Welsh schools, but there is no requirement for schools specifically to have a 
values education policy.  
2. While national oversight is important, an approach that allows schools freedom in 
determining their own policies of values education would be preferable, following the 
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example of Australia, which has a nationally determined policy, but allows schools to 
determine their own values strategy (Lovat, 2010). 
3. The pedagogy of values should be integral to all teacher-training programmes, and an 
element of school and teacher evaluation. 
7.5.4   Recommendations for social policy 
Social cohesion should be seen as being as important as economic development, and the more 
deliberate promotion of a range of national values, especially in schools, is a viable route to 
achieve that end, as has been done in Australia for example. While it is questionable whether 
social cohesion is the basis of economic wealth, as in one strand of social capital theory, the 
two should be seen as equally important in terms of social policy and that the common good 
is being served by the invigoration of civil society and the amelioration of the most egregious 
inequalities as well as the development of a highly-educated workforce and promoting 
entrepreneurship. 
7.6   Limitations of research 
One challenge for researching this topic has been to decide and define the appropriate 
literature. There is no body of literature dealing with the institutional transmission of values.  
Instead this had to be assembled from many disparate sources, which required having to read 
the literature of many fields with only the most tenuous connection to educational concerns in 
the hope of drawing out the vital threads to construct a theoretical justification for the 
research question. Moreover, the subject of values seems to come in and out of fashion in 
different disciplines, meaning that chronological searches in a discipline are not necessarily 
fruitful. While this wide dispersal of relevant literature has increased the possibility of 
making an original contribution in a poorly defined field, it has increased the chance of 
missing some perhaps important research of relevance.  
There were also some limitations to the sample for the research. Although I was very 
fortunate in being able to secure the participation of schools that fell within the parameters I 
had set, i.e. mixed secondary schools of different types – a faith school, an independent and a 
local community school – there was less choice with the sampling within the schools. I had to 
take more or less what I was given. In each case the survey was carried by the teacher, in one 
school on a voluntary basis, which meant that there was a high incidence of incomplete 
questionnaires; fortunately, the omissions tended to be in one part of the questionnaire, so it 
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only marginally reduced the usefulness of the data. Inevitably, there were cases of people 
answering a different question to the one I had asked or responses that were not as 
enlightening as I had hoped for. Yet, in the analyses some very interesting things generally 
emerged, even from such unpromising material. 
Inevitably there were limitations of time, opportunity and resources. Being neither in a 
position to conduct longitudinal research nor able to carry out extensive research within the 
schools, the impression of the schools has only been a fleeting one and therefore inferences 
about values education and the transmission of values has had to be made on the basis of 
limited information. This is where triangulation proved a particularly useful corrective. Not 
only was there the chance to cross reference respondent views and observations from other 
perspectives, but there were opportunities to fill in gaps in knowledge or to take up and 
explore some issue more deeply. Inevitably, though, it has not been as possible to develop as 
intimate a feel for the cases ‘from the inside’ as I think would be desirable. 
One area that I am acutely aware that this research did not address, nor the theory model, is 
the dimension of inter-institutional relations. It focused on the vertical dimension of 
transmission through the hierarchy of authority, but had virtually nothing to say about the 
often very fruitful relations and cooperation between other agencies and the schools. Future 
theoretical development needs to take into account that in successful values education 
programmes, such as those implemented in Australia, participation in local service projects is 
an integral part of the programme (Toomey, 2010). 
7.7   Suggestions for further research 
Some of these suggestions come out of what I perceive to have been the limitations of this 
research. I think more work should be done on the relevant literature: philosophical, 
sociological, educational, psychological, and anthropological. There is also important work 
being done on the neural basis of social values (Zahn et al., 2009). Allied to this, the concept 
of values as tangible and transmissible developed here needs to be developed further, through 
psychological and scientific research.  
I do not think that any real gains could be made by working with a larger sample of schools. 
However, a legitimate avenue for research would be to pursue a single case in greater depth, 
expanding the number of participants, having larger samples and a more intimate knowledge 
and feel for the institution. As mentioned earlier, the theory set out in this research could be 
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made more empirical through longitudinal research, perhaps tracking a single cohort as they 
progressed through the school. The extension of the theory to cover inter-institutional 
cooperation, as discussed in 7.6, is a particular area of theoretical development, as is a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between values, transmission and institutional structure 
pointed out in 7.3. The primary focus in this research was on the teacher-pupil relationship; 
this could also be broadened to investigate the larger institutional picture. 
There are more specifically educational areas where this theory suggests that research might 
be productive. One is the area of underachievement in schools and its relationship to values, 
specifically on how the values promoted in schools may impact on alienation of some 
individuals and some groups from the school ethos and the school community, with particular 
reference to ethnic minorities and those from the lower socio-economic groups. Much work 
has already been done on the value curriculum and a growing amount on value pedagogy. 
Despite resistance to the idea, it is inevitable that the assessment of pupils’ values will sooner 
or later be mooted. The theory proposed here may go some way towards mitigating the 
instrumentality in any such proposals, particularly through consideration of the aspects of 
resistance and transformation developed in the model. 
7.8   Last Thoughts 
Education has always been as much about conveying the desired values of the school, 
community or society as it has been about the teaching and learning of facts and skills. 
Perhaps the pluralism of our modern societies and the increasing fragmentation of unitary 
worldviews, both religious and secular, has made us as a society embarrassed by that to some 
degree, but it has certainly brought the issue of values more to the fore, from a sense of a 
‘crisis of values’ to the call for ‘British values’ to be entrenched in education. This research 
demonstrated that the link between the imparting of specifically moral values and good 
educational outcomes - both conceptually and in reality - remains unbroken in educational 
good practice; however, this seems to be largely implicit and intuitive. The challenge is to 
place this link on more secure theoretical foundations so that it gains greater currency in 
education policy and education practice. The implications, though, are wider than improved 
learning outcomes. The mechanism for institutional values transmission postulated as a result 
of this research demonstrates the ontological grounding of values in communal structure and 
the dependence of transmission on a sense of belonging, acceptance and the humanisation of 
authority structures. The teaching and acquisition of values is not simply another type of 
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knowledge; it is a fundamental generator of society itself.  There exists a strong convergence 
on the values which are fundamental to a good society, even allowing for a measure of 
disagreement and dissent. Explicit values education should, therefore, be central to all forms 
of institutional schooling and a required part of teacher training. Perhaps then, rather than 
being the ‘forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity’ (MacIntyre, 1987, p.16), 
teachers would come to play a key role in something we could agree was real social progress.  
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Information Sheet and Consent Form: 
Interviews and Observations 
(For teachers) 
 
My name is Don Trubshaw and I’m an educational research student at Derby University, 
studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is values education, in particular how 
schools function as institutions in which the transmission of values takes place.  
This interview/observation is being carried as part of data collection within the school. The 
results will form part of my research into how schools teach values and will be used in a 
comparative assessment of government legislation, school policies and teaching methods. 
So the participation of the school is important and greatly appreciated. 
All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, drawn up by the 
British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules relevant to the research 
taking place here are: 
Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which 
the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You and the 
school also have the right to withdraw from this research up to the time the results of the 
research are published. 
Anonymity: The anonymity of all participants and all participant schools are guaranteed. 
Where necessary, appropriate pseudonyms will be used and identifying features of 
participants and institutions will be altered. 
Confidentiality: In the course of data collection, the researcher may be privy to information 
not in the public domain and personally held views. No use of this information will be made 
beyond that agreed for research purposes. All data will be securely kept until the research is 
finished and then destroyed. The consent slip (below) is stored separately from the data to 
preserve anonymity. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Consent Slip 
Please sign to say you have read the information and agree to take part in the interview / 
agree for the observation to take place 
 
Signed_________________________________________ 
Consent given for the interview/observation to be recorded:  Yes / No 
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Explanation about the Research Questionnaire 
(For pupils) 
Hello 
My name is Don Trubshaw and I’m an educational research student at Derby University, 
studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is what is called values education, which 
is about how we learn things like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and the contribution school makes to us 
learning those things.  
This survey is being carried with small groups in several schools to sample students’ views. 
The results will form part of my research into how schools teach values and will be used in a 
comparative assessment of government legislation, school policies and teaching methods. 
So your contribution is important and greatly appreciated. 
All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, which are drawn up 
by a body called the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules 
relevant to this survey are: 
Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which 
the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You also have the 
right to withdraw from this research up to the time the results of the survey are analysed. 
Anonymity: This means that no names will be used in the research, not yours, not your 
teachers’ and not your school’s, so no one outside this classroom will ever know who took 
part in the survey. 
Confidentiality: The questionnaire asks you about your views on certain things about school 
life that you might not want other people to know. I am the only person who will ever see 
the questionnaires, and I don’t know who you are; the school will only ever see some 
statistical information. The questionnaires will be securely kept until the research is finished 
and then destroyed. The consent slip (below) is stored separately from the questionnaire to 
preserve anonymity. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Consent Slip 
Please sign to say you have read the explanation and agree to take part in the survey 
 
Signed_________________________________________ 
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Explanation about the Focus Group 
(For pupils) 
Hello 
My name is Don Trubshaw and I’m an educational research student at Derby University, 
studying for a doctoral degree. My area of research is what is called values education, which 
is about how we learn things like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and the contribution school makes to us 
learning those things.  
The focus group you are participating in is to follow up on some of the results of the survey 
you may have taken part in recently, but also more generally to gain a deeper insight into 
students’ views about these matters. The results will form part of my research into how 
schools transmit values and will contribute to a comparative assessment of government 
legislation, school policies and teaching methods. So your participation is important and 
greatly appreciated. 
All researchers in education have rules that their research is guided by, which are drawn up 
by a body called the British Educational Research Association (BERA). Some of the rules 
relevant to this survey are: 
Informed Consent: This means you know enough about the research and the use to which 
the results are going to be put to say whether you agree to take part in it. You also have the 
right to withdraw from this research up to the time of completion. 
Anonymity: This means that no names will be used in the research: not yours, not your 
teachers’ and not your school’s. 
Confidentiality: The purpose of the focus group is to understand the student perspective, so 
you should feel free to express your views honestly and openly. Although the discussions 
will be recorded for research purposes, no one outside the participants will know what was 
said and nothing will be attributable in any feedback given to the school. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Consent Slip 
Please sign to say you have read the explanation and agree to take part in the focus group 
and that you agree for the proceedings to be recorded. 
 
Signed_________________________________________ 
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Letter of thanks accompanying report to schools: School A  
    
   Don Trubshaw, BSc, MRE, PGCE 
     xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
      Tel: xxxxxxxxxxxxx  Mob: xxxxxxxxxxxxx       
     E-mail: dontrubshaw@hotmail.com 
Xxxxxxxxxxx 
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxx 
 
Dear  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Between 2009 and 2011 I carried out interviews, observations and a small-scale survey at 
ZZZZZZZZZZ as part of my doctoral research into values education. That data has now been analysed, 
along with data from two other schools, and the findings submitted for examination. I now feel able 
to share some of the findings, particularly those parts which are likely to be of greater interest to the 
participating schools: the implications for pedagogical practice in relation to the core values of the 
school. 
I mention in the report, but just to clarify; it was neither the intention nor an outcome of the 
research to evaluate the effectiveness of values education in the participating schools. The 
implications – effectively suggestions – for pedagogical practice are the outcomes of a particular 
theoretical model of value transmission, developed as a result of the research. They are offered in 
the hope that they might be of interest and of potential use in reflecting upon existing practice. 
It remains for me to thank you for allowing your school to be used for the collection of data, despite 
the inconvenience which it inevitably entailed, and the valuable time of the staff members and 
pupils who participated, without whom, of course, no research would have been possible. I should 
mention, in particular AAAAAAAAAA, who provided valuable assistance and guidance during my 
times there. 
Since the research process has now effectively concluded, feel free to disseminate the report to the 
extent that you think appropriate. I would also be happy to give a presentation and answer 
questions on aspects of the research to interested members of staff/pupils at a mutually convenient 
date, if you feel that would be worthwhile. 
Again, many thanks and best wishes 
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Approach Letter: School C 
 
Don Trubshaw, BSc, MRE, PGCE 
                                                               XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX; dontrubshaw@hotmail.com  
 
 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXX 
XXXXXX 
 
10
th
 November 2010 
 
Dear XXXXXXXXXX 
 
I am a part-time doctoral research student based at Derby University, in the department of education doing research on 
values education in secondary schools. I am currently looking for a school that would be willing to help me with my 
research. 
The focus of my research is on the interaction between school policies on values education, the school ethos and 
communal aspect of school life, class interaction, and teacher and pupil perceptions of issues relating to values. My 
intention is to do a comparative study in three secondary schools, one faith school, one independent school and one 
mainstream state school.  
I have already undertaken research in a local faith school and an independent school and am now looking for a 
state/community school in order to make a comparative assessment and to make my findings more robust. There are, of 
course, many schools in this region that falls into this category. However, I am particularly interested in XXXXXXXXX School 
for a number of reasons: 
1)  The excellent reputation of the school, not only in terms of its academic results but also the behaviour of its 
pupils and their involvement in the local community, make it a significant and interesting subject for 
investigation, particularly with respect to its ethos, leadership, communal structure and behaviour management.  
2) It draws on the broad mix of the local community, regardless of socio-economic background or ethnicity, and has 
no specific religious affiliation, which is very useful in drawing comparisons with schools rooted in either a 
specific faith community or a broad geographical catchment based on ability to pay. 
3) Its full integration into the national curriculum and successive government policies and initiatives, and its 
successful attainment of beacon school status and science, maths and language school status facilitate a 
consideration of the successful implementation of national educational policy into local and school-based 
initiatives. 
4) There are practical considerations; for example, being nearby is an advantage. I work full time, so require 
permission to take half day ‘study leave’ and am therefore limited in the amount of travelling I can do. 
In regard to the nature of the research I would want to undertake at XXXXXXXXX, I can say that it is small-scale and 
designed to be minimally intrusive in the life of the school. It would involve an interview with you or, if not possible, 
another person well-versed in the educational outlook of the school, and an observation. But beyond that I am flexible and 
would like the opportunity to meet and discuss what you think would be possible and appropriate. 
I appreciate you are very busy; if you would like to suggest a member of staff with whom I could pursue this matter, I 
would be most happy to discuss this with them. 
Best wishes 
Yours sincerely 
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Request for Access to school documents 
 
As part of my research into values education I would like to requested access to the school 
records pertinent to this topic. These would include such things as  
The school rules  
Codes of conduct 
The school motto and mission statement 
 Documents relevant to the school ethos and the communal aspects of the school 
The school charter, in particular anything that specifically mandates values education or 
moral education 
The school’s own policy on faith education 
Guidance on pastoral care  
Guidance for the delivery of Religious Education, Sex Education, Citizenship and PHSE 
And they might also include 
An SMCS (Spiritual, Moral, Cultural and Social) policy document 
A ‘values across the curriculum’ statement 
Or anything else that might be considered relevant, such as certain school records.  
Information contained in the documents will only be used in accordance with the principle 
that guarantees the anonymity of institutions participating in research. I understand that 
any documents not in the public domain may be subject to agreements of confidentiality. 
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Interview Questionnaire Template 
1. Could you tell me a little about your professional and academic background? 
 
2. Could you give me a brief outline of the history of the school? 
 
3.  What is the basic philosophy of education here? 
 
4. Are you familiar with the term ‘values education’? 
 
5. What do you understand by the term? 
 
6. Do you see values education as being something similar to or distinct from moral education?  
 
7. Do you see any of what you do here as being to do with values education?  
 
8. Does the school have a policy on values education? Does it have a strategy? 
 
9. Are you aware of any policies in the area of values education that successive governments 
have brought in over the past 10-15 years?  
 
10. Do you think that the state has a role in legislating what schools should do in this area of 
values education?  
 
11. What do you consider the most important values promoted at this school? 
 
12. Are you aware of or do you experience in any sense a clash of values in the school? 
 
13. How do you view the end product of the education process, or in other words, what is an 
educated person? 
 
14. Do you see target culture, league tables and so on as antithetical to a good education or as a 
possible stimulus to schools?  
 
15. What do you think has been your main contribution to the school?  
 
16. Final question: what is your vision for the school? 
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OBSERVATION SHEET 
 
 
Day/Date/Time _______________________ 
Lesson ______________________________ 
Teacher _____________________________ 
Class/Group __________________________ 
Aims ________________________________ 
Style ________________________________ 
Resources ____________________________ 
Duration _____________________________ 
 
Time 
(min) 
Description Categories 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 Setting 
 
layout 
 
 
Furnishings______________(     ) 
____________________(      ) 
 
Equipment______________(      ) 
____________________(      ) 
 
People________________(      ) 
____________________(      ) 
 
Features__________________ 
_______________________ 
 
 
Organisation 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
 Routines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rituals/Invocations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communal Narratives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretations 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
 
 
 
Notes 
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Institutional Code_______ 
Research Questionnaire on Values Education 
Thank you for taking part in this research project. Your contribution is under conditions of 
anonymity, so do not write your name anywhere on this paper. The results are also subject to 
confidentiality, so no one but the researcher will see what is written here. The school will only see 
statistical averages in feedback from any report. Therefore do not hesitate to answer these 
questions as accurately and honestly as possible. Your response is most useful if you answer all the 
questions, including the open questions. 
Background information 
Sex [circle]     M          F                      Age ______ 
 
State your parents’ occupations (optional) 
              Father__________________           Mother_________________ 
 
 
The Questions 
1. Write down three values*, from the box below, which you think are important in 
 
a) Human relationships : _____________, _______________, ______________ 
 
b) Playing a sport: ______________, __________________, ________________ 
 
c) Professing a religious conviction: ____________, ______________, _____________ 
 
d) Keeping and ‘getting on’ in a job: ____________, _____________, ______________ 
 
e) Doing well at school: _______________, _________________, _____________ 
 
                                 *You can use a word more than once if you need to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Write down three values - from those mentioned above, or any others - which are 
important to you? 
 
 
_____________________, _____________________, ______________________ 
Compassion, intelligence, cooperation, sincerity, respect, curiosity, diligence, 
honesty, faith, loyalty, trust, patience, tolerance, humility, confidence, fairness, 
determination, ambition, fitness, discipline, generosity. 
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3. The following people may have an influence on your life. Number them from 1 to 10     
(1 = most important, 10 = least important) 
___Parent(s) 
___ Brother(s) or sister(s) 
___Friend(s) 
___Classmate(s) 
___Someone in your club, neighbourhood or community 
___Other relative(s) 
___Teacher(s) 
___Famous personality (author, musician, actor, athlete, artist) 
___Religious figure or deity 
___Someone you know through the internet 
 
 
4. Which of the following attitudes do you think are taught at your school? [Put Y (yes), N 
(no) or U (unsure) next to each statement. Then in each section put a tick next to the 
one which is given the most importance at your school] 
 
(Attitude to teacher) 
 To obey the teacher 
 To listen to the teacher 
 To respect the teacher 
 To question the teacher 
(Attitude to other students) 
 To care for younger pupils/those with special needs 
 To strive to be better than others 
 To respect older pupils 
 To help those who are struggling 
(Attitude to your own abilities) 
 To work hard 
 To learn from others 
 To be responsible and mature 
 To be decisive 
(Attitude to education) 
 To pay attention in class 
 To be inquisitive and ask questions 
 To concentrate on getting good grades 
 To be interested in what you study 
(Attitude to life) 
 To get along with people 
 To be independent 
 To be the best you can be 
 To be someone who can do things for others 
 
APPENDIX   2   DATA COLLECTION 
12 
 
5. Which statement best describes your attitude to the school rules? [circle one] 
 
a) You have a total disregard for all rules 
b) You keep the rules for fear of the consequences 
c) You disagree with rules, but think it’s not worth the effort to go against them 
d) You don’t think much about them and keep or break them as you feel like it 
e) You keep them because they seem commonsense and what you would do anyway 
f) You keep them because you think it is right to obey rules 
g) You keep the rules because you think they serve the interests of the whole school 
h) You follow or break rules depending on whether you feel they are fair 
 
6. Respond to the following situations. What would you do? 
 
Your friend has left his/her lunch/lunch money at home 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
You find a valuable item in the playground 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A member of your class rarely speaks and is always alone 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A fight breaks out between two younger pupils 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Someone swears at you for no particular reason 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A teacher sets some homework which you know isn’t going to be marked 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Choose and circle two things that make a particular positive impression on you at your 
school?  
a) A subject/subjects that you like 
b) Individual teachers 
c) The feeling of security the school provides 
d) The opportunity to socialise 
e) The school buildings and facilities 
f) The feeling of being part of a community 
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8. Apart from the subjects you study, what do you think you learn by being at school? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT MATRIX (A) AND INVERSION MATRIX (B); [FOR DIFFERENT SCHOOLS] 
A. Documentary sources for values and transmission strategies (Broughampton) 
DOCUMENT/CONSTITUENT 
(SOURCES/AUTHOR) 
STATED OR IMPLIED 
PURPOSE 
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES EMBEDDED VALUES 
Aims of the school 
(Head teacher) 
To set out the pedagogical 
aims of the school and its 
main priorities [red* book] 
Aim to realise the potential 
of each individual pupil 
The values that are 
emphasised by the school 
Displayed on first page of 
red book 
Fulfilment, responsibility, 
uniqueness, achievement, 
order, community, 
instruction, encouragement, 
inspiration, academic rigour, 
moral and spiritual 
awareness, high personal 
standards, good manners, 
self-esteem, confidence. 
 
B. Values and transmission strategies (Chelmswood High) 
VALUE REFERENCE TRANSMISSION STRATEGY 
ability EOP, SEN non-tolerance of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, correct 
English, Inclusion Policy, staff, differentiated curriculum 
acceptance BDP code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative 
systems 
accessibility BDP, EOP, Aims code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative 
systems, non-tolerance of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, 
correct English 
achievement BDP, Cit, EOP, 
SEN, SRE 
code of conduct, rewards and sanctions, home- school agreement, support/monitoring/investigative 
systems, curriculum, events & activities, booklets & videos, School Council, question box, non-tolerance 
of stereotyping, infrastructure, balanced groups, cross-cultural perspectives, correct English, Inclusion 
Policy, staff, differentiated curriculum, classes, leaflets and books, role play & video, nurse, ground rules 
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MATRIX: VALUES ACROSS THE INSTITUTION (BROUGHAMPTON) 
VALUE GROUP: Spirituality, Self-Understanding, Awareness 
 OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE CLASSROOM (TEACHER) 
PERSPECTIVE 
PUPIL PERSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
Se
m
io
ti
c 
St
ru
ct
u
re
s 
1.Aims-Red Book 
2.Ethos 
1. Chapel 
2. Personal circumstances 
1.Chapel 
2. traditions 
 
There is some correlation between 
the official stance on spirituality, 
the chaplain’s views and some 
comments of the students. What is 
not understood exactly is what the 
school means by ‘moral and 
spiritual awareness’ for it seems not 
to be identified by the majority of 
pupils as being religious or believing 
in a god. Terms like this are 
notoriously difficult to pin down 
and, as the chaplain states, are not 
targetable or subject to well 
understood criteria as other 
subjects are. That is not to say it is 
meaningless; it clearly reflects a 
deeply felt need for continuity, for 
something ‘core’ and something 
transcendent to our institutions and 
our lives.  
Recognition of the value as a good 
and of the sign structure as 
significant in the institution, but 
only a limited conceptualisation, 
indeed an element of resistance to 
the conceptual superstructure. 
In
te
n
ti
o
n
al
 W
o
rl
d
 
Moral and spiritual 
awareness, high personal 
standards and good manners 
are cultivated [Aims-BB] 
I think spirituality has a 
unique kind of position in 
school and I don’t think it’s 
targetable in the way that 
other things are [I-30.22] 
The Christian ethos and the 
Christian core of the school 
[15.20]; There are some 
things that go unsaid and 
don’t need to be said [18.17] 
We try to make it as all-
encompassing as we can where 
students are encouraged to 
take an active part, to convey to 
their peers that the issues are 
important to them and where 
they feel they are on their 
spiritual journey. [I-33.28] 
I think the Chapel offers that 
space and that oasis and I think 
that is recognised, particularly 
at peak times like exam times 
where they go; and then finally, 
however rich you are, however 
secular you are, you don’t 
escape those existential 
moments: a family member 
dying or a family member being 
ill or Dad’s business going 
under. [I-36.15] 
The students surveyed put the influence 
of a religious figure or deity at 8th place 
out of 10 [SA] 
It’s a quiet place to just go and think 
about things …it’s what 
Broughampton’s centred around. That 
was the start of it all, having the chapel 
there… I don’t think it is a religious 
school … Nothing’s pushed on you, it’s 
just here. There are people, voluntary 
communion people go to, but I don’t 
think it’s very strong… I think it’s a good 
opportunity for us to get to know our 
culture and stuff… I don’t think there 
are that many people who are actually 
Christians, even believe in God, I don’t 
know. When we had RS lessons not that 
many people believed in God, I’d say 1 
in 4 or something… I think it’s only there 
because [of] it being a school tradition. 
[FG-11] 
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EXTRACT FROM MATRIX OF INTERVIEW WITH HEAD OF CHELMSWOOD HIGH 
 PRINCIPLES (System axioms) PRACTICES (System responses) OUTCOMES (System products) 
System 
components 
Aspiration Cooperation Autonomy Normal 
circumstances 
Difficult 
circumstances 
Stability Achievement 
Whole school Emphasis on academic 
excellence [0317] 
[School is] a place for 
learning [0317]; 
Learning at the centre 
of everything [0317] 
 
Seeing ourselves as 
different and as special 
[3503]; Diversity in 
itself gives a certain 
identity [1912]; The 
multicultural nature of 
the school [0829] 
 
 
 
Interpreting things very 
much in our own way 
[2545]; The strength to 
say ‘No’ [3503]; [not 
promoting]religious 
views at the expense of 
more widely shared 
secular values [2338] 
 
 
we run the school in a 
way that we have 
sufficient discretion 
and flexibility to deal 
with children as 
individuals, while as a 
large organisation we 
still have to have rules 
and procedures [INT-
0317] 
*Attempt to deal with 
more serious issues 
very much within the 
community [6149] 
 
Spending a length of 
time in one place 
[0155]; Stability [0155] 
‘Success breeds 
success’ [3503]; A step-
change [3503]; Making 
a feature of pluralism 
[1912] 
 
Increasing/ed 
reputation [0155]; 
OFSTED graded as 
‘outstanding’ 
Ethos and values The tradition of the 
school itself is to 
believe in the school 
[As?] as an excellent 
school [1912] 
 
Slow and steady 
development on the 
basis of consensus 
[3503] 
Not setting things out 
explicitly [0829] 
 
we've always prided 
ourselves on the care 
and the individual 
attention we can give 
to students [INT-0317] 
Resolv[ing] conflicts 
amicably as far as 
possible rather than by 
enforcing hard power 
on people[INT-1006] 
Education of values is 
intrinsic in what we do 
[0829]; General 
underlying theme of 
values education 
throughout all our 
interactions [0700] 
Internalising ethical 
standards and moral 
values [0525] 
Behaving in a proper 
way in school and 
beyond [0525] 
Senior 
management 
Tendency to avoid big, 
overarching visions 
[6331]; Aspiration for 
academic excellence 
…at the core of 
everything [6331] 
 
Creating credibility with 
the staff [3730] 
Staff don’t feel there’s 
that distance from 
senior management 
[40.48]; [The former] 
Headmaster’s door was 
literally always open 
[40.48] 
 
Interpreting things very 
much in our own way 
[2545] 
 
Setting the tone [1516] 
Other staff seeing how 
we respond to children 
[1516]; Leaving 
deputies to deal with 
most day-to-day issues 
[1516]; Going by your 
established procedures 
[1516] 
 
 
Falling back more onto 
written policies [1516] 
Looking again [1516] 
Suddenly starting to 
talk together more 
[1516] 
 
Slow and steady 
development on the 
basis of consensus 
[3503]; Not damaging 
the well-established 
good practice that’s 
gone on [5812]; 
Managing this process 
of slow and steady 
reform rather than 
revolution [5812] 
Making the necessary 
changes to the 
curriculum that had to 
happen for various 
external reasons [5812] 
 
Staff Positive and healthy 
relationships with 
children [1006] 
Greater demand on 
teachers [1006]; 
Insisting on very high 
standards of behaviour 
[1225] 
Consensus at a senior 
staff level [1740]; we’re 
all in it together and we 
support each other and 
help each other [INT-
4048] 
 
Scope and flexibility to 
individualise [4325]; 
People’s conflicting 
needs and rights and 
interests [1006] 
 
 
Dealing with things 
without unpleasant-
ness, conflict or 
aggression [1006]; Not 
acting in an aggressive 
or hectoring manner 
with pupils [1006] 
 
Focus on where things 
have gone badly wrong 
[1006] 
 
the staff here generally 
feel looked after in a 
way that isn’t always 
the case in some of the 
schools [INT-4048] 
[A]ll staff have a part in 
the decision making 
processes of the school 
and have the 
opportunity for 
professional 
development [AE-7]. 
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EXTRACT FROM MATRIX OF OBSERVED CLASS AT CHELMSWOOD HIGH 
 
 
STRUCTURE EVENTS [Time elapsed] SYMBOLIC-DRAMATIC 
CATEGORIES 
POWER/(ACTIVITY) 
STATUS [formality of 
relationship] 
PARTICIPATION 
STAGE TOPIC 
[Cycles] 
 Introduction Pupils entering; teacher comments on noise 
[0130/0] 
Assertion of authority Empowered 
(active) 
SSi 
OUT 
questions why pupils are late/pupils 
respond[0130/0] 
Assertion of authority Disempowered 
(passive) 
TSf 
TR
A
N
SFO
R
M
IN
G
 
Explains importance of punctuality[0130/0] Teaching value 
Announces register[0130/0] Foretelling 
Introduces observer[0130/0] Outsider 
Pupil asks to open a window /request declined 
[0130/0] 
Assertion of authority/taboo 
Register called [0130/1] Ritual 
Stage 1 
 
1st cyclic 
Recap of 
previous 
lesson  
 
[11 cycles] 
Shows slide on screen [0343/2] Image 
IN 
Reviewing last lesson [0343/3] Recalling Past 
Question about the derogatory use of the term 
‘gay’ [0343/4] 
Recalling Past 
Probing whether students have changed 
practice/student shares experience [0343/4] 
Probing Empowered 
(active) 
Stage 2 
 
1st 
inter-
cyclic 
Assessment 
preparation 
Announces focus on different beliefs and 
cultures [0625/6] 
Announcement Disempowered 
(passive) 
IN 
Asks pupils to look at assessment sheets in 
books[0625/6] 
Instruction Empowered 
(passive) 
Explaining assessment levels in 
Citizenship[0625/6] 
Explanation Disempowered 
(passive) 
 
 
